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ABSTRACT 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON FIRM LEARNING AND PERFORMANCE IN THE CONTEXT 
OF CORPORATE DIVESTITURE 
Patia McGrath 
Lori Rosenkopf and Harbir Singh 
 
The question of whether and how firms learn continues to fuel debate amongst strategic 
management scholars.  Within its answer lies the potential for identifying and capitalizing upon 
valuable drivers of firm performance advantage.   In this dissertation, I take aim at this question 
by investigating the viability and efficacy of three different learning processes in the context of 
corporate divestiture.  This approach not only permits a comprehensive examination of firm 
learning, but also affords the opportunity to advance our understanding of a heretofore 
understudied, but important, mode of corporate development. 
Using a combination of publicly-available datasets and hand-collected data, I construct a 
large sample of cross-industry and cross-border divestitures originating from U.S.-headquartered 
firms during a twenty-six year period.  From this platform, I consider whether and how firms may 
learn through 1) direct experience accumulation, 2) internal experience transfer, and 3) external 
experience transfer.   In the first case, by developing six process-based performance measures that 
closely track the unfolding of the divestiture process, I find that the firm’s own divestiture 
experience acts as a double-edged sword, both augmenting and impairing different aspects of 
divestiture performance.  In the second, I consider activity-to-activity learning transfer, and 
examine if experience gained in a firm’s execution of acquisitions is transferable to its execution 
of divestitures.  Not only do I find that a firm’s learning how to acquire can directly impact its 
divestiture performance, I find that a firm’s learning how to acquire influences its ability to learn 
from its own direct divestiture experience.  In the third case, I consider experience transfer across 
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firm boundaries, specifically by examining divestiture experience sourced from the investment 
bankers and buyers engaged in the firm’s divestitures.  I find that this external experience can not 
only play an outsize role in firm divestiture performance, but that it often impedes it.  Taken 
together, these findings contribute new insights towards answering the question of whether and 
how firms learn. 
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1 DISSERTATION INTRODUCTION 
 
“An organization's ability to learn, and translate that learning into action rapidly, is the 
ultimate competitive advantage.” – Jack Welch 
 
This dissertation was motivated by my desire to help firms achieve superior divestiture 
performance, with a focus on deciphering the role that divestiture process execution may play in 
realizing performance advantage.  My interest in this topic emerged from my work experiences at 
a large multinational corporation, where I observed how taxing, dreaded, and difficult the 
divestiture process could be for organizations.  This unfavorable view of divestiture is by no 
means anomalous; divestiture’s checkered reputation and (often unfair) association with strategic 
mistakes has given rise to the widely-held perception that it is the “ugly duckling” of corporate 
development (Boot, 1992; Brauer, 2006).  In light of the fact that divestiture is a crucial strategic 
tool for firm scope change, this aversion surprised and intrigued me.  It also suggested that 
possibilities for improving divestiture execution may be going unaddressed, representing hidden 
opportunities for achieving superior divestiture performance.   
In and of itself, as an area of study, divestiture has significant scholarly and managerial 
relevance.  Divestiture has long been an inveterate part of the corporate strategy landscape, 
consistently accounting for one-third of M&A activity and representing over one trillion dollars 
in average annual deal value worldwide. Although underexamined relative to other modes of firm 
scope change, such as acquisitions and alliances (perhaps due to its managerial disfavor as well as 
several analytical challenges associated with its examination, cf. Feldman and McGrath, 2016), 
scholars have made great strides in determining the drivers of the divestiture decision – which 
includes the decision to divest (Berry, 2010; Capron et al., 2001; Duhaime and Grant, 1984; 
Montgomery and Thomas, 1988; Porter, 1976; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1991) and the choice of 
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assets for divestiture (Bergh, 1995; Chang, 1996; Chang and Singh, 1999; Kaplan and Weisbach, 
1992; Moliterno and Wiersema, 2007) -- as well as the ramifications of that decision (Colak and 
Whited, 2007; Feldman, 2014; Hite and Owers; 1983; John and Ofek, 1995; Markides, 1992).  
However, with few exceptions (e.g. Bergh and Lim, 2008, Bergh et al., 2008; Gopinath and 
Becker, 2000; Moschieri, 2011; Nees, 1981; Semadeni and Cannella, 2011), the divestiture 
process has received only limited, and typically qualitative, attention.  
In this dissertation, I examine the potential for firm learning in the divestiture process and 
investigate its viability as a source of divestiture performance heterogeneity.  The issue of 
whether and how firms learn has been a topic of vigorous discussion for decades, especially 
amongst scholars in the organizational theory (Cyert and March, 1963; Huber, 1991; Levitt and 
March, 1988) and strategic management disciplines (Grant, 1996, Kogut and Zander, 1992; Teece 
et al., 1997; Zollo and Winter, 2002).  Fueling this topic’s interest is the fact that valuable firm 
resources, from knowledge to routines to capabilities, are an outgrowth of firm learning (Argote 
and Miron-Spektor, 2011; Helfat et al., 2007; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Zollo and Winter, 2002).  
In advancing our understanding of firm learning, scholars are advancing our understanding of an 
important source of firm performance advantage.  As such, targeting learning in my effort to 
unpack how firms may achieve divestiture performance advantage is both meaningful and 
promising.    
Yet, against this backdrop of learning’s performance possibilities lie some stark realities.  
Empirical results for the most fundamental of learning processes – learning through first-hand 
experience – have been strikingly inconsistent. Positive, neutral, and even negative performance 
effects associated with experience have all been demonstrated, including in the context of scope 
change (cf. Barkema and Schijven, 2008; King et al., 2004).  Scholars have offered numerous 
reasons for these inconsistencies – inappropriate generalization, causal ambiguity, myopia, 
superstitious learning, and organizational amnesia among them – and underscored their learning 
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perils (Argote et al., 1990; Barney, 1991; Huber, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993; Levitt and 
March, 1988; Snyder and Cummings, 1998; Zollo and Winter, 2002).   Hence, for all of its 
promise, the role of learning in realizing firm performance advantage – and specifically, in this 
dissertation, divestiture performance advantage -- is decidedly unclear.   
In this dissertation, I attack the issue of whether and how firms may learn to divest by 
examining three processes: first-hand experience accumulation, internal experience transfer, and 
external experience transfer.  In so doing, I ask and answer the following three research 
questions: 
1. Whether and how firm divestiture experience impacts firm divestiture 
performance, 
2. Whether and how firm acquisition experience impacts firm divestiture 
performance, and 
3. Whether and how externally-sourced divestiture experience impacts firm 
divestiture performance.   
To do so, using a combination of data from widely-available databases and hand-
collected from corporate regulatory filings, I constructed a large sample of cross-industry and 
cross-border divestitures originating from public U.S.-headquartered firms during a twenty-six 
year period.  I analyze these data using a variety of regression estimation techniques.  Care was 
taken to account for the potential of non-random selection stemming from the firm’s decision to 
divest, as well as several additional sources of possible sample selection bias.   
In the first case, first-hand experience accumulation, I employ a quantitative process-
based view of divestiture, developing six process-based performance measures that closely track 
the unfolding of the divestiture process.  While strong links between divestiture experience and 
performance were identified, I find that the firm’s own divestiture experience acts as a double-
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edged sword, both augmenting and impairing different aspects of divestiture performance.  In the 
second, internal experience transfer, I consider activity-to-activity learning transfer, and examine 
if experience gained in a firm’s execution of acquisitions is transferable to its execution of 
divestitures.  Not only do I find that a firm’s learning how to acquire can directly impact its 
divestiture performance, I find that a firm’s learning how to acquire influences its ability to learn 
from its own direct divestiture experience.  However, I find that these transfer processes are 
curvilinear, thus fueling incongruities in their performance effects.  In the third case, external 
experience transfer, I consider experience transfer across firm boundaries, specifically by 
examining divestiture experience sourced from the investment bankers and buyers engaged in the 
firm’s divestitures.  I find that this external experience can not only play an outsize role in firm 
divestiture performance, but that it often impedes it.  Notably, while I find that the activation of 
learning transfer varies with the source of the experience, I further find that when a certain 
transfer path is present for the investment banks and the buyers, the performance-enhancing (or 
performance-impairing) effect of that external transfer on divestiture performance is the same, 
irrespective of the source and its underlying motivations.  
Taken together, the results of this dissertation contribute new insights towards answering 
the question of whether and how firms learn, revealing a complex and nuanced picture of firm 
learning in the context of corporate divestiture.  Broadly stated, yes, the results indicate that firms 
can learn to divest.  And yes, each of the three processes examined – first-hand experience 
accumulation, internal experience transfer, and external experience transfer – represent possible 
alternative paths for learning, although both transfer processes, on average, offer divestiture 
performance impact above and beyond that provided by learning-by-doing. However, in none of 
these options were the relationships consistently viable or beneficial across the set of process 
performance metrics employed.  As such, these results surfaced the presence of unavoidable 
managerial tradeoffs -- across performance variables, within the accumulation of a single type of 
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experience, and between experience variables.   Although, on an average basis, the magnitude of 
learning’s effects on divestiture performance was comparatively smaller than those of other 
controlled factors, evidence for their presence was undeniably strong.  Indisputably, these results 
are complex.  Yet, within their complexity lies their power:  they provide a sharper and more 
realistic view of firm learning than previously available, and serve as a guiding map for firms to 
identify and capitalize upon their own best opportunities for leveraging learning in achieving 
superior divestiture performance. 
The insights of this dissertation also serve to offer significant implications for several 
major areas in strategic management research, especially concerning the issues of firm scope, the 
market for corporate control, and firm capability development.  Through its deep examination of 
divestiture, as well as its investigation of divestiture’s interplay with acquisition, this dissertation 
sheds new light on value creation through scope change and underscores the importance of 
considering the combination of scope expansion and scope contraction when evaluating the 
efficacy of a firm’s boundary-changing moves.  Moreover, this dissertation advances our 
understanding of the market for corporate control, shedding light on both the characteristics and 
the operations of this market.  The “strategic corporate” firms under examination in this 
dissertation are important players in this market, participating not only as reactive sellers of 
assets, but also as proactive buyers.  Further, firms and investment bank intermediaries, 
benefitting from their divestiture experience, facilitate and optimize the functioning of the market 
for corporate control.  This dissertation additionally surfaces intriguing implications for capability 
development in firms.  The role of concurrent learning in capability development is raised to the 
fore, wherein the potential for and impact of comingling between different (here, divestiture and 
acquisition) capability-building processes is surfaced. Implications concerning the role of external 
capability sourcing in the firm’s capability development process are also brought into sharp relief.       
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2 EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING IN CORPORATE DIVESTITURE 
The link between firm experience and performance has been shown to be inconsistent in 
several corporate strategy contexts, including scope change.  While repeated experiences in a 
scope change activity position the firm to develop routines and capabilities that may then be 
applied during the next instance of the activity, learning barriers may prevent their successful 
application and thereby impair performance outcomes.  However, focusing on the activity process 
-- and the outcome measures that closely track that process -- may help disentangle the 
experience-performance puzzle.  Considering the experience-performance relationship in the 
setting of corporate divestiture, a primary yet underexamined mode of scope change, not only 
contributes to our understanding of this important corporate strategic activity but also provides 
the opportunity to quantitatively examine process outcomes in a large sample context.  Six 
divestiture process performance measures are developed and used to assess a cross-industry and 
cross-border sample of divestitures initiated by U.S.-headquartered public firms over a twenty-six 
year period.  Facilitated by its focus on the divestiture process itself, this paper reveals a strong 
but complex relationship between firm divestiture experience and process performance.  I find 
that the firm’s own divestiture experience acts as a double-edged sword, both augmenting and 
impairing different aspects of divestiture performance. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
A fundamental focus of the strategy field is to decipher the drivers of superior, persistent 
firm performance.  Organizational learning (Huber, 1991; Levitt and March, 1988) has emerged 
as being a powerful source of firm performance heterogeneity, and scholars have made great 
strides in strengthening our understanding of how firms may learn from their experience to 
develop and deploy the routines and capabilities needed to foster profitable growth (Barney, 
1991; Helfat et al., 2007; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Prahalad and 
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Hamel, 1990; Zollo and Winter, 2002).  One robust area of work has examined the relationship 
between firm experience and performance in the context of firm scope change, and particularly 
the role that experience may play in expanding firm scope through such mechanisms as 
acquisition, internationalization, and alliance formation (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Hayward, 
2002; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Kale and Singh, 2007; Nadolska and Barkema, 2007; 
Sarkar et al., 2009; Zollo and Singh, 2004).  Intriguingly, the link between firm experience and 
performance has proven to be stubbornly inconsistent, making it challenging for firms to translate 
their experiences into performance gains. 
This paper aims to help disentangle the experience-performance puzzle by investigating 
their relationship in a comparatively understudied but important context, corporate divestiture, 
which is a primary mode of firm scope reduction.  Furthermore, this research examines the 
interplay between firm experience and performance at the process level of analysis as a means to 
potentially uncover new insights that are not visible at higher levels of analysis.  Stated simply, 
this paper focuses on the divestiture process, and examines whether and how firm divesture 
experience may be related to its divestiture process performance.   
In order to capture the richness of the divestiture process and fully explore its potential as 
a platform for performance heterogeneity, six outcome measures were developed and applied to a 
large sample of cross-industry and cross-border divestitures announced by public, U.S.-
headquartered firms over a twenty-six year period.  In considering the divestiture experience-
performance link at the process level in a quantitative, large sample way, this paper is able to 
contribute on several fronts.  For one, this research advances our understanding about corporate 
divestiture.  Notably, by identifying key factors in the divestiture process and by providing 
measures to assess its performance, this research helps to open the “black box” of the divestiture 
process.  For another, by examining the role of experience in this important but understudied 
strategic process of firm scope reduction, this paper contributes to both the corporate strategy and 
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organizational learning literatures.  Lastly, by focusing on the divestiture process itself, this 
research is able to offer new insights into the relationship between firm experience and 
performance in the crucial arena of corporate scope.   
2.2 THEORY & HYPOTHESES 
2.2.1 The (potential) relationship between experience and performance 
The concept of learning-by-doing, or experiential learning, is a cornerstone of the 
organizational learning literature (Cyert and March, 1963; Huber, 1991; Levitt and March, 1988).  
The premise is simple:  the firm learns as it gains experience by repeatedly performing a 
particular activity.  Each time it performs the activity, the firm receives performance feedback.  It 
can subsequently adjust its actions according to this feedback and relative to its aspirations, and 
thereby attempt to improve its performance.  As the firm accumulates experience through 
repetition of the activity, it can incrementally progress along its learning curve (Dutton and 
Thomas, 1984; Yelle, 1979).  Intention is not a precondition for learning; rather than being the 
objective of the activity, learning may in fact be an unexpected dividend earned from a firm’s 
experience investment.  
The transformation of the firm’s accumulated experiences into performance benefits is 
catalyzed by the firm’s development of routines and capabilities.  Routines are action patterns 
that arise to address the repetitive, predictable tasks posed by the regular requirements of stable 
operating environment of the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1995, 2003).   Like a 
dependable engine, routines offer firms speed and efficiency performance gains in their 
operational activities.  Routines evolve slowly, and often passively in a context-specific manner 
(Cohen et al., 1996; Nelson and Winter, 1982).   To address the challenges posed by the rapidly 
changing demands of their internal and external environments, firms can hone capabilities.  To 
develop them, firms deliberately articulate and codify the knowledge gleaned from their 
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experiences.  As such, they are not costless to build, but they offer firms the advantage of being 
able to reconfigure and modify their existing routines and resources -- as well as create new ones 
-- thereby offering the firm new paths and opportunities to navigate their dynamic environments 
and achieve sustained competitive advantage (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Helfat, 
1997; Helfat et al., 2007; Zollo and Winter, 2002). 
The beneficial link between accumulated experience and performance was first 
powerfully demonstrated empirically in manufacturing settings (e.g. Argote, 1999; Argote and 
Epple, 1990), wherein the unit cost of production declined as a function of cumulative output.  In 
the time hence, researchers have explored the relationship between experience and performance 
in numerous, and decidedly dynamic and complex, activity domains, including in the important 
strategic arena of scope change.  Here, there has been particular attention paid to considering how 
experience may lead to performance gains in scope expansion activities involving acquisitions, 
internationalization, and alliances (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Barkema et al,. 1996; Delios and 
Henisz, 2003; Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Hayward, 2002; Zollo et al., 2002; Zollo and 
Singh, 2004).  However, in shifting the research lens from the operational manufacturing tasks to 
complex and variegated strategic activities, findings concerning the purported link between firm 
experience and performance became strikingly inconsistent (cf. Barkema and Schijven, 2008; 
King et al., 2004).  Indeed, in studying firms’ scope changing activities, researchers have a clear 
vantage point from which to identify challenges to firm’ learning and benefiting from their 
experiences. 
Broadly classified, these learning challenges originate from three areas.  First, hurdles to 
learning may be posed by the nature of the activity itself.  The more the activity rests on tacit 
knowledge, and the more complex the activity, the more onerous learning becomes.  Firms may 
be required to make significant, deliberate efforts to learning from their experiences in these types 
of activities – and firms may be unwilling to make these expensive investments.  Second, learning 
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challenges may stem from the learning context.  The less frequently the activity is performed, the 
fewer the learning opportunities.  Should the activities occur in interspersed bursts of activity, 
rather than in a regular and steady way, the firm will not be able to make best use of the outcome 
feedback that it is receiving.  Ideally, the experiences should occur in a measured, step-by-step 
fashion, with sufficient time between each step for the firm to revise and build its knowledge base 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Laamanen and Keil; 2008).  Further, the less similar the firm’s past 
experience is to the activity at hand – be it in terms of its process, location of implementation, or 
even industry setting -- the less applicable and beneficial the prior experience will be (Barkema et 
al., 1996; Ellis et al., 2011; Hayward, 2002; Nadolska and Barkema, 2007; Zollo and Reuer, 
2010).  Third, the firm itself may, in fact, be responsible for its own difficulties in translating its 
experience to performance gains.   Indeed, the firm’s own experience can hurt it (Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Huber, 1991; Levinthal and March, 1993; Levitt and March, 1988).  Firms may 
inappropriately generalize from its past experience, and this may cause firms to misapply their 
past experiences to the focal activity (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Gavetti et al., 2005).  
Causal ambiguity can plague the firm internally, wherein it is unable to identify the aspects of its 
experience that are driving performance gains, and therefore may fail when it attempts to reapply 
its experience elsewhere (Barney, 1991; Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; Peteraf, 1993). Given the 
relative complexity and intermittency of scope changing activities, firms are especially vulnerable 
to superstitious learning, wherein firms “don’t really know what they think they know” (Levitt 
and March, 1988; Zollo, 2009) and have misunderstood the relationship between action and 
outcome.  
 This paper shifts attention from the context of scope expansion to that of scope reduction 
and the process of corporate divestiture in order to investigate the potential relationship between 
firm experience and performance.  Focusing directly on process, in this under-researched but 
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critical setting, can serve to help reveal new insights about the potential relationship between firm 
experience and performance.    
2.2.2 The corporate divestiture context 
Few topics are as central to strategic management research as firm scope.  In the decades 
since the foundational works of Penrose (1959), Chandler (1962) and Rumelt (1974), scholarly 
interest in firm boundary decisions and the means by which firms engage in their boundary-
changing moves has remained consistently strong.  The extant literature has placed particular 
focus on investigating scope expansion and the acquisitions, alliances, and joint ventures used by 
firms to achieve it (e.g. Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale and Singh, 2007; Nadolska and Barkema, 
2007; Puranam et al., 2006; Sarkar et al., 2009; Zollo and Singh 2004).  Although understudied in 
comparison, scope reduction is a similarly crucial aspect of firms’ boundary decisions.  Corporate 
divestiture is a primary mode of this type of scope change.     
Corporate divestiture is defined as the disposal of assets by a firm, which may be 
achieved through a variety of market mechanisms, such as sell-off, spin-off or leveraged buyout 
(Reed and Lajoux, 1998).  In this research, the assets of focus are business units, which are 
economically distinct business areas of the parent company.  Business units are typically defined 
in terms of the product markets or geographic regions in which parent competes (Hill and Jones, 
1995).  For a transaction to qualify as a divestiture, the parent must lose majority control of the 
unit as a condition of the sale. 
The prevalence and relevance of divestiture as a tool for scope change is captured by 
Figure 1, which depicts an upward trajectory in its use by firms.  In the last ten years alone, there 
has been a twenty-five percent increase in divestiture volume globally, with over fourteen 
thousand divestitures announced in 2015 reflecting over $1.4 trillion in deal value.  Moreover, as 
shown in Figure 2, divestitures account for approximately one-third of M&A volume overall.  
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Further, when compared with mergers and acquisitions, divestitures have been found to create 
more value for the firm on average in both the short- and the long-terms (cf. Bergh et al., 2008; 
Comment and Jarrell, 1995; Feldman, 2015; Houston et al., 2001; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992; 
Lee and Madhavan, 2010).  While these statistics make the relative paucity of divestiture research 
even more surprising, they also serve to evidence the importance and potential of divestiture 
research.   
To date, extant strategic management research on divestiture has primarily emphasized 
the firm’s decision to divest, which includes the drivers of the divestiture decision, as well as the 
choice of business unit selected for divestiture.  First, there are a number of factors that may 
influence a firm’s decision to divest.  Poor performance of the parent firm or the target business 
unit is a commonly cited divestiture driver (Duhaime and Grant, 1984; Montgomery and Thomas, 
1988; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1991). In some cases, this poor performance is connected to a 
lackluster acquisition, and the divestiture serves as tangible evidence of the acquisition’s 
disappointment (Bergh, 1997; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992; Porter, 1976).  Strategic rationales 
often underpin divestiture, wherein firms divest in an aim to refocus the business or to shed non-
core assets (Chang and Singh, 1999; Markides, 1992; Montgomery et al., 1984).  Further, a firm 
may decide that its assets could be put to higher value or more efficient use elsewhere (Berry, 
2010; Kaul, 2012; Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988), and the divestiture would consequently 
liberate precious managerial and operational resources for application to other, more attractive 
opportunities within the firm.  Similarly, a firm may divest assets simply to finance other growth 
opportunities it deems more beneficial.  In response to the stock analyst community and financial 
markets, firms may divest with the objective of presenting the firm in a simplified and more 
easily analyzed manner (Feldman, 2015; Zuckerman, 2000).   Regulatory bodies, such as the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ), may mandate divestitures to 
preserve competition, typically upon a merger or acquisition announcement.  To preempt such 
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required involuntary divestitures, firms may opt to proactively shed assets while they are 
engaging in an acquisition or merger, in an effort to build their case for regulatory approval of the 
transaction.  Activist investors may also spur firm divestment (Goranova and Ryan, 2014).   
Second, another key part of the decision to divest is the choice of unit to be divested.  
Poorly performing units are likely targets for divestiture, with lower profitability and lower 
market share increasing the likelihood of a unit’s being jettisoned (Duhaime and Grant 1984, 
Ravenscraft and Scherer 1991).  Depending on the context, such as ownership concentration in 
the parent, smaller or larger units may be more likely selected for divestiture (Bergh 1995, Chang 
1996, Duhaime and Baird 1987).  The unit’s origins and age are also influencers, with acquired 
units being particularly susceptible to divestiture (Chang and Singh 1999, Karim and Mitchell 
2004, Ravenscraft and Scherer 1991).  The relatedness of the business unit to the parent is another 
factor, with unrelatedness being a predictor of divestment (Bergh 1995, Chang 1996).        
As part of this research on the decision to divest, researchers have correspondingly 
considered the performance implications of the divestiture decision.  Given the high hurdles to 
measuring unit performance (of which many stem from the scant regulatory reporting 
requirements for business units), prior divestiture research has typically examined the financial 
performance, using market- or accounting-based measures, of the parent firm (Bowman et al., 
1999; Brauer, 2006).  Consideration of the divestiture process, along with its performance 
ramifications, has been limited.  As a result, the divestiture process has largely remained as a 
“black box” to scholars and researchers alike. By taking a close look at the divestiture process, 
there is a rich opportunity to not only shed more light on an important mode of scope change, but 
also to reveal new insights about the relationship between firm experience and performance.  
  14 
 
2.2.3 The corporate divestiture process 
The corporate divestiture process is complex and challenging, involving many activities, 
decisions, and stakeholders (cf. Gole and Hilger, 2008). It begins with the firm’s announcement 
of its intention to divest a particular unit, and ends upon the completion of the divestiture (or with 
its early termination).  Broadly described, there are two main parts to the divestiture process: the 
execution of the divestiture transaction or “deal”, and the separation of the target unit from the 
parent.  These parts occur largely in parallel and influence one another, which means that they 
must be considered by the firm concurrently.  Moreover, all transaction and separation activities 
must be fully finished for the divestiture to reach completion.  
The divestiture transaction encompasses the carrying out of the deal “mechanics.”  This 
includes the structuring of the deal, such as whether the unit will be sold off or spun off (Bergh 
and Lim, 2008).  Another important activity is determining whether, in the case of a sell off, if the 
sale will be conducted through an auction or negotiated through a private sale (Boone and 
Mulherin, 2007). Both options require a selling process, which typically involves the likes of 
marketing efforts, soliciting letters of interest, management presentations, establishing “data 
rooms” for unit due diligence efforts, and hosting shortlisted buyers.  The parent firm must also 
engage in a thorough process of cost quantification, wherein it determines the one-time and 
ongoing costs associated with the divestiture.  This is far from easy, as interdependencies between 
the unit and parent, or connections between the unit and external parties may be tacit and thus 
challenging to identify, let alone quantify. Crucially, these activities and their decisions are often 
fluid – the decision to spin or sell, for example, can change as the divestiture process unfolds and 
the firm better understands the market’s appetite for a particular structure and can better estimate 
the likely gains (or losses) associated with each option.     
The separation of the unit from the parent, aptly described as disentanglement or dis-
integration, is the other major area of activity in the divestiture process (Harrigan, 1981).  A key 
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step to separation is defining the boundaries of the unit that is to be divested, and determining the 
resources that will go with the unit and those that will stay with the parent firm.  Such 
“ringfencing” can be a contentious process, both politically internally and strategically, since the 
seller needs to provide enough quality assets to make the unit attractive to many buyers (in hopes 
competition will boost sale price), but yet the seller might be reluctant to include the “jewels” 
from which it could still benefit. Moreover, separation impacts the firm as a whole, with the 
impact reverberating more widely with more and deeper parent-unit interdependences that arise 
from integration.   Each interdependency represents routines and process that will be disrupted 
and changed (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Puranam et al., 2006).  Furthermore, these 
interdependencies may flow in both directions (Burgelman, 1996).  The parent firm may depend 
on the unit, such as for the supply of a critical component or for its contributions to co-
development or co-branding efforts with other units.  The unit may also depend on the parent, 
such as for the use of IT platforms, HR processes, and external sourcing arrangements, or for 
access to IP, customer lists, or manufacturing capacity.  Accordingly, a key part of the separation 
is identifying these links and determining how each entity will proceed once they are severed.  
This can be notoriously challenging; these parent-unit links may be undocumented or unknown, 
having developed tacitly over decades of deepening integration (Feldman, 2014). It is not 
uncommon for a selling parent to negotiate Transaction Service Agreements (TSAs) with the 
buyer, wherein the seller agrees to provide the critical resources the unit needs for a specified 
period, which could range from weeks to years.  These agreements are also designed to facilitate 
the unit’s (and thus the new parent’s) providing the selling parent with appointed resources. Thus, 
the separation that is inherent to the divestiture process involves both implementing 
disconnections and building reconnections between the unit and the parent (Feldman, 2015; 
Semadeni and Canella, 2011).    
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Numerous stakeholders are involved in the divestiture process.  The divestiture 
transaction is typically limited to executives from corporate headquarters (especially those from 
Finance and Business Development) and sometimes leadership from the target unit (it is not 
uncommon for the latter to be excluded, given that their incentives and feelings about the 
transaction likely diverge from those of Corporate, cf. Bagwell and Zechner, 1993; Nees, 1981).  
In sharp contrast, employees in the wider organization often become deeply involved in the 
separation of the unit from the parent, representing the functions (e.g. Marketing, Accounting, IT, 
R&D, HR, Legal, Sales) as well as business operations (from the target unit and the other 
impacted units).  External stakeholders, such as suppliers, customers, labor unions, regulators, 
and politicians from the unit’s community, all have vested interests in the outcome of the 
divestiture process and may actively aim to shape it.   Investor blockholders, for example, have 
been shown to be influential in determining which assets are included in the divestiture and how 
the deal is structured (Bergh and Sharp, 2015; Hoskisson et al., 1994).  For all of these 
stakeholders, the divestiture process presents significant change and ambiguity.  Learning how to 
manage this uncertainty effectively can greatly impact the performance of the divestiture process.  
Actively rejecting the reputational stigma of failure or strategic mistake that are often associated 
with divestiture (Boot, 1992; Hayward and Shimizu, 2006), and replacing it instead with a sense 
of opportunity for the future for the employees of the target and the remaining units is one 
alternative (Moschieri, 2011).  Transparent and frequent communications throughout the unit and 
parent firm are another, which can serve to preserve morale and productivity (Gopinath and 
Becker, 2000). Unfortunately, firms often opt for secrecy during the divestiture process, which 
has been demonstrated to impair divestiture performance (Nees, 1981). Including and 
collaborating the target unit managers in the divestiture process from its outset can not only help 
to align incentives, but it can greatly facilitate separation since the unit managers likely have the 
best knowledge of interdependencies and their ramifications.  Thus, there are many areas and 
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activities that pose opportunities – both operational and managerial – for firms to gain experience 
and master in order to potentially enhance its divestiture process performance.        
The richness and complexity of the divestiture process makes it particularly challenging 
to study in a large-sample manner.  Studies to date have been qualitative, examining divestitures 
across a handful of cases or within a single firm.  In these studies, divestiture process 
performance outcomes, when considered, was frequently assessed qualitatively.  For example, 
Gopinath and Becker (2000) evaluated employee trust, commitment, and their perceptions of 
procedural justice about the divestiture. Moschieri (2001) considered employees’ sense of 
opportunity during the divestiture process.  Corley and Gioia (2004) assessed the identity tensions 
and change overload which emerged among employees during the process.  While these 
approaches do shed important light on the divestiture process, much still remains to be measured 
and learned.  This paper uses six outcome measures – which are directed squarely at the 
divestiture process – and further applies them in a large sample setting. 
2.2.4 Hypotheses 
2.2.4.1 Completion 
Completion is a fundamental measure of process performance.  It is a comprehensive 
measure, as completion captures the collective performance of all intermediary process activities, 
yet its binary simplicity makes its outcome easy to assess and communicate.  Completion has 
served as an important outcome measure throughout the strategy literature, for processes as varied 
as acquisitions, new product launches, initial public offerings, and CEO succession (Dikova et al., 
2010; Muehlfeld et al., 2012).  In corporate strategy, failed processes (or, even more specifically, 
failed deals) involve significant financial, operational, and reputational costs.  As a result, once 
firms announce their intentions to engage in such strategic processes, the common goal is to 
complete them.   
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The impetus for process completion is especially salient in divestiture for selling firms.  
Incomplete divestitures may result from situations such as the parent withdrawing the unit from 
sale due to a lack of interested buyers, or the parent and acquirer failing to agree to final terms.  
Divestitures that fail to complete are disastrous scenarios for the parent firm, since the units gain 
“damaged goods” or “passed over” reputations, making subsequent attempts at their divestiture 
difficult.  In order to make another attempt at the unit’s sale, the parent firm may now have to 
invest in the unit to improve its prospects.  Further, the parent’s bargaining position with potential 
buyers in subsequent negotiations is weakened, not only from the initial failure and the loss of a 
prospective buyer, but also from a reduction in information asymmetry since due diligence 
information about the unit from the prior sale process may have diffused.  Should the divestiture’s 
failure to complete be interpreted by outsiders as being due to the selling parent’s making onerous 
deal demands or being a difficult partner, the number of interested buyers and their willingness to 
pay may be reduced – for the divestiture at hand and for future divestitures.  Taken together, it is 
clear why divestiture completion is viewed in the trade as an essential divestiture process 
performance objective (cf. Gole and Hilger, 2008; Kelly, 2002; Smith, 2012).      
Interestingly, the use of completion as a process outcome measure highlights a key 
difference between divestiture and acquisition while reinforcing the relevance of completion as a 
divestiture process performance metric.  In acquisition, the deal completion precedes the 
complex, challenging work of post-acquisition integration.  Post-deal integration involves the 
wider organization, beyond the senior leaders and business development executives who were 
involved in executing the mechanics of the transaction.  Post-deal integration can be a very taxing 
time for the firm, and it is where the promised synergies are realized or value is destroyed.  In 
contrast, in divestiture, the burdens of the dis-integration, or separation, of the unit from the 
parent must occur before the deal is complete.  Unit disentanglement unavoidably disrupts firm 
routines, and requires extensive managerial attention.  It typically impacts all functions of the 
  19 
 
organization, from IT to HR to Marketing, in addition to the business operations that have 
interdependencies with the unit. As such, separation is an exacting and expensive process that 
must conclude before the divestiture completes.  In this regard, the cost of deal failure is much 
higher in divestiture than in acquisition, and completion as a performance measure is especially 
meaningful for the divestiture process. 
Firm divestiture experience connects to completion performance in two important ways.  
First, more experienced firms should be better able to successfully navigate the divestiture 
process to drive deal completion.  Second, more experienced firms are better positioned to 
recognize the potential severity of the deleterious effects of divestitures that fail to complete, 
thereby further fueling the drive towards completion.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Firm divestiture experience is positively associated with divestiture 
completion. 
2.2.4.2 Duration  
The duration of the process, or the time elapsed from its start to its completion, is another 
important process performance measure.  The longer the process takes, the longer that managerial 
and other firm resources are committed to the process and unavailable for other value-generating 
opportunities.  Moreover, longer processes are more susceptible to losses and overruns than 
shorter ones, since employee turnover and forecasting challenges arise as material and potentially 
damaging issues to the process over time (Ethiraj et al., 2005).  Duration is seen as a key process 
characteristic throughout the strategic management literature, in such contexts as project 
management, organizational change, technology development, and M&A (Ethiraj et al., 2005; 
Homburg and Bucerius, 2006; Luypaert and De Maeseneire, 2015; McCrostle et al., 2015).   
Duration is similarly salient for the divestiture process.  Given the complexities of 
divestiture, especially those associated with separating the unit from the parent firm, process 
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duration can be quite lengthy.  In the cases studied by Nees (1981), divestiture durations ranged 
from twenty months to several years, although divestitures may be more typically expected to last 
on the order of several months to a year (Baer, 1999).   In divestiture, the deal process places the 
selling firm into a “holding pattern,” in which it is unable to move forward with its strategic plans 
until the divestiture is complete.  This limbo-like period also creates uncertainty for internal 
stakeholders (e.g. employees, executive talent) and external stakeholders (e.g. customers, 
suppliers, investors), which can negatively impact firm operations and performance.   For 
example, employees in the unit, fearing for their jobs post-completion, may opt to preempt 
layoffs by searching for a new job outside of the firm.  A critical supplier for the unit may be 
unwilling to renew a contract with the selling parent since the future owner may try to change its 
terms.  A key customer may be wooed away by competitors who are taking advantage of the 
uncertainty generated by the divestiture.   Moreover, the longer the divestiture drags on, the more 
likely it is that the competitive value of the business unit’s assets will diminish (Baer, 1999).  
There are several other factors that serve to make duration an especially suitable 
performance measure for divestiture.  For one, unlike acquisition, divestiture frees up managerial 
resources (Vidal and Mitchell, 2015) to pursue other, higher-value activities.  The sooner the 
divestiture process completes, the sooner these liberated resources will be available to the firm.  
For another, divestitures are often associated with strategic mistakes, so CEOs may be motivated 
to complete them quickly (Dranikoff et al., 2002; Hayward and Shimizu, 2006).  Furthermore, the 
divestiture process offers the opportunity for potential acquirers to conduct due diligence about 
the target unit.  The more time that the interested buyer has to “look under the hood,” the more 
opportunity there is for the buyer to identify concerns that could derail the deal or necessitate its 
renegotiation.   
 Taken together, these issues encourage firms to aim to complete divestitures as quickly 
as possible.  Indeed, shorter divestiture transactions are viewed as better by industry practitioners 
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and experts (cf. Clark et al. 2013, Gole and Hilger, 2008; Ross et al., 2012).  With more 
divestiture experience, firms will be better equipped to identify shortcuts and avoid time sinks as 
the process unfolds, expediting the divestiture process accordingly.  As a performance outcome, 
the degree of divestiture duration performance should be interpreted as being measured on a 
reverse scale, with shorter divesture durations reflecting better performance outcomes.  With that 
approach in mind, these factors lead to the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 2:  Firm divestiture experience is positively associated with divestiture 
duration.  
2.2.4.3 Financial gain on sale 
Financially-based performance is also a key process outcome in strategic management, 
although it is not always easy to measure.  While metrics like process revenues and profitability 
are natural candidates, it can sometimes be challenging to obtain these results for processes that 
have an indirect impact on the bottom line, such as employee corporate training initiatives, 
corporate branding campaigns, and R&D.  In other cases, even though the process-specific 
financials may be available, it can be difficult to translate them to firm financial impact, due to 
factors like corporate overhead costs (Ethiraj et al., 2005).  As a result, the ways in which process 
financial performance may be meaningfully assessed varies widely throughout the strategic 
management literature, and may be specific to the process of interest.   
In the case of corporate transactions like divestitures and acquisitions, understanding how 
much money the firm made on the deal is valuable, and it tracks directly to the firm’s execution 
of the process.  In acquisitions of public firms, the bid price may be translated into a share 
premium since the target firm has been valued by the financial market.  Although such a 
valuation is not available for divestitures, the financial gain on sale provides a reasonable 
alternative (Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992).  In divestiture, the financial gain (or loss) on sale is an 
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audited number that the firm includes in its regulatory filings. Gain on sale reflects the difference 
between the unit’s sale price and its fair market value.  Thus, gain on sale represents the price 
premium associated with the divestiture. The higher the premium, the more value that the firm 
was able to capture throughout the divestiture process and the better that the firm was able to 
preserve (or even augment) the value of the unit during the process.  Accordingly, gain on sale is 
a process-level outcome financial performance measure, not a firm-level one.   
 With more divestiture experience, firms have more opportunities to learn how to 
maximize their returns on divestiture.  In so doing, firms may hone capabilities for such activities 
as negotiating the transaction terms, identifying and pursuing potential acquirers that would value 
the unit most highly, and managing the transparency and type of information disclosed during due 
diligence.  More divestiture experience should benefit the firm’s performance of these activities, 
which leads to the following hypothesis:      
Hypothesis 3: Firm divestiture experience is positively associated with the financial gain 
on sale pertaining to the divestiture. 
2.2.4.4 Announcement date-based CAR 
A firm’s cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around an event date of interest is a 
commonly used market-based performance measure in the corporate strategy context (Alexander 
et al., 1984; Brauer, 2006; Feldman et al., 2014; Jain, 1985; MacKinlay, 1997).  As an outcome 
descriptor, CAR has several appealing features.  First, it is immediate.  Many operational and 
financial indicators of performance, such as market share changes, profitability, and return on 
invested capital, are lagging indicators.  Several quarters or even several years may need to pass 
before the impact of the action or event will be detectable in the firm’s results.  CAR, on the other 
hand, is nearly instantaneously available, as it requires only the firm’s security prices within the 
event window in conjunction with the firm’s previous returns and market returns.  Second, CAR 
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is a financial measure.  It can be challenging to monetarily quantify the impact of a firm’s 
particular strategic action.  CAR provides a readily accessible measure of an action’s economic 
impact on the firm through the corresponding change in the firm’s market value.  Third, CAR is 
market-based.  Here, the benefit is rooted in the idea that the rationality of the market will provide 
an arm’s length assessment of the firm’s action. 
Cumulative abnormal returns are especially well suited for characterizing firm process 
performance since they may be determined at numerous junctures along the process trajectory.  
For example, in the case of the new product development process, the market’s reaction to the 
firm’s announcement of its plan to develop the new product, to the firm’s unveiling of the 
prototype, to the product’s regulatory approval, and to product launch could each be measured 
(Sood and Tellis, 2009; Sorescu et al., 2007).  The CAR measurements provide a real-time 
market evaluation of how well the firm has been executing the different stages of the process. 
Regarding the divestiture process, the firm’s announcement of its intent to divest a 
business unit is a major event.  The announcement date marks the start of the divestiture process, 
after which the selling firm begins to disentangle and separate the unit from its operations.  The 
firm’s actions at the start of the process help determine how well it is positioned to execute those 
that remain.  These initial, stage-setting activities could include the likes of the disclosure of a 
targeted sale price, the engagement of outside experts (e.g. investment banks, consulting firms), 
communication initiatives about the divestiture to stakeholders, and unit “ringfencing” (i.e. 
delineating which assets and resources will be included in the sale).  The importance of 
announcement date is considerable in the divestiture process – since the costs of terminating a 
divestiture are substantive for the firm, the announcement signals the firm’s genuine commitment 
to the divestiture.  Consequences to reversal of other corporate strategic intentions, such as plans 
to engage in an alliance or merger, are not as severe as in the divestiture case, and thus the firm’s 
commitment to the process at the time of announcement may be weaker in those cases versus that 
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of divestiture.  Announcement date is such a significant event in the divestiture process (and with 
data that are readily available for public firms) that announcement date-based CAR has been a 
dominant measure of divestiture performance in the strategy literature to date (Bergh et al., 2008; 
Colak and Whited, 2007; Comment and Jarell, 1995; Feldman, 2015; Hite and Owers, 1983, John 
and Ofek, 1995).  
Announcement date-based CAR therefore captures the market’s assessment of how well 
the firm has initiated the divestiture process, as well as the market’s expectation as to how well 
the divestiture process will unfold.  With more divestiture experience, firms have more 
opportunities to learn how to “kick-off” the divestiture process effectively and set the stage for 
ensuring process success. Further, with the firm’s having engaged in more divestitures, the 
markets have had more chances to observe the firm during the divestiture process.  
Announcement-date CAR will thus reflect the market’s expectations given its assessment of the 
firm’s past divestiture experience.  These factors lead to the following hypothesis:           
Hypothesis 4: Firm divestiture experience is positively associated with divestiture 
announcement date-based cumulative abnormal return. 
2.2.4.5 Effective date-based CAR  
The effective date of the divestiture – the date on which the divestiture is legally recorded 
as being complete – is another critical event in the divestiture process (Hite and Owers, 1983; 
Vijh, 1994).  As announcement date marks the start of the divestiture process, effective date 
marks its end.  Examining the firm’s cumulative abnormal return around the effective date of the 
process is especially meaningful for divestiture, since the unit must be fully separated from the 
selling parent firm upon effective date.  Thus, the activities of the divestiture process are finished 
and final.   
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This sharp clarity around process completion surfaces an important distinction between 
the acquisition and divestiture processes, which in turn underscores the appropriateness of using 
effective date-based CAR as a divestiture process characteristic.  The effective date of an 
acquisition reflects only the closure of the financial transaction.  It is the point where the firm’s 
CEO, CFO, and corporate development executives pass the baton to the operational leaders in the 
company, who must then begin the heavy lifting of post-acquisition integration.  As such, the 
primary opportunities for value capture (and loss) in acquisition occur after effective date, 
whereas in divestiture they arise beforehand.  Thus, effective date-based CAR captures the 
market’s assessment of how well the firm executed – and realized the value creation opportunities 
presented by -- the divestiture process in its entirety.  CAR based on divestiture effective date is 
therefore another useful measure of market-based divestiture process performance that 
complements, but is distinct from, CAR based on divestiture announcement date.  Prior 
divestiture experience will alert firms to the possible sources and sinks of value generation that 
may emerge throughout the divestiture process, and additionally prepare firms to address them.  
Hence, firms with more divestiture experience should execute the divestiture process more 
successfully, which the financial markets will accordingly recognize and reward.  This reasoning 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Firm divestiture experience is positively associated with divestiture 
effective date-based cumulative abnormal return. 
2.2.4.6 Withdrawn date-based CAR  
The termination of a divestiture process that was underway is a significant, albeit 
unwelcome, event in the divestiture process.  It is formally recorded as the “withdrawn date,” and 
could be precipitated by a number of causes. For example, the selling firm may cease its search 
for a buyer, contentious negotiations may cause the firm to remove the unit from the market, or 
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an intended acquirer may reconsider and bow out of the purchase.  Irrespective of the reason, 
divestiture withdrawal typically incurs notable costs for the selling firm.  Unit-parent separation is 
disruptive and taxing, and is often initiated upon the parent’s decision to divest.  Early 
termination thus implies that not only were resources expended in the separation procedures, but 
the suspended separation also means that the parent firm must now “reattach” its severed 
operations with the unit or devise ways to function with partially detached operations until the 
next attempt at divestiture.  Additionally, the divestiture process impacts stakeholders, both inside 
and outside of the firm.  The withdrawal of the divestiture does not necessarily mean that the 
uncertainty it created for stakeholders will dissipate.  Employees (both in the target unit and in the 
rest of the firm) may feel that another attempt at divestiture is imminent and look for more stable 
opportunities elsewhere.  Stakeholders like suppliers and alliance partners may feel similarly, and 
adjust their dealings with the firm accordingly.  In this regard, it is important to emphasize that 
the meaningfulness of withdrawal date is heightened for the divestiture process, beyond what is 
expected for the effective dates of other corporate strategic actions.  In acquisitions, firms can 
more readily “test the waters” and pull out of a deal, since firm operations are not impacted until 
after the acquisition closes.  Overall, withdrawal is far from costless for the firm, and the firm’s 
CAR around the withdrawal date is a powerful way of assessing its financial impact on the firm 
(Hite et al., 1987; Lee, 1992; Luo, 2005).  
Given these consequences, more experienced firms are expected to avoid deal 
withdrawal, which is essentially a failed divestiture process.  The financial markets are not 
expecting an experienced firm to err in the process and withdraw, and thus will likewise respond 
more negatively to withdrawals by experienced firms.  Further, the process problems that led to 
withdrawal may be more catastrophic for experienced firms, whose learning biases will more 
entrenched than in firms with less experience (Levinthal and March, 1993; Levitt and March, 
1988).  The withdrawn date-based CAR will capture the severity of the disconnect between the 
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divestiture process performance that the market expected of an experienced firm and their actual 
performance.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: Firm divestiture experience is negatively associated with divestiture 
withdrawn date-based cumulative abnormal return. 
2.3 METHODOLOGY 
2.3.1 Data & Sample 
This paper uses a cross-industry sample of divestitures announced by publicly-traded, 
U.S.-headquartered parent firms from 1985 to 2010.  By definition, all divestitures represent a 
loss of majority control in the target unit.  The business units involved in these divestiture 
transactions are not subject to any geographic constraints; this sample therefore includes cross-
border transactions.  Divestitures were identified using the Thomson ONE M&A database, which 
also provided divestiture transaction characteristics.  The first year of divestiture data availability 
is 1985.  The year 2010 was selected as the endpoint of the sample to ensure that the divestitures 
announced in 2010 had sufficient time to complete in the remaining years hence.  An important 
advantage of this cross-industry and cross-border sample is its inherent generalizability.  
Moreover, the long timespan covered by the data sample further assists with generalizability, as 
there may be macroeconomic or other environmental factors that impact firms’ propensity to 
divest during a particular time period.   
Since permanent firm identifiers for tracking parent firms are not available in the 
Thomson M&A database, the historical cusip data from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) was used in conjunction with the most recent parent firm cusips from Thomson 
M&A to assign consistent firm identifiers in the divestiture transaction data.  This also facilitated 
the connection between the transaction-level data and the firm-level data in Compustat.  
Compustat was a key source of firm financial and other corporate data.  CRSP also provided 
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parent firm stock return data.  Additional firm and divestiture transaction data was further hand-
collected from regulatory filings, including the 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K reports.   
The Divestiture Experience variable (described subsequently in the “Independent 
Variables” section) was constructed using the entire universe of 45,979 divestitures.  These 
divestiture transactions were associated with 10,552 unique parent firms.  Firm-level control 
variables were available for approximately forty thousand divestitures; their identification 
required establishing reliable connections across the three databases.  The divestiture deal price 
was available for 46% of divestitures, further reducing the sample by approximately twenty-four 
thousand observations.1     For one of the dependent variables, the Gain-to-Assets ratio (described 
in the “Dependent Variables” section), gain on sale data were hand-collected for the over eight 
hundred transactions in 2005 for which a deal price was available.        
2.3.2 Variables 
This research is focused on the divestiture process, and how firm divestiture experience 
may be related to divestiture process performance.  Accordingly, there are six principal dependent 
variables that measure divestiture performance and the primary independent variable measures 
firm divestiture experience.  The control variables capture a number of firm and unit 
characteristics to address possible alternative explanations.  Variables specific to the coarsened 
exact matching models and the Heckman selection model are later described in their 
corresponding discussion in the “Analyses and Results” section.     
                                                     
1 T-tests using a variety of firm characteristics were performed to successfully confirm that there were no 
significant differences between those firms which had divestitures with a deal price and those firms which 
had divestitures for which no deal price was available. 
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2.3.2.1 Dependent variables 
The outcome of most interest in this paper is divestiture process performance, which is 
measured in six ways.  Completion is an indicator variable equal to one if the divestiture 
transaction was completed, and equal to zero if it was incomplete.  Duration measures the length 
of time of the divestiture transaction, from the announcement date to the close date of the 
transaction, in units of days.  Gain-to-Assets is a ratio that is a financially-based performance 
variable, calculated as the gain (or loss) on sale from the divestiture divided by the parent firm’s 
total assets.  The gain on the divestiture sale may be interpreted as the “transaction premium,” as 
it reflects the difference between the unit’s sale price and its fair market value.  Announcement 
Date CAR, Effective Date CAR, and Withdrawn Date CAR each reflect the firm’s cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR), but are each based upon different dates for specific events in the 
divestiture process: the date that the divestiture was publicly announced, the date that the 
divestiture deal became complete and effective, and the date that an incomplete divestiture was 
formally withdrawn from the divestiture process, respectively.  Event studies were used to 
calculate these three CAR-based variables through a multi-step process performed for each 
divestiture and for each event date of interest.  For each divestiture, the announcement date, the 
effective date (if applicable), and the withdrawn date (if applicable) were collected from the 
Thomson M&A database.  Firm stock return data were obtained in CRSP.          
  The first step in calculating the firm’s cumulative abnormal returns associated with a 
particular event is to estimate the firm’s expected returns.  To do so, in this paper, the firm’s daily 
stock returns and the market’s daily returns were collected for a 250-day period (the estimation 
window) that began 800 days prior to the event date (i.e. from -800 to -551 days before the 
event).  The firm’s expected, or normal, returns were then predicted from its daily stock returns 
and the market returns within the estimation window.  The second step is to determine the firm’s 
actual returns around the event date.  Here, actual returns were collected for a three-day window 
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around the event (i.e. spanning from one day before to one day after the event, -1 to +1).  In the 
third step, the firm’s abnormal returns are found by subtracting the firm’s expected returns from 
its actual returns.  This was done for each day in the three-day event window.  Lastly, the 
abnormal returns for the event window are summed to determine the firm’s cumulative abnormal 
returns corresponding to the event.  This procedure was repeated for each divestiture for each 
event of interest (divestiture announcement, effective, withdrawn), using estimation ([-800, -551]) 
and event ([-1, +1]) windows corresponding to each event date (Anand and Singh, 1997; 
Feldman, Amit and Villalonga, 2014).2       
2.3.2.2 Independent variables 
The variable Divestiture Experience measures the firm’s cumulative divestiture 
experience.  To calculate this variable, the count of the number of divestiture transactions 
undertaken by the parent firm was first determined, and was then depreciated on a linear basis 
over the twenty-six years of the sample (Barkema et al., 1996; Ingram and Baum, 1997).  More 
recent experience may be more relevant and accessible by the firm than distant experience, and 
thus more recent experience may play a larger role in divestiture transaction performance.  
Moreover, potentially fading organizational memories may impair the efficacy of more distant 
learnings (Levitt and March, 1988).  Both complete and incomplete divestitures are included in 
the calculation, as firms still have the opportunity to learn from the divestiture process, 
irrespective of the performance outcome (Madsen and Desai, 2010).3 
                                                     
2 Conclusions are robust to the use of an alternative 150-day estimation window [-515, -366] for the firm’s 
expected returns. Conclusions are also robust to the use of numerous alternative event windows (i.e.  [-1, 
0], [0, +1], [-2, +2], [-3, +3]) with both estimation windows.  
3 Robustness checks were performed with multiple alternative operationalizations for Divestiture 
Experience. For example, the count of divestiture experience was depreciated using different discount 
factors (i.e. the square root and the square of the age of the divestiture experience, causing experience to 
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2.3.2.3 Control variables 
There are two sets of control variables: the first set is focused strictly on the parent firm, 
and the second set pertains to the divested unit. 
The first set of variables controlled for a number of important characteristics of the parent 
firm, concerning its size, financial health, management efficiency, and diversification.  The 
components of these variables are all lagged by one year prior to the year of the divestiture 
announcement, to ensure a properly representative picture of the firm at the start of the divestiture 
process.   
The variable ln(Total Assets), with total assets in units of $Million, was used to control 
for the size of the parent firm.  Larger firms have more resources than smaller ones; with more 
operations comes more opportunity to engage in divestiture.   
Three variables were used to control for the state of the firm’s financial health:  Negative 
Net Income, Leverage, and Tobin’s q.  Negative Net Income, an indicator variable, is set equal to 
one if the firm reports negative net income, and is zero otherwise.  Leverage, which varies from 
zero to one, is the ratio of the firm's total debt to the sum of the firm’s total debt and its market 
capitalization.  Higher values of Leverage represent greater indebtedness. Tobin’s q is the market 
value of parent’s assets divided by the book value of its assets.  The market value of the assets is 
calculated as the sum of the market capitalization of the firm's equity and the book value of its 
debt.  Thus, Tobin’s q is calculated as ((Common Shares Outstanding*Close Price) + (Current 
Debt+Long Term Debt)) / (Total Assets).  Close price is the share price at the end of the last 
trading day of firm's fiscal calendar.  Firms with constrained financial resources, such as indebted 
or profitless firms, may have a greater propensity to divest as means to generate cash for the firm. 
                                                                                                                                                              
depreciate more slowly and more rapidly, respectively, than in the linear case), the experience count was 
not depreciated at all, and only completed divestitures were included in the experience count.  Conclusions 
are robust to these alternatives. 
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Return on Equity was used to control for management efficiency.  It is the ratio of the 
firm's net income to the shareholders' equity, calculated as (Net Income) / (Total Assets-Total 
Liabilities).  Poor managerial efficiency, or low values of Return on Equity, may serve as an 
impetus for the firm to engage in divestiture as a means to improve its return.     
Firm diversification was controlled for by using the sales-based Herfindahl Index.  The 
Herfindahl Index is calculated as the sum of Pi squared, where Pi is the proportion of a firm's 
sales in segment i.  As the index approaches 1, the more the firm’s sales are concentrated within 
fewer business segments.  Highly diversified firms, or those having small Herfindahl Index 
values, may see divestiture as a means to refocus their businesses and potentially improve 
performance (cf. Berger and Ofek, 1999; John and Ofek, 1995; Markides, 1992).   
The second set of control variables characterized the relationship between the business 
unit and the parent firm.  Unit-Parent Size Ratio was calculated as the divestiture transaction 
price divided by the market value of the parent firm.  Thus, market-based financial measures are 
being used to capture unit and parent size.  Since Unit-Parent Size Ratio had some outlying 
observations on the right hand side of its distribution, the variable was winsorized at the five 
percent level to account for these observations and to confirm that they were not biasing the 
results.  Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the parent 
firm's headquarters and the unit are both located in the same country, and zero otherwise. Unit-
Parent Industrial Relatedness is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the parent firm and the unit 
share the same 3-digit SIC code, and zero otherwise.  Parent firms may have a greater propensity 
to divest units that are smaller or less related (be it on an geographic or industry basis) as they 
may be easier to separate from the parent firm. 
Lastly, the final control variable category considers the parent firm’s divestiture 
operations.  Divestiture Program is an indicator variable set equal to one if the parent firm has 
made at least three divestiture announcements within the last three years.  Firms engaged in a 
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divestiture program, reflected by a number of divestitures occurring in rapid succession, may 
have a greater propensity to divest in order to finish all divestiture activity within a defined period 
(Brauer and Schimmer, 2010) to avoid the potential negative reputational effects that are 
sometimes associated with divestiture (Boot, 1992; Hayward and Shimizu, 2006; Dranikoff et al., 
2002).    
2.4 ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the principal variables used in the 
analysis are provided in Table 1.  The correlations in Table 1 and the variance inflation factors 
(mean VIF of 1.38 and individual VIFs of 2.64 or below) do not raise any concerns about 
multicollinearity.4  The descriptive statistics for the independent variable, Divestiture Experience, 
show that firms on average accumulated, on a linearly depreciated basis, divestiture experience 
corresponding to seven divestiture transactions (completed or not) during the 1985-2010 period.  
Stated in terms of an undepreciated count, firms engaged in a total of eighteen divestiture 
transactions on average over the period.  
 
-----Insert Table 1 here----- 
 
                                                     
4 In Table 1, there are several cases of missing correlations between dependent variables.  This is expected 
whenever one of the variables reflects only a single value (in this case, always zero or always one) for the 
observations for which the correlations are calculated. The resultant relationship between such variables is 
indeterminate since the constant variable’s zero-value standard deviation (SD) in the denominator of 
cov(x,y)/[SD(x)*SD(y)] would render the division by zero.  For example, a divestiture by definition cannot 
be both completed and withdrawn.  Therefore, Completion must always have a value of zero when a value 
of Withdrawn Date CAR is available and their correlation is thus indeterminate.    
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Turning to the dependent variables, the descriptive statistics show that seventy-seven 
percent of divestiture transactions completed and that these took, on average, fifty-one days to 
complete.  Given the adverse consequences associated with incomplete transactions for firms, this 
completion rate is unsurprising. On average, parent firms see a gain (rather than a loss) on sale for 
a divestiture, corresponding to a mean Gain-to-Assets of 2.8%.  The results for the CAR-based 
divestiture performance variables show that the market responds favorably to both the 
announcement and the close of a divestiture transaction (with an average Announcement Date 
CAR of 0.9% and Effective Date CAR of 0.4%, respectively).  The fact that the average CAR is 
higher for the initiation of the divestiture process than its closure may suggest that the market has 
already “priced in” some of the value of the divestiture by the effective date, but the fact that 
there is a rise in Effective Date CAR helps to lend support to the idea that the market does 
evaluate the firm’s management of the divestiture process and also places weight on its 
completion. That the average Withdrawn Date CAR is negative (at -1.0%) evidences that firms do 
indeed pay a penalty for incomplete divestitures.5  To further validate these results, 
Announcement Date CAR, Effective Date CAR, and Withdrawn Date CAR were tested and each 
was found to be statistically different from zero at the one percent level of significance.                 
Regarding the correlations between Divestiture Experience and each of the dependent 
variables, one of the relationships (with Announcement Date CAR) is significant at the one 
percent level, one of the relationships (with Duration) is significant at the five percent level, and 
                                                     
5 As noted earlier, these average CAR values were calculated using a 250-day estimation window with a 3-
day event window ([-800, -551] and [-1, +1]) in the event study procedure.  The average positive CAR 
results (for announcement date and effective date) and negative CAR results (for withdrawn date) presented 
here are consistent across the entire set of estimation-event window combinations examined (using 2 
estimation windows and 5 event windows, as described in the Variables section). Average CAR results 
ranged from 0.8% to 1.1% for Announcement Date CAR, from 0.3% to 0.7% for Effective Date CAR, and 
from -1.3% to -0.2% for Withdrawn Date CAR.      
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two of the relationships (with Completion and with Effective Date CAR) are significant at the ten 
percent level.  Neither the correlation between Divestiture Experience and Gain-to-Assets nor 
between Divestiture Experience and Gain-to-Assets is significant.  Moreover, the signs of each of 
these relationships are opposite to the directions predicted in the hypotheses.  This beautifully 
illustrates the complexity of the experience-performance relationship in corporate strategic 
activities, and foreshadows the importance of appropriate model specification, as will described 
in the sections that follow.       
2.4.2 Primary Model Specification 
The primary regression model used to test the hypotheses has the following form:  
 
The divestiture performance variable Y has six alternatives (Completion, Duration, Gain-
to-Assets, Announcement Date CAR, Effective Date CAR, Withdrawn Date CAR), and therefore 
the performance metric index k has a range of one to six.  The models for Completion, Duration, 
and Gain-to-Assets include all ten control variables described earlier. The models for the three 
CAR-based performance variables use seven of the control variables. Since CAR is based on 
market performance, the market-based controls (Leverage, Tobin’s q, and Unit-Parent Size Ratio) 
had to be excluded from the models that have a CAR-based dependent variable.   
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to estimate the models for each of the 
divestiture performance variables.  Results are presented in Table 2; Table 3 provides the same 
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regression results but with standardized coefficients.6  In all regressions, industry fixed effects 
(based on the parent firm’s primary 2-digit SIC code) are included to control for all stable 
industry characteristics (both observable and unobservable) that may drive divestiture process 
performance.  Year fixed effects are also used throughout, except in the regression for Gain-to-
Assets (year fixed effects are not needed in the regressions for Gain-to-Assets since all 
observations correspond to divestitures announced in 2005). Year fixed effects are included to 
control for macroeconomic conditions that may influence divestiture performance results.7    
Lastly, coarsened exact matching procedures are used to address non-random selection in 
the divestiture decision, and a two-stage Heckman selection model is used to control for a 
possible selection issue with Gain-to-Assets. These are discussed in depth in the sections that 
follow. 
2.4.3 The Choice to Divest  
This paper explores the potential relationship between firm divestiture experience and 
performance.  Embedded in this research question, however, is the firm’s decision to engage in 
divestiture.  Even further, not only is there is the firm’s decision to divest, but there is also the 
                                                     
6 As a test of robustness, logit models (which are appropriate for use with dichotomous outcome variables) 
were used to analyze Completion.  Furthermore, as another test of robustness, negative binomial regression 
models (which help to address overdispersion in count outcome variables) were used to analyze Duration. 
In both cases, results were consistent with those obtained from the OLS regressions. Results for these 
alternative regression models are presented in the Appendix in Table 5 and Table 6, respectively.  
7 While firm fixed effects would provide the strongest identification, this approach causes firms that have 
divested only once (corresponding to 4095 observations) to be dropped from the analysis.  Additionally, for 
the regression for Gain-to-Assets, firms which engaged in only one divestiture in 2005 (the year for which 
Gain-to-Assets data is available) would similarly be dropped from the analysis.  Furthermore, for the 
regression for Completion, firms which had no variation in their completion performance (i.e. all completed 
divestitures or all incomplete divestitures) would also be dropped from the analysis.  As an alternative, 
robust standard errors clustered by firm are used with all regressions. This serves to help address the 
potential for systemic firm idiosyncrasies that may be influencing divestiture process performance. 
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firm’s decision to divest a particular business unit.  There may be fundamental differences in 
characteristics between those firms that choose to make such a divestiture decision and those 
firms that do not.  Without taking steps to address this issue of non-random selection in the 
divestiture decision, results from regressions that examine the effects of this decision – here, the 
effects of firm divestiture experience on performance – may be biased.       
In this paper, coarsened exact matching procedures were used to deal with the problem of 
non-random selection in the divestiture decision (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012).  Coarsened exact 
matching involves a two-stage regression, wherein the first stage regression model estimates the 
likelihood of treatment (here, making the decision to divest a particular business unit) and the 
second stage regression model estimates the effect of treatment on the outcome (here, divestiture 
performance).  The power of this approach lies in the first stage’s matching of treated 
observations (firms that made the decision to divest) with control observations (firms that did not 
make the decision to divest) based upon the observable characteristics of the observations (firm 
characteristics, which are the independent variables in the first stage model).  The matching 
process avoids the rigidity of exact one-to-one matching by coarsening the values of each variable 
into strata.  A treated-control pair qualifies as a match when the values of each of their 
characteristics are found in the same strata ranges.  Only the matched pairs of treated and control 
observations are to be used in the second stage regression. 
The second stage regression poses a special challenge in this paper.  As previously 
discussed, the performance variables of focus in this paper pertain to the divestiture process.  
These variables are meaningful for firms that have made the decision to divest a particular 
business unit – the treated observations described above.  These variables are not, however, 
available for the control observations since these firms did not make the decision to divest, and 
therefore they did not engage in the divestiture process. By definition, measuring divestiture 
process performance is not applicable for the non-divesting control group.  To circumvent this 
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issue, the approach taken in this paper fully exploits the power of the coarsening in the first stage 
regression to identify those treated observations that have strong matches with control 
observations.  Those treated observations alone were then used in the second stage regression.   
   The first stage probit regression estimated the propensity of a firm to divest a particular 
business unit (i.e. one that is operating in a particular industry) in a certain year. The dependent 
variable was Opportunity Taken, which is a binary variable that is set equal to one if the firm had 
a business segment operating in a certain industry in a certain year and also decided to divest it.  
It is equal to zero if the firm had a business segment operating in a certain industry in a certain 
year (thus it had the opportunity to make a divestiture in this industry), but did not make any 
divestitures in that segment’s industry.  Business segment data was obtained from Compustat.  
Strict standards for coarsening were imposed on a variety of firm characteristics, including assets, 
revenues, net income, and leverage.  Exact matches were required for year (of divestiture 
announcement) and business unit industry (at the 2-digit SIC level).  The strata bands for the 
continuous firm characteristics variables were set on a percentile basis (i.e. minimum-p1-p5-p25-
p50-p75-p95-p99-maximum).  This stringency helped to ensure sharp, high quality matches.  The 
treated observations that were members of treated-control matched pairs were then used in the 
second stage regression, which estimates divestiture performance.  This regression was repeated 
for each of the six divestiture performance variables.  Results were consistent with those in Table 
2 and conclusions were robust to controlling for non-random selection in the firm’s decision to 
divest a particular business unit. 
As another test of robustness, the coarsened exact matching process was repeated to 
address the issue of non-random selection stemming from the firm’s decision to divest in a 
particular year.  This non-random selection issue (the firm’s choice to divest at all in a particular 
year) is more general than the discussed above (the firm’s choice to divest a business unit 
operating in a particular industry in a particular year).  Here, the dependent variable used was 
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Divested, which is set equal to one if the firm divested in a particular year, and is zero otherwise.  
The variables used in the first stage regression model are the same with the exception of the 
industry variable, which here is the 2-digit SIC code of the parent firm. The coarsening and 
regression procedures were the same as in the case above.  Results were again consistent with 
those in Table 2 and conclusions robust to controlling for non-random selection in the firm’s 
choice to divest. 
2.4.4 Heckman Selection Model 
The divestiture performance variable Gain-to-Assets uses the gain (or loss) on sale 
reported by the firm in the regulatory filings it submits to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  The firm has some flexibility in terms of how it reports the gain on sale.  For 
example, in cases where the firm is reporting on several divestitures, it may choose to combine 
the results and report one overall gain on sale number.  The firm may also deem the gain on sale 
results to be immaterial, and not report them accordingly.  This sets the stage for a potential 
selection problem, which is addressed in this paper through a Heckman selection model.         
The first stage of the two-stage Heckman selection model predicts the firm’s disclosure 
of the divestiture’s gain on sale. The dependent variable (or treatment variable) used in this probit 
regression is Gain Disclosed, which is a binary variable that is set equal to one if the gain (or 
loss) on sale for the divestiture was disclosed in the firm’s regulatory filings and is zero 
otherwise. The second stage of the model estimates the OLS regression with Gain-to-Assets as 
the dependent variable.  The first stage model requires at least one instrumental variable that is 
correlated with the likelihood that a firm reports the divestiture’s gain on sale, but is uncorrelated 
with the actual Gain-to-Assets ratio that is realized with the divestiture.  Here, two instrumental 
variables are used.  The first instrument is Segment Count, which is equal to the number of the 
firm’s business segments reported by the firm in the year prior to the divestiture announcement, 
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as recorded in Compustat.  Firms with numerous business segments necessarily have to report on 
the details of these businesses; thus these firms naturally disclose more information than do firms 
with fewer segments.  Moreover, more diversified firms (i.e. those with more business segments) 
are more likely to engage in divestiture than those that are less diversified (Comment and Jarrell, 
1995; Markides, 1992, 1995). Thus, firms with more segments are high-disclosure firms relative 
to firms with fewer segments, and it is reasonable to expect that such “high disclosure” firms 
would be more likely to explicitly report the gain on sale associated with their divestitures.  
Therefore, as Segment Count increases, the likelihood that the firm will report the gain on sale 
also increases.  However, there is no reason to expect that Segment Count should be correlated 
with the divestiture’s gain on sale in the Gain-to-Assets ratio. 
The second instrument is Restatements.  This binary variable has a value of one when the 
parent firm operates in an industry that is characterized as having firms that issue a high number 
of restatements of their financial reports filed with the SEC, and is zero otherwise.  The industry-
based restatement data is taken from Scholz (2008, 2014).  Relative to other industries, the rate at 
which the firms in a particular industry restate their financial statements remains fairly constant 
across time.  Restatements considered are those that were due to troublesome issues that rendered 
the firm’s financials unreliable; restatements due to reporting events like pooling-of-interest 
mergers and the adoption of new accounting standards are excluded.8   Firms which are subject to 
such restatement requirements are more likely to be aggressive in their accounting approaches 
than others.  Thus, firms that are members of high restatement industries would be less likely to 
report the gain on sale associated with their divestitures than those which are not.  .  However, 
whether or not the firm is a member of a high-disclosure industry has no bearing on the gain (or 
                                                     
8 The types of restatements considered here are damaging events for the firm, as they have been shown to 
impair share price (average CAR of -9 percent) and increase the firm’s cost of equity capital (relative 
increases averaging between 7 and 19 percent) (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Palmorese et al., 2004). 
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loss) realized on the divestiture sale itself, and therefore Restatements is not expected to be 
correlated with Gain-to-Assets.  The results for the Heckman selection model are presented in 
Table 4 and are discussed in the next section.         
2.4.5 Hypothesis Testing 
Table 2 presents the OLS regression results for the Completion, Duration, Gain-to-Assets 
Announcement Date CAR, Effective Date CAR, and Withdrawn Date CAR divestiture process 
performance variables.  There are three models that are associated with each outcome variable: a 
“baseline” model, which includes just the independent variable Divestiture Experience; a 
“controls” model, which includes only the control variables; and a full model, which includes 
both Divestiture Experience and the control variables, that is used for hypothesis testing.  These 
same regression results are presented using standardized coefficients in Table 3.  
It bears repeating that, for the Duration performance regressions (Models 4, 5, 6), a 
decrease in the duration of the divestiture process is interpreted as a positive performance result, 
since firms typically want these divestiture transactions to close as quickly as possible.  For the 
other five performance variables, positive increases (e.g. a larger Announcement Date CAR) are 
viewed as beneficial improvements in performance.   
Taken together, the baseline model results for each of the performance variables (Models 
1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16) offer only inconsistent support for the predicted divestiture experience-
performance relationships.  The coefficient for Divestiture Experience is significant for three of 
the six cases (Gain-to-Assets, p<0.5; Announcement Date CAR, p<0.01; and Effective Date CAR, 
p<0.01), but the sign of the Divestiture Experience coefficient in the model for Gain-to-Assets 
(Model 7) is negative -- implying that additional divestiture experience accumulated by the firm 
would actually reduce its gain on sale performance (which runs counter to the predicted 
relationship).  Similar trends of unevenness (and contradictions) in support were seen in the 
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experience-performance correlations of Table 1.  In light of the inconsistent findings relating 
experience to performance in the extant strategic management literature on corporate scope, these 
baseline results are not especially surprising. 
Turning to the hypotheses, Model 3 of Table 2 serves to test Hypothesis 1 (H1), which 
predicts that firm divestiture experience is positively associated with divestiture completion.  The 
coefficient for Divestiture Experience is significant (p<0.05) and negative, and indicates that a 
one-unit increase in Divestiture Experience corresponds to a -0.01 percent decrease in 
Completion.  This suggests that, as the firm accumulates direct divestiture experience, its 
divestiture completion performance is actually impaired – or, stated more informally, the results 
show that divestiture experience “hurts” divestiture completion performance.  Interpreting the 
coefficient in terms of standard deviations (Model 1 of Table 3), a one-standard deviation 
increase in Divestiture Experience results, on average, in a decrease in Completion of 0.037 
standard deviations.  Thus, divestiture experience is negatively associated with divestiture 
completion performance, and H1 is not supported.9 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) predicts that firm divestiture experience is positively associated with 
divestiture duration.  The results of Model 6, which tests H2, indicate that a 1-unit increase in the 
coefficient for Divestiture Experience corresponds to a decrease of 0.24 days (p<0.01) in 
divestiture duration.  Stated in terms of the standardized coefficients in Model 6 of Table 3, a 
one-standard deviation increase in Divestiture Experience results, on average, in a decrease in 
Duration of 0.023 standard deviations.  A shortened divesture duration is interpreted as a 
                                                     
9 As previously noted, logistic regression was used to estimate Completion as a test of robustness.  These 
results, presented in Table 5, are consistent with the OLS results.    
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performance improvement.  Therefore, H2 is supported, with divestiture experience being 
positively associated with divestiture duration.10  
Hypothesis 3 (H3) predicts that firm divestiture experience is positively associated with 
the financial gain on sale pertaining to the divestiture.  Model 9, which can be used to test H3, 
shows that a one-unit increase in Divestiture Experience results in a 0.2 percent (p<0.05) increase 
in Gain-to-Assets.  While this supports H3, this evidence should be interpreted cautiously since 
the results of Model 9 may be biased due to non-random selection in the firm’s decision to 
disclose the gain on sale.  This potential bias may be addressed by using a Heckman selection 
model, which is presented in Table 4.  This is a two-stage model, where the first stage regression 
(Model 1) predicts disclosure of the gain on sale (used in the calculation of Gain-to-Assets), and 
the second stage estimates the OLS regression with Gain-to-Assets as the dependent variable 
(Model 2).   
The first point of interest in the results of Table 4 is the significance of the two 
instruments, Segment Count and Restatements, in Model 1.  Moreover, the coefficient of Segment 
Count is positive (indicating that an increase in Segment Count corresponds to an increase in the 
likelihood of Gain Disclosed), which is as expected from the argument discussed above. The 
coefficient of Restatements is negative (indicating that firms that are members of high restatement 
industries are less likely to disclose the gain on sale than those firms which are not members of 
high restatement industries), which is also as expected.  Additionally, the combination of these 
two instruments passes the overidentification test (2 = 10.54 with p<0.01), further supporting the 
validity of the instruments.  Taken together, these pieces of evidence serve to help confirm the 
strength and appropriateness of Segment Count and Restatements as instrumental variables in this 
case.  The second major point of interest is that the coefficient of Divestiture Experience retains 
                                                     
10 Likewise, negative binomial regression was used to estimate Duration as a test of robustness.  These 
results, presented in Table 6, are also consistent with the OLS results.    
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its significance and direction (and, in fact, is very close in magnitude) to its corresponding result 
in Model 9 of Table 2.  This suggests that non-random selection on Gain Disclosed is not biasing 
the regression results.  Lastly, Lambda (i.e. the inverse Mills Ratio) is not significant in the 
second stage of the model.  This further evidences that selection bias is not an issue for the Gain-
to-Assets results.  
In Model 2 of Table 4, the coefficient for Divestiture Experience shows that a one-unit 
increase in Divestiture Experience results in a 0.3 percent increase in Gain-to-Assets.  Therefore, 
overall, even after controlling for the effects of non-random selection, H3 is still supported.  
The final three hypotheses consider the relationship between divestiture experience and 
performance measured as cumulative abnormal returns using three different event dates.  
Hypothesis 4 (H4) predicts that firm divestiture experience is positively associated with 
divestiture announcement date-based cumulative abnormal returns. In Model 12, the coefficient 
of Divestiture Experience is significant (p<0.05) and indicates that a one-unit increase in 
Divestiture Experience corresponds to a 0.02% increase in the firm’s Announcement Date CAR.  
This supports H4.  Hypothesis 5 (H5) predicts that firm divestiture experience is positively 
associated with divestiture effective date-based cumulative abnormal returns. The results of 
Model 15 indicate that a one-unit increase in Divestiture Experience results in a 0.01% increase 
(p<0.01) in the firm’s Effective Date CAR.  Interpreting the results using the standardized 
coefficients in Model 15 of Table 3, a one-standard deviation increase in Divestiture Experience 
results, on average, in an increase in Effective Date CAR of 0.022 standard deviations.  This 
supports H5.  Hypothesis 6 (H6) predicts that firm divestiture experience is negatively associated 
with divestiture withdrawn date-based cumulative abnormal returns.  The coefficient of 
Divestiture Experience in Model 18, although negative, is not significant at the ten percent level 
of significance. Thus, H6 is unsupported.   
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2.5 DISCUSSION 
With the results in hand, attention can now turn to this paper’s research question: is firm 
divestiture experience associated with divestiture process performance?  Although the results 
show that the general answer is yes, there are numerous aspects of this question that deserve 
detailed discussion. 
To start, the hypotheses for Duration (H2), Gain-to-Assets (H3), Announcement Date 
CAR (H4), and Effective Date CAR (H5), each predicted a positive relationship between firm 
divestiture experience and its respective process performance measure. In these four cases, a 
significant, positive relationship was found.  The presence of a positive link between divestiture 
experience and performance – showing that divestiture experience is beneficially associated with 
performance – helps to support the case that firms, on average, can learn to divest.  This is quite 
striking, as it means that firms are able, on average, to avoid (at least to some degree) succumbing 
to the potential pitfalls associated with organizational learning, such as overgeneralization.    
 For Withdrawn Date CAR (H6), however, there was no evidence of a significant 
relationship between divestiture experience and this performance measure.  This may suggest 
that, once the firm finds itself in the predicament of having to withdraw from the divestiture 
process, its experience has no bearing on the adverse outcomes that will correspondingly arise.  
The market appears to be indifferent to how much divestiture experience firms have previously 
accumulated when it is penalizing them for process failure in the divestiture at hand.  In fact, the 
only variable showing significance in the model used to test H6 (Model 18 of Table 2) is the 
control variable Return on Equity (β= -0.006, p<0.05).  Return on Equity is a measure of 
managerial efficiency, and its negative coefficient estimate may be interpreted as indicating that 
the market more severely penalizes firms with higher Return on Equity that fail in the divestiture 
process since the market was likely expecting these to be the very firms that could be depended 
upon for a successful divestiture.       
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In the case of Completion (H1), there is strong evidence for the presence of a relationship 
between firm divestiture experience and completion performance – but the evidence regarding the 
nature of that relationship suggests that it is in the opposite direction than that hypothesized in 
H1.  Rather than a positive relationship, the results show that an increase in Divestiture 
Experience actually impairs the likelihood of the firm completing the divestiture process.  
Especially in light of the support for positive relationships with the other divestiture process 
performance variables, this negative relationship between Divestiture Experience and Completion 
seems counterintuitive.  Upon reflection, however, this result could be suggesting that the firms 
with more experience in divestiture have learned something about the divestiture process – that an 
unwavering commitment to completing the divestiture may not always be the best outcome.  
Perhaps the more experienced firms have learned that walking away from a deal is, at times, the 
right thing to do – that the ramifications of completing a bad deal may be worse than those of not 
finishing it at all.   
Next, for the five cases where there is evidence of a relationship between divestiture 
experience and performance, it is important to consider the magnitude of this relationship.  In so 
doing, it is useful to consider the magnitude of this relationship relative to the magnitudes of 
other factors’ relationships with performance.  Since the variables in this paper have widely 
varying means and variances, comparisons are best made using the standardized coefficient 
model results in Table 3.     
Starting with Model 3 in Table 3 for Completion, a comparison of the standardized 
coefficient for Divestiture Experience (β*= -0.037, p<0.01) with the standardized coefficients of 
the seven significant control variables shows that its absolute magnitude lies near the median, 
being larger than four and smaller than three.  Of these, its absolute difference with the coefficient 
for Divestiture Program (β*=0.113, p<0.01) is the largest.  It makes good sense that Divestiture 
Program has such a strongly positive relationship with Completion.  If a firm has launched a 
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refocusing strategy, there would be a great impetus for the firm to realize it and therefore drive 
the corresponding divestitures to closure.    
Turning to Model 6 in Table 3 for Duration, the absolute magnitude of the standardized 
coefficient for Divestiture Experience (β*= -0.023, p<0.05) is smaller than those for all but one of 
the six significant control variable standardized coefficients. Here, ln(Assets) (β*=0.176, p<0.01), 
Unit-Parent Size Ratio (β*=0.162, p<0.01), and Leverage (β*= -0.070, p<0.01) are particularly 
strong drivers of Duration. The strength of these relationships is logical.  Disentangling business 
units from large firms or extricating firms’ bigger units is likely to be more complex than in the 
smaller cases due to more interdependencies, tighter integration, and a greater number of 
stakeholders involved – all of which could contribute to lengthening the duration of the 
divestiture process.  As for the relationship between Leverage and Duration, it is easy to envision 
a highly leveraged firm in need of cash being very eager to close its divestiture deal as quickly as 
possible. 
Model 9 in Table 3 for Gain-to-Assets reveals even more insights about the divestiture 
process and the role of divestiture experience.  Here, the absolute magnitude of the coefficient for 
Divestiture Experience (β*=0.165, p<0.05) is larger than one of the five significant control 
variable coefficients and is on par with another.  The influence of Unit-Parent Size Ratio 
(β*=0.364, p<0.01) on divestiture performance measured as Gain-to-Assets is especially notable.  
When a firm is divesting a unit that represents an increasingly larger part of its operations, such a 
unit would represent one of the parts of the company that the firm knows best. The firm would 
therefore have a clear understanding of how to position the unit for sale and preempt concerns or 
issues that might impair its price premium. 
While there are similarities in the insights gleaned from the results of Announcement 
Date CAR and Effective Date CAR (Models 12 and 15 in Table 3, respectively), there are some 
interesting differences.  Beginning with Announcement Date CAR, the absolute magnitude of the 
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standardized coefficient for Divestiture Experience (β*=0.022, p<0.01) lies at the median of the 
absolute coefficient magnitudes of the four significant control variables.  In the case of Effective 
Date CAR, the absolute coefficient of Divestiture Experience (β*=0.016, p<0.01) shows the same 
pattern of relative strength (although one member of the set of significant control variables is 
different).  In both cases, ln(Assets) plays the most influential role (Model 12: β*= -0.108, p<0.01; 
Model 15: β*= -0.053, p<0.01), perhaps reflecting the fact that as firm size increases, a particular 
divestiture is less of an event and therefore there is a reduced impact on the cumulative abnormal 
return.  Yet there are differences among the results as well.  In the results for Announcement Date 
CAR, the divestiture characteristic Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness (β*=0.009, p<0.1) is 
significant but with relatively low absolute magnitude, while it is not significant at all in the 
results for Effective Date CAR.  However, in the results for Effective Date CAR, a different 
divestiture characteristic Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness (β*=0.015, p<0.05) is instead 
significant, and its relationship with Effective Date CAR performance is of near equal magnitude 
as that of Divestiture Experience (β*=0.016, p<0.01).  While the financial markets may be 
indifferent to parent-unit similarity on an industry basis at the beginning of the divestiture 
process, it is probable that the parent firm’s deep familiarity with the unit’s industry enables it to 
engage in a smoother and more effective divestiture process, for which it is recognized and 
rewarded upon the divestiture’s completion.                 
Taken together, a very interesting picture of the relationship between divestiture 
experience and divestiture process performance – as well as the divestiture process itself -- 
emerges from the results of this paper.  To start, it is clear that using a variety of measures of 
divestiture process performance is valuable and necessary to properly evaluate the divestiture 
process, as they are each capturing different aspects of it.  This is demonstrated by the fact that 
the roles of not only firm divestiture experience but also key firm and divestiture characteristics 
vary across the six different process performance measures.  Second, there is a relationship 
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between divestiture experience and performance, which is confirmed by the significance of 
coefficient estimate for Divestiture Experience for five of the six performance measures.  This 
relationship is not always in the direction hypothesized, however, as was seen in the negative 
relationship between Divestiture Experience and performance measured as Completion.  That 
incongruity, itself intriguing, lends further credence to the importance of using numerous 
performance measures to assess the divestiture process.  Third, the relative impact of experience 
on divestiture performance (as compared with the other factors associated with performance) 
varies according to the measure of performance used.  A firm’s accumulated divestiture 
experience is a stronger driver of performance for some measures of divestiture process 
performance than others.  This is important information for managers, as the ramifications of 
accumulating divestiture experience will not be the same across different measures of 
performance.  Having this insight will enable firms to make informed decisions and tradeoffs 
about their divestiture strategies as necessary.  Moreover, there are notable differences in other 
factors, such as indebtedness and firm size, that are related to divestiture process performance 
across the six performance variables.  Not only does this shed light on the divestiture process, but 
it is likewise relevant to managers aiming for divestiture process success.                  
2.5.1 Limitations & Directions for Future Research 
This research does have some limitations, which shape an agenda for future work.  For 
one, the variable Divestiture Experience is left censored.  Although the linear depreciation 
approach taken in this paper greatly helps to address this issue (since more distant experiences 
contribute less than recent ones), it does not eliminate it.  Thus, the measure for divestiture 
experience may offer an incomplete view for some firms’ experience histories.  For another, the 
different types of accumulated experience captured by Divestiture Experience are treated 
uniformly.  While this approach is appropriate for this paper’s research objectives, which were 
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targeted at understanding the firm divestiture learning and performance on an average basis, 
investigating the roles that specific types of experience may play (e.g. experience in divesting 
units of varying sizes, units in different or similar industries, units which were more or less 
integrated with the parent firm, etc.) could be an interesting extension into unpacking divestiture 
process performance.     
Additionally, while the six divestiture performance variables do offer a new view of the 
divestiture process, still more types of divestiture process performance measures can be imagined.  
For example, maintaining employee morale and productivity (in both the divesting unit and also 
the parent firm) during the divestiture process is an important task.  Survey methods could be a 
very effective way of collecting this data, although implementation is notoriously challenging on 
a large sample scale.  As another example, financial metrics for the business unit – such as its 
revenue and profitability – would offer important insights into how well the parent firm has 
navigated the divestiture process.  Unfortunately, this data must be hand-collected from the firm’s 
regulatory filings, which places natural constraints on sample size.  Furthermore, such a hand-
collection process is made very difficult due to the fact there are only limited regulatory 
requirements around business unit reporting, so business unit data in the regulatory filings may be 
incomplete, if not wholly unavailable.  (Unfortunately, the firm’s business segment reporting 
offers only a rough approximation of the firm’s business unit structure; cf. Villalonga, 2004),   
Making this data collection problem even worse is the issue that, when business units are 
discussed in the firm’s filings, the business unit financials (and, in fact, any business unit 
characteristics, such as assets, number of employees, etc.) are inconsistently available due to the 
lack of regulatory reporting requirements for business units.  So, while business unit performance 
variables could be very useful measures of the divestiture process, researchers not only need to 
overcome the hand-collection hurdle but also the non-random selection issues stemming from 
firms’ choices in business unit data disclosure.   
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This business unit-specific data challenge also surfaces another limitation of this paper, in 
that potential bias due to non-random selection on unobservable characteristics stemming from 
the firm’s decision to divest a particular business unit was not addressed.  The coarsened exact 
matching procedures used in this paper robustly helped to confirm that that non-random selection 
on observable characteristics was not biasing this paper’s results.  However, would a business 
unit performance variable like unit profitability have been available – and such a performance 
measure would not only be meaningful for the divestiture process, but it would also be applicable 
to units in the treatment group (divested units) and in the control group (non-divesting units) – 
then first-differencing techniques on the performance variable could have been applied in the 
second stage of the coarsened exact matching regressions to account for any non-random 
selection on unobservable characteristics due to the firm’s divestiture decision.          
Lastly, the data sample for this research is composed of divestitures that were conducted 
by public firms headquartered in the United States.  While these divestitures were cross-border 
(e.g. a U.S. parent may divest one of its business units located in France), they do not include 
divestitures made by non-U.S. parent firms.  Examining these divestitures could provide a 
platform for a number of very interesting extensions to this work.  There may be fundamental 
differences in the divestiture process across geographies, perhaps stemming from differences in 
corporate governance, organizational structure, management-employee relations, political 
environments, and so forth.  Not only could these differences impact the way the divestiture 
process unfolds, but they could also impact the type and level of firm experience needed to 
successfully navigate divestiture on a global level.                         
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This research focused on the divestiture process, and examined whether and how firm 
divestiture experience may be related to divestiture process performance.  To appropriately 
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characterize the richness of the divestiture process, six outcome measures were developed and 
applied to a large sample of cross-industry and cross-border divestitures announced by public, 
U.S.-headquartered firms over a twenty-six year period.  While strong links between divestiture 
experience and performance were identified, divestiture experience was found to benefit 
divestiture performance only inconsistently.  The surfacing of the resultant performance tradeoffs 
evidences the value of employing a process-based view quantitatively to large samples in 
organizational learning research. In so doing, this paper offers new insights into the relationship 
between experience and performance in the arena of corporate scope, and identifies potential 
process-based sources of firm performance heterogeneity.  Furthermore, in examining this 
important but understudied strategic process, this paper advances our understanding of corporate 
divestiture and serves to help open the heretofore “black box” of the divestiture process.             
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2.7 TABLES 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
  
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Completion 0.772 0.420 1
2 Duration 51.095 113.948 . 1
3 Gain-to-Assets 0.028 0.105 . 0.01 1
4 Announcement Date CAR 0.009 0.118 0.00 0.03*** -0.01 1
5 Effective Date CAR 0.004 0.134 . 0.00 0.14*** 0.60*** 1
6 Withdrawn Date CAR -0.010 0.145 . . . 0.13*** . 1
7 Divestiture Experience 7.027 12.875 -0.01* 0.01** -0.07 -0.03*** -0.01* 0.00 1
8 ln(Total Assets) 7.691 2.723 -0.02*** 0.06*** -0.29*** -0.07*** -0.04*** 0.00 0.58*** 1
9 Negative Net Income 0.333 0.471 -0.01 -0.03*** 0.16*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -0.02 -0.14*** -0.37*** 1
10 Leverage 0.379 0.269 -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.08* 0.03*** 0.01* -0.03 0.11*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 1
11 Tobin's q 1.454 45.223 -0.01* -0.01** 0.24*** -0.03*** -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.02*** 1
12 Return on Equity -0.195 36.750 0.00 0.00 0.36*** -0.01 0.01 -0.04* 0.00 0.01* -0.01*** 0.01** 0.00 1
13 Herfindahl Index 0.630 0.327 -0.02*** -0.01** 0.13** 0.02*** 0.01 0.02 -0.24*** -0.39*** 0.16*** -0.01* 0.01* -0.01 1
14 Unit-Parent Size Ratio 0.248 0.429 -0.08*** 0.08*** 0.34*** 0.20*** 0.06*** 0.00 -0.19*** -0.38*** 0.29*** 0.32*** -0.05*** 0.01 0.15*** 1
15 Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.811 0.392 0.02*** 0.03*** -0.04 0.02*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.20*** -0.23*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.00 0.00 0.10*** 0.13*** 1
16 Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.363 0.481 -0.04*** 0.04*** 0.12** 0.01** 0.02*** -0.01 -0.14*** -0.13*** 0.10*** -0.01*** 0.01 -0.01* 0.17*** 0.09*** 0.02*** 1
17 Divestiture Program 0.528 0.499 0.10*** 0.02*** -0.10** -0.03*** -0.02*** 0.00 0.43*** 0.54*** -0.13*** 0.10*** -0.01* 0.01* -0.28*** -0.23*** -0.15*** -0.11*** 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2: OLS Estimates of Divestiture Performance 
  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Dependent Variable:
Baseline Controls H1 Baseline Controls H2 Baseline Controls H3 Baseline Controls H4 Baseline Controls H5 Baseline Controls H6
Divestiture Experience -0.0003 -0.001** 0.110 -0.239*** -0.0007** 0.0019** -0.0003*** 0.0002** -0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.000 -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0847) (0.0844) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0004) (0.0006)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0063*** -0.0037** 7.813*** 8.291*** -0.0093 -0.014* -0.0037*** -0.0041*** -0.0021** -0.0025*** 0.002 0.0024
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.564) (0.651) (0.0066) (0.0078) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0021) (0.0026)
Negative Net Income -0.0202*** -0.0185*** -3.375 -3.503 0.000 -0.006 0.006*** 0.0059*** 0.0069*** 0.0065*** 0.0092 0.0108
(0.0061) (0.0061) (2.483) (2.482) (0.0181) (0.0178) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0079) (0.0079)
Leverage 0.0328*** 0.0322** -33.040*** -32.710*** -0.0486 -0.0567
(0.0126) (0.0126) (5.230) (5.223) (0.0393) (0.039)
Tobin's q -0.0005 -0.0004 0.405 0.419 0.0136 0.0123
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.287) (0.290) (0.0107) (0.011)
Return on Equity 0.000 0.000 -0.017 -0.0261 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.000 0.000 0.0001* 0.0001* -0.0006*** -0.0006***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0317) (0.0288) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Herfindahl Index -0.0105 -0.0094 -6.435* -6.340* 0.0259 0.0304* -0.0033 -0.0036 -0.0046** -0.0048** 0.0159 0.0153
(0.0089) (0.0089) (3.781) (3.843) (0.0163) (0.0167) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0127) (0.0129)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio -0.0493*** -0.0465*** 48.700*** 48.670*** 0.133*** 0.133***
(0.0084) (0.0084) (2.824) (2.873) (0.0401) (0.0389)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.0369*** 0.0348*** 13.620*** 13.190*** -0.0096 -0.0088 0.0022 0.0022 0.0006 0.0007 0.0024 0.0018
(0.0075) (0.0076) (3.344) (3.410) (0.0247) (0.024) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0088) (0.0089)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness -0.0188*** -0.0197*** 2.860 2.280 0.035** 0.0382** 0.0011 0.0012 0.0034** 0.0039** 0.0007 -0.0004
(0.006) (0.0061) (2.363) (2.402) (0.0142) (0.0148) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0072) (0.0073)
Divestiture Program 0.0697*** 0.071*** -7.898*** -7.179*** 0.0156 0.011 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.000 -0.0004 -0.004 -0.0035
(0.0063) (0.0063) (2.658) (2.653) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.003) (0.0031) (0.008) (0.0083)
Constant 0.780*** 0.728*** 0.812*** 50.790*** -1.014 -20.290 0.0319*** 0.057 0.0842 0.0114*** 0.0123 0.0134 0.0052*** 0.0012 0.0006 -0.0105** -0.0133 -0.0077
(0.0032) (0.104) (0.103) (0.920) (17.490) (16.140) (0.0063) (0.0815) (0.0837) (0.001) (0.021) (0.0214) (0.0011) (0.0347) (0.035) (0.0043) (0.038) (0.0406)
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.000 0.057 0.054 0.000 0.067 0.067 0.005 0.360 0.376 0.001 0.017 0.018 0.000 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.075 0.077
Number of Observations 42,182 16,601 16,316 32,801 14,721 14,519 411 345 345 34,377 29,804 29,230 26,065 22,856 22,440 1,718 1,583 1,534
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Withdrawn Date CARCompletion Duration Gain-to-Assets Announcement Date CAR Effective Date CAR
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Table 3: Unstandardized and Standardized OLS Coefficient Estimates of Divestiture Performance  
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Dependent Variable:
Baseline Controls H1 Baseline Controls H2 Baseline Controls H3 Baseline Controls H4 Baseline Controls H5 Baseline Controls H6
Divestiture Experience -0.0003* -0.001*** 0.110** -0.239** -0.0007*** 0.0019** -0.0003*** 0.0002*** -0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.000 -0.0002
(-0.0089) (-0.0367) (0.0125) (-0.0229) (-0.0718) (0.165) (-0.0305) (0.0216) (-0.0111) (0.0161) (0.0017) (-0.0136)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0063*** -0.0037** 7.813*** 8.291*** -0.0093 -0.014* -0.0037*** -0.0041*** -0.0021*** -0.0025*** 0.002 0.0024
(-0.0527) (-0.0311) (0.165) (0.176) (-0.180) (-0.274) (-0.0964) (-0.108) (-0.0439) (-0.0531) (0.0355) (0.0417)
Negative Net Income -0.0202*** -0.0185*** -3.375 -3.503 0.000 -0.006 0.006*** 0.0059*** 0.0069*** 0.0065*** 0.0092 0.0108
(-0.0311) (-0.0288) (-0.0131) (-0.0137) (0.000) (-0.0251) (0.029) (0.0285) (0.0272) (0.0258) (0.0314) (0.0366)
Leverage 0.0328*** 0.0322*** -33.040*** -32.710*** -0.0486 -0.0567
(0.0278) (0.0277) (-0.0708) (-0.0704) (-0.107) (-0.125)
Tobin's q -0.0005 -0.0004 0.405 0.419 0.0136 0.0123
(-0.0064) (-0.0054) (0.0132) (0.0138) (0.125) (0.113)
Return on Equity 0.000 0.000 -0.017 -0.0261 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.000 0.000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0006* -0.0006*
(-0.0002) (0.0011) (-0.0014) (-0.0022) (0.323) (0.322) (-0.0051) (-0.0052) (0.0105) (0.0104) (-0.0491) (-0.049)
Herfindahl Index -0.0105 -0.0094 -6.435* -6.340* 0.0259 0.0304* -0.0033* -0.0036* -0.0046** -0.0048** 0.0159 0.0153
(-0.0109) (-0.0098) (-0.017) (-0.0168) (0.0782) (0.0917) (-0.0113) (-0.0121) (-0.0129) (-0.0133) (0.0336) (0.0319)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio -0.0493*** -0.0465*** 48.700*** 48.670*** 0.133*** 0.133***
(-0.0671) (-0.0638) (0.162) (0.162) (0.363) (0.364)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.0369*** 0.0348*** 13.620*** 13.190*** -0.0096 -0.0088 0.0022* 0.0022* 0.0006 0.0007 0.0024 0.0018
(0.0423) (0.0406) (0.0394) (0.0383) (-0.0302) (-0.0277) (0.0089) (0.009) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0053) (0.0039)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness -0.0188*** -0.0197*** 2.860 2.280 0.035** 0.0382*** 0.0011 0.0012 0.0034** 0.0039** 0.0007 -0.0004
(-0.0287) (-0.0304) (0.011) (0.0088) (0.152) (0.166) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0135) (0.0153) (0.0025) (-0.0012)
Divestiture Program 0.0697*** 0.071*** -7.898*** -7.179*** 0.0156 0.011 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.000 -0.0004 -0.004 -0.0035
(0.110) (0.113) (-0.0314) (-0.0286) (0.0688) (0.0487) (-0.0006) (-0.0036) (0.0001) (-0.0018) (-0.0143) (-0.0124)
Constant 0.780*** 0.728*** 0.812*** 50.790*** -1.014 -20.290 0.0319*** 0.057 0.0842 0.0114*** 0.0123 0.0134 0.0052*** 0.0012 0.0006 -0.0105*** -0.0133 -0.0077
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.000 0.057 0.054 0.000 0.067 0.067 0.005 0.360 0.376 0.001 0.017 0.018 0.000 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.075 0.077
Number of Observations 42,182 16,601 16,316 32,801 14,721 14,519 411 345 345 34,377 29,804 29,230 26,065 22,856 22,440 1,718 1,583 1,534
Standardized coefficient estimates appear in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Withdrawn Date CARCompletion Duration Gain-to-Assets Announcement Date CAR Effective Date CAR
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Table 4: Heckman Selection Model for Performance Measured as the Gain (or Loss) on the 
Divestiture Sale Scaled by Parent Total Assets (Gain-to-Assets) 
   
 
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable: Gain 
Disclosed
Gain-to-
Assets
Segment Count 0.147***
(0.0517)
Restatements -0.520*
(0.284)
Divestiture Experience -0.0199*** 0.0026**
(0.007) (0.0012)
ln(Total Assets) -0.087** -0.0081
(0.0425) (0.0052)
Negative Net Income -0.254 -0.0035
(0.154) (0.0243)
Leverage 0.195 -0.0773*
(0.337) (0.0447)
Tobin's q 0.0124 0.0102
(0.0834) (0.0122)
Return on Equity -0.0438 -0.0186
(0.0692) (0.0269)
Herfindahl Index -0.0508 0.0565*
(0.227) (0.0295)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio -0.264 0.156***
(0.206) (0.0458)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.242 -0.0168
(0.176) (0.0203)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness -0.137 0.0451**
(0.131) (0.0186)
Divestiture Program -0.158 0.0157
(0.142) (0.0113)
Constant 0.888 0.0748
(0.647) (0.0783)
Lambda -0.0802
(0.0623)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No
Number of Observations 593 324
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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2.8 FIGURES 
Figure 1: Global Divestitures from 1985-2015 
 
Figure 2: Divestiture Activity as a Percent of M&A Activity (Deal Count Basis), 1985-2015 
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2.9 APPENDIX 
Table 5: Logit Estimates of Completion Divestiture Performance 
  
 
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Completion
 (Odds Ratios) Baseline Controls H1
Divestiture Experience 0.998 0.989***
(0.002) (0.004)
ln(Total Assets) 0.939*** 0.963**
(0.016) (0.018)
Negative Net Income 0.815*** 0.829***
(0.051) (0.053)
Leverage 1.364** 1.356**
(0.171) (0.172)
Tobin's q 0.996 0.997
(0.003) (0.003)
Return on Equity 1.000 1.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Herfindahl Index 0.901 0.910
(0.090) (0.094)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio 0.657*** 0.667***
(0.044) (0.046)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 1.466*** 1.446***
(0.108) (0.108)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.834*** 0.825***
(0.051) (0.052)
Divestiture Program 2.102*** 2.205***
(0.140) (0.156)
Constant 3.538*** 2.802 3.919
(0.065) (3.193) (4.488)
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Pseudo-Log Likelihood -22350.22 -5434.73 -5257.83
Chi-Square 0.75 795.49*** 749.75***
Number of Observations 42,182 16,553 16,260
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 6: Negative Binomial Estimates of Duration Divestiture Performance 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Duration
(IRR) Baseline Controls H2
Divestiture Experience 1.002 0.996***
(0.002) (0.002)
ln(Total Assets) 1.150*** 1.160***
(0.012) (0.015)
Negative Net Income 0.969 0.969
(0.041) (0.041)
Leverage 0.557*** 0.563***
(0.059) (0.060)
Tobin's q 1.027 1.030
(0.025) (0.026)
Return on Equity 0.998 0.997
(0.008) (0.007)
Herfindahl Index 0.867** 0.871**
(0.051) (0.052)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio 2.256*** 2.263***
(0.104) (0.106)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 1.216*** 1.206***
(0.068) (0.069)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 1.027 1.019
(0.038) (0.039)
Divestiture Program 0.888*** 0.895***
(0.035) (0.035)
Constant 50.710***18.190***14.650***
(0.934) (5.837) (4.692)
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Pseudo R-Squared 0.000 0.006 0.006
ln(alpha) 2.017*** 1.474*** 1.477***
Number of Observations 32,801 14,721 14,519
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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3 INTERNAL EXPERIENCE TRANSFER IN CORPORATE DIVESTITURE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The issue of whether and how firms learn has been a topic of vigorous discussion for 
decades, especially amongst scholars in the organizational theory (Cyert and March, 1963; Levitt 
and March, 1988) and strategic management disciplines (Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
Teece et al., 1997; Zollo and Winter, 2002).  Fueling this topic’s interest is the fact that valuable 
firm resources, from knowledge to routines to capabilities, are an outgrowth of firm learning.  In 
advancing our understanding of firm learning, scholars are advancing our understanding of an 
important source of firm performance advantage. 
A central pillar of organizational learning research has addressed the process of 
experiential learning, or learning-by-doing.  In this case, the firm accumulates experience through 
repetition of a particular activity, and progresses along its learning curve as it receives 
performance feedback and adjusts its actions in response (Dutton and Thomas, 1984; Yelle, 
1979).  While the premise of experiential learning is fundamental, its empirical support has been 
mixed in the strategic management literature, including in the context of corporate development 
(cf. Barkema and Schijven, 2008; King et al., 2004).  These inconsistencies have spurred scholars 
to investigate the hurdles that impede learning (Levinthal and March, 1993), as well as to explore 
the potential of alternative learning paths.   
One such alternative is internal experience transfer, wherein the firm transfers its own 
experience in one area to that in another (Argote and Ingram, 2000).  Scholars have demonstrated 
its promise in a variety of firm contexts (e.g. Darr et al., 1995; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999), 
as well as its challenges (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Szulanski, 1996).  One particularly 
vibrant stream has considered the potential role of internal experience transfer in firm scope 
change, wherein the firm transfers its experience in one mode of corporate development -- such as 
alliances, joint ventures and acquisitions --  from one situation to another (e.g. Barkema et al., 
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1996.; Ellis et al., 2011; Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Kale and Singh, 2007).  These studies 
suggest that learning through internal transfer helps firms to circumvent the constraints posed by 
learning-by-doing in scope change (e.g. Penrose, 1959) and serves as a critical enabler of firms’ 
pursuit of growth and the fulfillment of their strategic objectives.          
This paper focuses on activity-to-activity internal experience transfer in corporate 
development, and considers if experience gained in a firm’s execution of one strategic activity is 
transferable to its execution of another strategic activity.  Specifically, this research examines 
whether and how a firm’s acquisition experience may influence its divestiture performance.  Two 
primary avenues for experience transfer are considered: direct and moderating.  In the first, the 
firm’s acquisition experience is directly applied to its execution of divestiture.  Stated differently, 
this path represents the question of whether a firm’s learning how to acquire directly impacts its 
implementation of divestiture.  In the second, the transfer of the firm’s acquisition experience 
moderates the relationship between the firm’s divestiture experience and its divestiture 
performance. This path for transfer surfaces the issue of whether a firm’s learning how to acquire 
influences its ability to learn how to divest.  
In so doing, this research makes several contributions.  With some important exceptions 
(e.g. Bingham et al., 2015; Zollo and Reuer, 2010) activity-to-activity transfer has seen only 
limited attention in the strategic management literature, in spite of its apparent prevalence and 
value.  In focusing on activity-to-activity internal transfer, this research helps to offer a more 
complete picture of intra-firm learning processes.  Moreover, by examining acquisition and 
divestiture learning concurrently, and by considering both the direct and moderating paths to 
transfer, this research advances our understanding of how learning processes are intertwined in 
firms.  While prior research has largely investigated learning and capability development treating 
corporate development activities as being in isolation (e.g. Anand and Khanna, 2000; Hayward, 
2002; Zollo and Singh, 2004), this research offers a more realistic view of the comingled nature 
  62 
 
of learning processes in firms by treating them in concert.  Lastly, in considering experience 
transfer from acquisition to divestiture – two strategic activities that are both crucial to firm 
development, but that present a tension through their competing objectives of scope expansion 
and scope reduction – this research sheds light on the opportunities and limits inherent to internal 
experience transfer. 
3.2 THEORY & HYPOTHESES 
3.2.1 Internal Experience Transfer 
Internal experience transfer is defined as the process through which the firm transfers its 
own experience in one area to that in another (Argote & Ingram, 2000; Levitt & March, 1988).  
Its consideration in the organizational context has its origins in cognitive psychology, which 
examined experience transfer within individuals (Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901; Gick and 
Holyoak, 1987).  From that foundation, scholars expanded their focus to include experience 
transfer between individuals; this research stream held important implications for education and 
job training (Baldwin and Ford, 1988; Cormier and Hagman, 1987).   A notable outcome of this 
rich history of experience transfer research was the insight that similarity – be it similarity of 
situation, activity, or time – plays a key role in enabling transfer.  As such, these works also 
foreshadowed the challenges of experience transfer, as well as the potential for negative, or 
performance-impairing, experience transfer that has since been identified in organizational 
studies. 
From these roots, the study of experience transfer within firms has flourished, with 
scholars engaging with the topic from a variety of perspectives (e.g. Capron, 1999; Dokko et al., 
2009; Epple et al., 1991; Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Sakhartov and Folta, 2014; Winter and 
Szulanski, 2001).   The interest in within-firm experience transfer speaks to its importance in 
organizations.  Indeed, experience transfer animates a fundamental premise of the resource-based 
view of the firm, wherein the fungibility of resources (including the knowledge, routines, and 
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capabilities reaped through experience) is an important component of sustainable firm growth 
(Teece, 1982; Wernerfelt, 1984).  As such, it is unsurprising that a robust stream in the strategic 
management literature explores the potential of internal experience transfer in the context of firm 
scope change.  
Through these works, a number of factors that may drive experience transfer within firms 
have been identified.  For one, there may be limitations to the firm’s ability to learn from its own 
direct accumulated experience.  This could be due to opportunity; some important strategic 
activities like international expansion, for example, are simply infrequently performed.  Cost and 
risk may also limit the firm’s ability to accumulate first-hand experience, and encourage its 
search for an alternative source.  Moreover, managerial constraints may stimulate internal 
experience transfer.  There are natural limits to the degree that managers’ attention may be 
stretched (Ocasio, 1997; Penrose, 1959), and thus transferring prior experiences rather than 
engaging in additional ones may be the most viable course of action.   
A clear theme that emerges from intra-firm experience transfer research is that it can be 
very difficult to execute successfully.  At best, a failed transfer process has a neutral effect on the 
firm’s performance.   Such neutral effects might stem from an incomplete or interrupted transfer 
process, which mutes the ability of the experience to influence the target (Gupta and 
Govindarajan 2000, Szulanski 1996).  At worst, a firm’s transfer process has a negative impact on 
firm performance.  Firms may inappropriately generalize from its past experience, and this may 
cause firms to misapply their past experiences to the focal activity (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 
2002; Gavetti et al., 2005).  Causal ambiguity can plague the firm internally, wherein it is unable 
to identify the aspects of its experience that are driving performance gains, and therefore may fail 
when it attempts to reapply its experience elsewhere (Barney, 1991; Lippman and Rumelt, 1982; 
Peteraf, 1993). In the context of scope change, given the relative complexity and intermittency of 
boundary changing activities, firms are especially vulnerable to superstitious learning, wherein 
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firms “don’t really know what they think they know” (Levitt and March, 1988; Zollo, 2009) and 
have misunderstood the relationship between action and outcome. 
However, scholars have made strides in identifying conditions that help to facilitate 
internal experience transfer. Similarities in timing, task, and context between the firm’s 
accumulated experience and the focal situation help to facilitate transfer.  For example, 
accumulated experience in acquisitions of the same size as the focal acquisition (Ellis et al., 
2011), in similar industries as the focal acquisition (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 
2002), and in similar geographic regions (Barkema et al., 1996; Bruneel, 2010) have all been 
identified as contextual factors that can help to promote successful internal experience transfer.  
The importance of contextual, or situational similarity, between the firm’s experience and the 
focal situation for transfer has been empirically demonstrated in other modes of corporate 
development as well, such as in repeated experiences with the same partner and similarity of 
technical domain in alliances (Zollo et al. 2002).     
Likewise, the benefits of task-based similarities have been demonstrated in activity-to-
activity experience transfer process.  In this case, scholars examine how the firm’s experience in 
one type of corporate development activity may be transferred to another.  For example, Zollo 
and Reuer (2010) investigated the potential for internal experience transfer from a firm’s 
experience in alliances to its execution of acquisitions.  They found that the more the structural 
characteristics of the firm’s prior alliance experience mimicked the managerial processes and 
tasks associated with the focal acquisition (as per level of integration and relational quality), the 
more beneficial the alliance experience would be to the acquisition’s performance. Nadolska and 
Barkema (2007) demonstrated that, upon accumulating a sufficient level of international joint 
venture experience, the firm’s international joint venture experience would benefit its 
international acquisition performance.   
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3.2.2 Acquisition and Divestiture as Candidates for Experience Transfer 
This paper investigates whether and how a firm’s acquisition experience may be 
transferred to benefit its divestiture performance.  There are several compelling reasons to 
examine experience transfer against the backdrop of these two corporate development activities. 
For one, both acquisition and divestiture are fundamental modes of scope change.  It is 
not unusual for asset divestment to directly follow an earlier acquisition (Porter, 1976; Capron, 
Mitchell, Swaminathan, 2001).  As such, studying how these learning processes may be 
intertwined is particularly meaningful.  Their temporal proximity also makes acquisition a ready 
target when managers search “locally” for substitutable recent experience (Simon, 1955).  For 
another, there are constraints on a firm’s ability to learn to divest through experiential learning 
alone.  Certainly, there are natural limits – unlike acquisition, should a firm divest in excess, it 
will shrink into non-existence.  Further, due to its (often unfair) association with strategic failure, 
there is typically of veil of secrecy around the divestiture process, even within the firm itself 
(Ghertman, 1988; Nees, 1981).  This lack of transparency impairs the firm’s learning from its 
own past experiences.  These issues drive the need for an alternative experience source.   In 
contrast, acquisitions do not suffer from the same reputational effects, and firms normally engage 
in more acquisitions than divestitures (on average, divestitures account for only about thirty 
percent of M&A activity).  Since firms may have a better opportunity to accumulate acquisition 
experience than in divestiture, this serves to make acquisition experience a potential transfer 
source. 
Moreover, there are notable task-oriented similarities between the acquisition and 
divestiture processes.  Acquisition is often described as a two-stage process, a transaction stage 
followed by a post-deal integration stage (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Hitt et al., 2001).  The 
transaction stage includes such tasks as the identification of potential buyers, performing due 
diligence, evaluating the state of the M&A markets, financial analysis, and deal negotiation.  
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Divestiture likewise has a transaction component, and these activities are similarly performed, 
albeit in “reverse” from the seller’s, rather than the buyer’s perspective (Gole and Hilger, 2008).  
Furthermore, these transaction-focused activities are often performed by a central corporate team.  
Such teams often handle the transaction aspects of all corporate development activities, including 
both acquisition and divestiture. That the same people could be involved would greatly assist the 
experience transfer process, especially in regards to any tacit knowledge transfer that needs to 
occur (Zollo & Winter 2002).  The extent of these similarities has encouraged many scholars to 
treat acquisition and divestiture as being the two sides of the same coin, or as being located on the 
same activity spectrum. (Bingham et al., 2015; Boddewyn, 1979; Villalonga and McGahan, 
2005). 
There are, however, striking differences between the acquisition and divestiture 
processes, which could stymie experience transfer.  These differences have, in fact, caused some 
scholars to rally against their mirror-image association in research (e.g. Brauer, 2006).  The crux 
of these differences stems from the structure of the divestiture process itself.  In divestiture, the 
parent firm must fully de-integrate, or disentangle, the unit from the parent before the deal 
completes.  This is a taxing and difficult process that demands extensive managerial attention.  
Until the deal closes and the heavy lifting of integration begins, the acquisition is just a financial 
transaction to the buyer.  To the seller, divestiture is such a costly, disruptive process that some 
practitioners have likened it to divorce (as opposed to the marriage of acquisition).   Thus, with 
respect to the de-integration phase of divestiture, there appear to be few shared task similarities 
between acquisition and divestiture.  Indeed, developing a capability for integration, given the 
tight integration that could ensue, may even impair the firm’s ability to de-integrate.   
 
3.2.3 The Transfer of Acquisition Experience to Divestiture  
Although this paper is focused on internal experience transfer, and investigates whether 
and how a firm’s acquisition experience may influence its divestiture performance, the potential 
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for experiential learning in divestiture should not be neglected.  Although any learning through 
direct experience accumulation in divestiture may be insufficient for the firm’s needs, or may be a 
less attractive learning path than others available to the firm, it still merits formal consideration.  
As per the learning-by-doing arguments presented in Essay 1, it is predicted that the firm’s 
divestiture experience will benefit its divestiture performance.  Thus:      
Baseline Hypothesis (H0): Firm divestiture experience is positively associated with 
divestiture performance. 
Two avenues for experience transfer within firms are considered in this paper.  The first 
considers the direct effect that acquisition experience may have on divestiture performance.  The 
second considers the potential for a moderating effect, wherein the firm’s acquisition experience 
influences the relationship between the firm’s divestiture experience and its divestiture 
performance. 
Most studies of experience transfer in corporate development focus on the direct avenue 
of experience transfer.  In some of these studies, the presence of a curvilinear transfer relationship 
has been empirically demonstrated (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 
1999; Lavie and Miller, 2008), with transferred experience at first impairing and then benefitting 
performance in the focal situation with increasing experience accumulation.  At low levels of 
experience, firms are especially susceptible to negative experience transfer due to the 
overgeneralization of their prior experience.  They misperceive similarities between their past 
experiences and the focal situation, and consequently inappropriately apply learnings from their 
past experiences to it, thereby causing deleterious performance effects. As firms accumulate more 
experience in the source context, they are better positioned to recognize areas of true similarity 
between their past experience and the focal situation.  They are thus able to identify suitable 
learnings for transfer, which in turn positively impact performance in the focal activity.   As firms 
continue to increase their experience, the firms further improve their abilities to distinguish 
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similarities between prior experience and the focal situations, as well as select learnings to 
transfer. This mechanism is consistent with the role of absorptive capacity in firms (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990).            
While the curvilinearity of the transfer relationship has been demonstrated only in 
situational, or context-to-context transfer, the underpinning mechanisms can be reasonably 
expected to be present in the case of activity-to-activity experience transfer.  Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Firm acquisition experience has a curvilinear relationship with 
divestiture performance.  Specifically, it has a negative relationship at low levels of 
acquisition experience and a positive relationship at high levels of acquisition 
experience. 
 
Notably, in the case of acquisition-to-divestiture experience transfer, firms may well face 
a “double transfer problem” due to the need to transfer experience across not only activity, but 
context.  As such, firms may require a large amount of acquisition experience to move from the 
realm of negative transfer to positive transfer.   
In the moderating avenue for transfer, the firm’s transferred experience influences the 
relationship between the firm’s experience in the focal activity and its performance in the focal 
activity.  As such, it shapes the way in which the firm learns from its own direct experience.  In 
contrast to the direct transfer process described above, it is expected that the moderating effect of 
the transferred experience will at first benefit and then impair performance in the focal situation 
with increasing experience accumulation. 
At low levels of experience in the source activity, the firm is receptive to its adaptation in 
order to suit the needs of the focal activity.  Routines are malleable (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994). 
Although modification for transfer does require effort and resources (Zander, 1991), at low levels 
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of experience there are fewer “sunk costs” of investment in the source activity that may deter 
willingness for change.   Moreover the firm’s engagement in both the source and the target 
activities offers the benefits of distributed practice (Bingham et al., 2015).  This avoids the 
competency traps associated with increasing specialization (Levinthal and March, 1993).   
As firms accumulate more experience in the source activity, this moderating transfer path 
impairs performance in the focal activity.  Extensive experience can cause routines and 
capabilities to become deeply rooted and inflexible.  Managers have limits to their attention 
(Ocasio, 1997; Penrose, 1959), and those who are engaged in a high volume of acquisitions will 
not be motivated to take the deliberate steps needed to modify the acquisition experience for the 
divestiture context.  Moreover, with more experience in the source activity, path dependence and 
increasing familiarity with the activity will cause firms to continue to put further emphasis on its 
execution (Argote, 1999; Levitt and March, 1988). To this end, researchers have demonstrated 
that firms will skew their corporate development activities towards one primary mode (Folta and 
Miller, 2002; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005).  As this occurs, increasing specialization in the 
source activity will impair the efficacy of its transfer (Levinthal and March, 1993).  This leads to 
the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Firm acquisition experience moderates the relationship between firm 
divestiture experience and divestiture performance in a curvilinear way.  Specifically, it 
positively moderates the relationship at low levels of acquisition experience and 
negatively moderates the relationship at high levels of acquisition experience. 
 
An illustration of the model proposed by the hypotheses is provided in Figure 3.  
 
--- Insert Figure 3 here --- 
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3.3 METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1 Data & Sample 
This study begins with a cross-industry sample of publicly-traded, U.S. headquartered 
parent firms that made at least one divestiture announcement from 1985-2010, which reflects 
10,552 unique parent firms.  Both their divestitures and acquisitions announced during this period 
are considered in the analysis.  By definition, all divestitures represent a loss of majority control 
in the target unit.  Similarly, in this paper, only acquisitions in which the firm acquires one 
hundred percent of the target in a single transaction (“full acquisitions”) are considered for the 
analysis.  This ensures that the acquisitions and divestitures examined are comparably appropriate 
platforms from which to explore the theoretical mechanisms of interest in this paper.  Data 
sources included the Thomson ONE M&A database for transaction information and Compustat 
and CRSP for firm and target information.  Data were further hand-collected for one of the 
divestiture performance variables (Gain-to-Assets, described subsequently) using firms’ 
regulatory filings (e.g., the 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K reports).  Data for one of the instrumental 
variables used in this paper (Restatements, also described subsequently) stem from SEC financial 
reporting records.  The sample and data are fully described in the “Data & Sample” section of 
Essay 1.    
3.3.2 Variables 
This research is focused on the potential for experience transfer between corporate 
strategic activities. Specifically, this paper investigates whether and how a firm’s acquisition 
experience may be associated with its divestiture performance.  In order to fully explore this 
possible relationship, four dependent variables are used to measure divestiture performance.  
Each of these divestiture performance measures captures a different aspect of the divestiture 
process; the role of acquisition experience may vary across them.  There are two primary 
independent variables, one that measures firm divestiture experience and another that measures 
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firm acquisition experience.  A variety of control variables that capture both firm and unit 
characteristics are used to address possible alternative explanations.  Variables that apply to the 
coarsened exact matching models and the Heckman selection model are later described in detail 
in the “Analyses and Results” section.     
3.3.2.1 Dependent variables 
Divestiture performance is the outcome of primary interest in this paper, and it is 
measured in four ways: Announcement Date CAR, Completion, Duration, and Gain-to-Assets.  
First, Announcement Date CAR, a market-based measure of performance, reflects the 
firm’s cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) associated with the public announcement of the 
divestiture.  The event study procedures used to calculate Announcement Date CAR are detailed 
in Essay 1.  As in Essay 1, each firm’s risk-adjusted returns were estimated for a 250 day period 
starting 800 days prior to its divestiture announcement, and the firm’s abnormal returns were 
calculated over a three-day window around the date of the divestiture announcement.11  A firm’s 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around an event date of interest is a commonly used market-
based performance measure in the corporate strategy context (Alexander et al., 1984; Brauer, 
2006; Feldman et al., 2014; Jain, 1985; MacKinlay, 1997).  In the divestiture process, the firm’s 
announcement of its intent to divest a business unit is a major event.  The announcement date 
marks the start of the divestiture process, after which the selling firm begins to disentangle and 
separate the unit from its operations.  The firm’s actions at the start of the process help determine 
how well it is positioned to execute those that remain.  These initial, stage-setting activities could 
include the likes of the disclosure of a targeted sale price, the engagement of outside experts (e.g. 
investment banks, consulting firms), communication initiatives about the divestiture to 
                                                     
11 Conclusions are robust to the use of an alternative 150-day estimation window [-515, -366] for the firm’s 
expected returns. Conclusions are also robust to the use of numerous alternative event windows (i.e.  [-1, 
0], [0, +1], [-2, +2], [-3, +3]) with both estimation windows.  
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stakeholders, and unit “ringfencing” (i.e. delineating which assets and resources will be included 
in the sale).  The importance of announcement date is considerable in the divestiture process – 
since the costs of terminating a divestiture are substantive for the firm, the announcement signals 
the firm’s genuine commitment to the divestiture.  Consequences to reversal of other corporate 
strategic intentions, such as plans to engage in an alliance or merger, are not as severe as in the 
divestiture case, and thus the firm’s commitment to the process at the time of announcement may 
be weaker in those cases versus that of divestiture.  Announcement date is such a significant 
event in the divestiture process that announcement date-based CAR has been a dominant measure 
of divestiture performance in the strategy literature to date (Bergh et al., 2008; Colak and Whited, 
2007; Comment and Jarell, 1995; Feldman, 2015; Hite and Owers, 1983, John and Ofek, 1995).  
Completion is an indicator variable set equal to one if the divestiture transaction was 
completed, and set equal to zero if it was incomplete.  Incomplete divestitures may result from 
situations such as the parent withdrawing the unit from sale due to a lack of interested buyers or 
the parent and acquirer failing to agree to final terms.  Process completion is a fundamental 
measure of process performance that has served as an important outcome measure throughout the 
strategy literature, for processes as varied as acquisitions, new product launches, initial public 
offerings, and CEO succession (Dikova et al., 2010; Muehlfeld et al., 2012).  In corporate 
strategy, failed processes (or, even more specifically, failed deals) involve significant financial, 
operational, and reputational costs (Bradley et al., 1983; Fabozzi et al., 1988).  The impetus for 
process completion is especially salient in divestiture for selling firms.  Divestitures that fail to 
complete are disastrous scenarios for the parent firm, since the units gain “damaged goods” or 
“passed over” reputations, making subsequent attempts at their divestiture difficult.  In order to 
make another attempt at the unit’s sale, the parent firm may now have to invest in the unit to 
improve its prospects.  Further, the parent’s bargaining position with potential buyers in 
subsequent negotiations is weakened, not only from the initial failure and the loss of a prospective 
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buyer, but also from a reduction in information asymmetry (and perhaps buyer willingness to 
pay) since due diligence information about the unit from the prior sale process may have diffused.  
Thus, divestiture completion is viewed in the trade as a fundamental divestiture process 
performance objective (cf. Gole & Hilger, 2008; Kelly, 2002; Smith, 2012). 
Duration measures the elapsed time of the divestiture process, from the announcement 
date to the close date of the transaction, in units of days. Process duration is seen as a key process 
characteristic throughout the strategic management literature, in such contexts as project 
management, organizational change, technology development, and M&A (Eisenhardt and 
Tabrizi, 1995; Ethiraj et al., 2005; Homburg and Bucerius, 2006; Luypaert and De Maeseneire, 
2015; McCrostle et al., 2015; Puranam et al., 2006; Schoonhoven et al., 1990).  The longer the 
process takes, the longer that managerial and other firm resources are committed to the process 
and unavailable for other value-generating opportunities.  Moreover, longer processes are more 
susceptible to losses and overruns than shorter ones, since employee turnover and forecasting 
challenges arise as material and potentially damaging issues to the process over time.  Duration is 
similarly salient for the divestiture process.  The complexities of divestiture, especially those 
associated with separating the unit from the parent firm, serve to exacerbate the lengthiness of its 
process duration.  In divestiture, the deal process places the selling firm into a “holding pattern,” 
in which it is unable to move forward with its strategic plans until the divestiture is complete.  
This limbo-like period also creates uncertainty for internal stakeholders (e.g. employees, 
executive talent) and external stakeholders (e.g. customers, suppliers, investors), which can 
negatively impact firm operations and performance. Moreover, the longer the divestiture drags 
on, the more likely it is that the competitive value of the business unit’s assets will diminish 
(Baer, 1999).  In sum, it is understandable that shorter divestiture processes are viewed as better 
than longer ones by industry practitioners and experts (cf. Clark et al. 2013, Gole & Hilger 2008, 
Ross et al. 2012).   
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Lastly, Gain-to-Assets, a financially-based performance variable, is a ratio calculated as 
the gain (or loss) on sale from the divestiture divided by the parent firm’s total assets.  
Financially-based performance is a key process outcome in strategic management, although it is 
not always easy to measure.  While metrics like process revenues and profitability are natural 
candidates, it can sometimes be challenging to obtain these results for processes that have an 
indirect impact on the bottom line, such as employee corporate training initiatives, corporate 
branding campaigns, and R&D.  In other cases, even though the process-specific financials may 
be available, it can be difficult to translate them to firm financial impact, due to factors like 
corporate overhead costs (Ethiraj et al., 2005).  As a result, the ways in which process financial 
performance may be meaningfully assessed varies widely throughout the strategic management 
literature, and may be specific to the process of interest.  In the case of corporate transactions like 
divestitures and acquisitions, understanding how much money the firm made on the deal is 
valuable, and it tracks directly to the firm’s execution of the process (Beckman and Haunschild, 
2002; Haunschild, 1994; Laamanen, 2007).  In acquisitions of public firms, the bid price may be 
translated into a share premium since the target firm has been valued by the financial market.  
Although such a valuation is not available for divestitures, the financial gain on sale provides a 
reasonable alternative (Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992).  In divestiture, the financial gain (or loss) on 
sale is an audited number that the firm includes in its regulatory filings. Gain on sale reflects the 
difference between the unit’s sale price and its fair market value.  Thus, gain on sale represents 
the price premium associated with the divestiture. The higher the premium, the more value that 
the firm was able to capture throughout the divestiture process and the better that the firm was 
able to preserve (or even augment) the value of the unit during the process.  Accordingly, gain on 
sale is a process-level outcome financial performance measure, not a firm-level one.  Data for this 
variable were hand-collected from firms’ regulatory filings for divestitures announced in 2005.   
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In addition to the divestiture performance variables, Gain Disclosed is another dependent 
variable that is used in conjunction with the Heckman selection models (described subsequently 
in the “Analyses and Results” section).  
3.3.2.2 Independent variables 
The variables Divestiture Experience and Acquisition Experience reflect the cumulative 
count of divestiture and acquisition transactions, respectively, undertaken by the firm over the 
three years prior to the focal divestiture.  Measuring experience within a window of the firm’s 
recent history is an approach that is frequently employed by strategic management researchers 
(Anand and Khanna, 2000; Beckman and Haunschild, 2002; Bergh and Lim, 2008; Brauer et al., 
2014; Ellis et al. 2011; Fowler and Schmidt, 1989; Shimizu and Hitt, 2005).  Evaluating recent 
experience is particularly appropriate when studying experience transfer.  Inferences from the 
firm’s more recent experience are more relevant and readily accessible by the firm than are those 
from the firm’s more distant experience, and diminishing organizational memories may impair 
the efficacy of more distant learnings (Argote et al., 1990; Ingram and Baum, 1997; Levitt and 
March, 1988).  Moreover, employee tenures in a particular role are not typically expected to last 
more than several years; unless transaction learning is thoroughly codified, attrition or internal 
relocation of employees involved in prior transactions would make inferences from those prior 
experiences unavailable for application to the focal transaction (Hayward, 2002; Levitt and 
March, 1988, Zollo and Winter, 2002). Furthermore, the use of a three-year experience window 
removes any empirical concerns due to potential left censoring of the transaction counts. Both 
complete and incomplete divestitures are included in the calculation of Divestiture Experience 
and Acquisition Experience, since firms still have the opportunity to learn from their experiences, 
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irrespective of whether  the performance outcome is successful or not (Madsen and Desai, 2010; 
Muehlfeld, 2012).12 
Additionally, Segment Count and Restatements are instrument variables that are used in 
the first stage of the Heckman selection models. These will be described in the discussion of the 
Heckman selection models in the “Analyses and Results” section.  
3.3.2.3 Control variables 
The control variables are fully described in the corresponding section in Essay 1. One 
group of control variables controlled for a number of important characteristics of the parent firm, 
including its size (ln(Total Assets)), financial health (Negative Net Income, Leverage, Tobin’s q), 
management efficiency (Return on Equity) and diversification (Herfindahl Index).  These 
variables are lagged by one year prior to the year of the divestiture announcement in order to 
reflect the state of firm prior to the initiation of the divestiture process.  The second group of 
control variables served to characterize the relationship between the business unit and the parent 
firm. These included: Unit-Parent Size Ratio, Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness and Unit-
Parent Industrial Relatedness.  Finally, Divestiture Program captures a key aspect of the parent 
firm’s divestiture operations.  
3.4 ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables used in the analyses are 
presented in Table 7.  The descriptive statistics for Divestiture Experience show that firms 
engaged, on average, in 6.1 divestiture transactions over a three-year window. The median for 
Divestiture Experience is lower, at 2.0 divestiture transactions, suggesting that there are firms that 
                                                     
12Results are consistent with the use of different experience windows (e.g., five-year windows) and to the 
inclusion of only completed transactions in the experience count.  
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are actively divesting and thus raising the average higher.  The statistics for Acquisition 
Experience show that firms engaged in an average of 8.5 acquisition transactions over a three-
year window.  The median for Acquisition Experience is likewise lower, at 3.0 acquisition 
transactions.  It bears repeating that only divestitures in which the parent loses majority control 
are included in these counts, as are only acquisitions in which the entire target organization was 
acquired.    
Divestiture Experience shows a strongly significant correlation (p<0.01) with three of the 
divestiture performance variables (Announcement Date CAR, Completion, Duration), although 
the correlation is not in the direction hypothesized in H0 for any of the three relationships.  The 
correlation between Divestiture Experience and Gain-to-Assets is not significant, and moreover is 
not in the direction hypothesized.  Given the inconsistent expectations relating corporate 
development experience to performance in the extant literature, this result is not especially 
surprising and speaks to the importance of appropriate model specification.  Acquisition 
Experience has a significant correlation (p<0.01) with only one of the divestiture performance 
variables (Announcement Date CAR).  This correlation is negative; the sign of this average 
relationship aligns with the negative association that was hypothesized for low levels of 
acquisition experience in H1.            
The descriptive statistics for the divestiture performance outcome variables show that 
seventy-seven percent of divestiture transactions completed and that these took, on average, fifty-
one days to complete.  Given the adverse consequences associated with incomplete transactions 
for firms, this completion rate is understandable. On average, parent firms see a gain (rather than 
a loss) on sale for a divestiture, corresponding to a mean Gain-to-Assets of 2.8%.  The results for 
Announcement Date CAR indicate that the market on average responds favorably to a firm’s 
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announcement of a divestiture transaction (with an average Announcement Date CAR of 0.9%).13  
Additionally, Announcement Date CAR was tested and found to be statistically different from 
zero at the one percent level of significance, further validating these results.                 
--- Insert Table 7 here --- 
3.4.2 Model Specification 
There are two regression models of central interest in this paper, which are used to test 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, respectively.  These models are as follows: 
 
Equation 1: Regression Model for Testing Hypothesis 1 
 
Equation 2: Regression Model for Testing Hypothesis 2 
 
 
                                                     
13 As noted earlier, these average CAR values were calculated using a 250-day estimation window with a 3-
day event window ([-800, -551] and [-1, +1]) in the event study procedure.  The average positive CAR 
results for announcement date are consistent across the estimation-event window combinations (using two 
estimation windows and five event windows, as described in the Variables section). Average 
Announcement Date CAR results ranged from 0.8% to 1.1%.      
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The divestiture performance variable Y has four alternatives (Announcement Date CAR, 
Completion, Duration, Gain-to-Assets), and therefore the performance metric index k has a range 
of one to four.  The models for Completion, Duration, and Gain-to-Assets include all ten control 
variables described earlier. The models for Announcement Date CAR use seven of the control 
variables. Since CAR is based on market performance, it was necessary to exclude any controls 
that are also based on market performance (Leverage, Tobin’s q, and Unit-Parent Size Ratio) 
from the models using Announcement Date CAR as the dependent variable.   
In Equation 1, the presence of the hypothesized curvilinear relationship between 
acquisition experience and divestiture performance will be tested using the quadratic term for 
Acquisition Experience.  The linear and quadratic terms of Acquisition Experience will together 
be used to test the specific characteristics of the posited relationship (i.e. negative at low levels 
and positive at high levels of acquisition experience). In Equation 2, the two interaction terms 
(between Divestiture Experience and each of the linear and quadratic terms of Acquisition 
Experience) will be used to test the hypothesized moderating role that acquisition experience may 
play in the relationship between divestiture experience and divestiture performance.  It bears 
highlighting that to properly test for the hypothesized direct relationship between acquisition 
experience and divestiture performance in Hypothesis 1, it would not be appropriate to examine 
the linear and quadratic terms of Acquisition Experience in Equation 2.  Attempting to use 
Equation 2 to do so would only provide the conditional effect of Acquisition Experience on 
divestiture performance (i.e. technically reflecting the case of zero Divestiture Experience).  In 
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contrast, the estimation of Equation 1 (which does not have interaction terms) provides the main 
effect of Acquisition Experience on divestiture performance Y.      
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to estimate the models for Announcement 
Date CAR. Logistic regression is used to estimate the models for Completion, as Completion is a 
binary outcome variable. Negative binomial regression is used to estimate the models for 
Duration.  Negative binomial regression can help to correct for overdispersion in models with 
count outcome variables.  In all regressions, industry fixed effects (based on the parent firm’s 
primary 2-digit SIC code) are included to control for all stable industry characteristics (both 
observable and unobservable) that may drive divestiture performance.  Year fixed effects are also 
used throughout, except in the regression for Gain-to-Assets (since all observations correspond to 
divestitures announced in 2005). Year fixed effects are included to control for macroeconomic 
conditions that may influence divestiture performance results.14    
Lastly, coarsened exact matching procedures are used to address non-random selection in 
the divestiture decision, and a two-stage Heckman selection model is used to control for a 
possible selection issue with Gain-to-Assets. These are discussed in the sections that follow. 
3.4.3 The Choice to Divest 
At its heart, this paper explores drivers of divestiture performance heterogeneity.  An 
obvious prerequisite for divestiture performance is the firm’s decision to engage in divestiture.  
However, there may be non-random selection associated with the firm’s decision to divest, which 
                                                     
14 While firm fixed effects would provide the strongest identification, this approach causes firms that have 
divested only once (corresponding to 4095 observations) to be dropped from the analysis.  Additionally, for 
the regression for Gain-to-Assets, firms which engaged in only one divestiture in 2005 (the year for which 
Gain-to-Assets data is available) would similarly be dropped from the analysis.  Furthermore, for the 
regression for Completion, firms which had no variation in their completion performance (i.e. all completed 
divestitures or all incomplete divestitures) would also be dropped from the analysis.  As an alternative, 
robust standard errors clustered by firm are used with all regressions. This serves to help address the 
potential for systemic firm idiosyncrasies that may be influencing divestiture process performance. 
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could, in turn, bias the firm’s divestiture performance results. Coarsened exact matching 
procedures are used to address this possibility. 
The procedure is the same as described in Essay 1.  Here, as in Essay 1, potential bias 
stemming from two choices -- both the firm’s decision to divest and also the firm’s decision to 
divest a particular business unit – are considered.     
To start, the first stage probit regression was used to estimate the propensity of a firm to 
divest a particular business unit (i.e. one that is operating in a particular industry) in a certain 
year.  Business segment data from Compustat was used to proxy for the firm’s business units. The 
binary dependent variable was Opportunity Taken, which is equal to one if the firm had a 
business segment operating in a certain industry in a certain year and also decided to divest it.  It 
is equal to zero if the firm had a business segment operating in a certain industry in a certain year 
(thus it had the opportunity to make a divestiture in this industry), but did not make any 
divestitures in that segment’s industry.  Business segment data was obtained from Compustat. 
Strict standards for coarsening were imposed on a variety of firm characteristics, including assets, 
revenues, net income, and leverage.  Exact matches were required for year (of divestiture 
announcement) and business unit industry (at the 2-digit SIC level).  The strata bands for the 
continuous firm characteristics variables were set on a percentile basis (i.e. minimum-p1-p5-p25-
p50-p75-p95-p99-maximum).  This stringency helped to ensure sharp, high quality matches.  The 
treated observations that were members of treated-control matched pairs were then used in the 
second stage regression, which estimated divestiture performance.  This regression was repeated 
for each of the four divestiture performance variables.  Results were consistent with those of the 
baseline regression results (Model 1 in Table 8, Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11).  A comparison 
between the regression results using the full sample versus the CEM sample (Table 14 in the 
Appendix) illustrates the robustness of the results to controlling for non-random selection in the 
firm’s decision to divest a particular business unit. 
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--- Refer to Appendix Table 14 here --- 
The coarsened exact matching process was repeated to address the issue of non-random 
selection stemming from the firm’s decision to divest in a particular year.  This non-random 
selection issue (the firm’s choice to divest at all in a particular year) is more general than the 
discussed above (the firm’s choice to divest a business unit operating in a particular industry in a 
particular year).  Here, the dependent variable used in the first stage was Divested, which is equal 
to one if the firm divested in a particular year, and zero otherwise.  The variables used in the first 
stage regression model are the same with the exception of the industry variable, which here is the 
2-digit SIC code of the parent firm. The coarsening and regression procedures were the same as 
in the case above.  Results were again consistent with those from the full sample (Model 1 in 
Table 8, Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11). 
While this paper is premised on exploring drivers of divestiture performance 
heterogeneity, it further considers the role that firm acquisition experience may play in shaping 
divestiture performance.  Embedded in firm acquisition experience is the firm’s choice to acquire.  
Ideally, the treated observations that were members of treated-control matched pairs from the 
divestiture-based coarsened exact matching would then be put through a second coarsened exact 
matching procedure that was designed to address the firm’s decision to acquire.  Operationally, 
performing this two-step coarsened exact matching process is not feasible.  The industry 
segments that are in play for the divestiture matching are not the same as those candidates for the 
acquisition matching, which severely limits the sample and overwhelms the matching attempts.  
While addressing the decision to acquire would have been a useful robustness check, this paper is 
fundamentally about divestiture, and the firm’s decision to divest.  Hence, the results of the 
coarsened exact matching procedures that were successfully performed provide valuable 
confirmation of the efficacy of the results.      
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3.4.4 Heckman Selection Model 
As described in Essay 1, there is a potential selection problem associated with the Gain-
to-Assets divestiture performance variable since the firm has some discretion in terms of whether 
and how it reports the gain (or loss) on the divestiture sale in its regulatory filings.  A Heckman 
selection model is used to address the possibility of any resultant selection bias.    
The first stage of the two-stage Heckman selection model uses Gain Disclosed as its 
binary dependent variable, and predicts the firm’s disclosure of the divestiture’s gain on sale. The 
second stage of the model estimates the OLS regression with Gain-to-Assets as the dependent 
variable.  Two instrumental variables are used in the first stage model: Segment Count, which is 
equal to the number of the firm’s business segments reported by the firm in the year prior to the 
divestiture announcement; and the binary Restatements, which is equal to one when the parent 
firm operates in an industry that is characterized as having firms that issue a high number of 
restatements of their financial reports filed with the SEC.   
Firms with more segments are high-disclosure firms relative to firms with fewer 
segments, and it is expected that such “high disclosure” firms are more likely to explicitly report 
the gain on sale associated with their divestitures. Therefore, as Segment Count increases, the 
likelihood that the firm will report the gain on sale also increases, but there is no reason to expect 
that Segment Count should be correlated with the divestiture’s gain on sale in the Gain-to-Assets 
ratio.  Likewise, firms that are subject to restatement requirements (wherein the restatements were 
due to major issues that rendered the firm’s financials unreliable) are more likely to be aggressive 
in their accounting approaches than others.  Firms that are members of high restatement industries 
are thus less likely to report the gain on sale associated with their divestitures than those which 
are not.  However, whether or not the firm is a member of a high-disclosure industry has no 
bearing on the gain (or loss) realized on the divestiture sale itself, and therefore Restatements is 
not expected to be correlated with Gain-to-Assets. 
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 The results for the Heckman selection model are presented in Table 12 and are discussed 
in the next section.  As will be seen, there is no evidence to suggest that selection bias is an issue 
in the Gain-to-Assets regression results.                
3.4.5 Hypothesis Testing 
The OLS regression results for Announcement Date CAR are presented in Table 8.  The 
logit model regression results for Completion are provided in Table 9.  The negative binomial 
regression results for Duration are provided in Table 10.  The OLS regression results for Gain-to-
Assets are presented in Table 11.  In each of these tables, for its respective divestiture 
performance measure, Model 1 may be used to test the baseline hypothesis H0, Model 6 may be 
used to test H1, and Model 7 may be used to test H2.  The tables are constructed such that the 
simplest model (for testing H0) is illustrated first.  Key model components are then added in a 
step-by-step fashion, culminating in the models used to test H1 and H2.  
--- Insert Table 8, Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11 here --- 
 
It merits highlighting that, for the Duration performance regressions (Table 10), a 
decrease in the duration of the divestiture process is interpreted as a positive performance result, 
since firms typically want divestiture transactions to close as quickly as possible.  For the other 
three performance variables, positive increases (e.g. a larger Announcement Date CAR) are 
viewed as beneficial improvements in performance.   
The units of measurement used in the regression results also deserve special mention.  
Since OLS was used to estimate the models for Announcement Date CAR and Gain-to-Assets, the 
estimated coefficients in Table 8 and Table 11 are measured in the units of the outcome variable 
divided by the units of its predictor variable.   In contrast, since logistic regression was used to 
estimate Completion, the estimated coefficients in Table 9 are measured in units of log-odds.  
These coefficients may be converted into odds ratios through exponentiation.  Furthermore, since 
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negative binomial regression was used to estimate Duration, the estimated coefficients in Table 
10 are interpreted as a difference between the logs of the expected counts (i.e. duration days) for a 
unit change in the associated predictor variable. These coefficients may be converted into 
incidence rate ratios (IRR) through exponentiation.         
To start, the baseline hypothesis H0 predicts that there is a positive relationship between 
firm divestiture experience and divestiture performance.  H0 is supported when considering 
divestiture performance measured as Announcement Date CAR (p<0.05, Model 1 of Table 8), as 
Duration (p<0.01, Model 1 of Table 10), and as Gain-to-Assets (p<0.05, Model 1 of Table 11).  
As for Completion, although the coefficient estimate for Divestiture Experience is significant 
(p<0.01), its sign is negative (as opposed to the predicted positive sign).  Rather than benefitting 
divestiture completion performance, this result suggests that divestiture experience is actually 
harmful -- a one-unit increase in Divestiture Experience corresponds to a 0.0117 decrease in the 
log-odds of Completion.   
Hypothesis 1 (H1) predicts that firm acquisition experience has a curvilinear relationship 
with divestiture performance.  Even more precisely, H1 predicts that firm acquisition experience 
has a negative relationship with divestiture performance at low levels of acquisition experience, 
and a positive relationship at high levels of acquisition experience.  As a first step in testing H1, it 
is useful to return to the equation for the regression model, Equation 1.  It is restated here in a 
simplified format as Equation 3:  
Equation 3: Simplified Format of the Regression Model for Testing Hypothesis 1 
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The partial derivative of Equation 3 with respect to Acquisition Experience is:  
Equation 4: 
 
The second derivative of Equation 3 with respect to Acquisition Experience is: 
Equation 5: 
 
The presence of curvilinearity predicted in H1 is readily tested through examination of 
the second derivative in Equation 5.  Curvilinearity is present if β3≠0.   However, H1 further 
predicts the nature of the relationship (i.e. negative and then positive) between acquisition 
experience and divestiture performance.  To test this aspect of H1, the partial derivative in 
Equation 4 is required.  Here, β2 is the slope of the relationship between Acquisition Experience 
and divestiture performance Y, while 2β3 is the rate of change of the slope and is proportional to 
the curvature.  Both β2 and β3 may be positive or negative, leading to four types of curvilinear 
relationships.  These are illustrated in Figure 4.  The relationship posited in H1 is represented by 
the curve where β2<0 and β3>0 for Announcement Date CAR, Completion, and Gain-to-Assets.  
Since shorter durations are viewed as better performance, the relationship posited in H1 is 
represented by the curve where β2>0 and β3<0 for Duration. 
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--- Insert Figure 4 here --- 
 
Turning to the regression results, Model 6 in Table 8 (Announcement Date CAR), in 
Table 9 (Completion), in Table 10 (Duration), and in Table 11 (Gain-to-Assets) each correspond 
to Equation 3 above.  Starting with Announcement Date CAR, Model 6 in Table 8 shows that 
neither the coefficient estimate β2 for Acquisition Experience nor the coefficient estimate β3 for 
the quadratic Acquisition Experience predictor are significant, although their signs are in the 
directions predicted. In contrast, for Completion (Model 6 of Table 9), the curvilinearity predicted 
in H1 is supported, as the coefficient estimate β3 for the square of Acquisition Experience is non-
zero and significant (β3=0.0001, p<0.05).  Further, the predicted directionality of the relationship 
between acquisition experience and completion performance is supported, as the coefficient β2 for 
Acquisition Experience is negative (p<0.05) and β3 for the square of Acquisition Experience is 
positive (p<0.05). To further test the significance of the relationship, a joint test between the 
linear and quadratic terms was performed; the significant result (p<0.05) evidences that both 
terms have a significant effect on Completion.  Thus, H1 is supported for Completion.   
Interestingly, while the predicted curvilinearity is supported for Duration (β3≠0, p<0.01) 
in Model 6 of Table 10, the nature of the relationship is in fact opposite of that which was 
predicted in H1.  Since longer durations reflect poorer performance and shorter durations reflect 
better performance, the estimated coefficients (β2=-0.0053, p<0.10; β3=0.0001, p<0.01) indicate 
that Acquisition Experience actually has a positive relationship with Duration at low levels of 
Acquisition Experience and a negative relationship with Duration at high levels of Acquisition 
Experience.  Again, a joint test between the linear and quadratic terms was performed to further 
confirm the relationship; the significant result (p<0.01) evidences that both terms have a 
significant effect on Duration. Thus, H1 is only partially supported when divestiture performance 
is measured as Duration.  Lastly, for Gain-to-Assets, although the signs of β2 and β3 are in the 
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directions predicted, neither β2 nor β3 are significant in Model 6 of Table 11. H1 is therefore 
unsupported for Gain-to-Assets.15   
Results for H1 are summarized in Table 13.  
Next, Hypothesis 2 (H2) predicts that firm acquisition experience positively moderates 
the relationship between firm divestiture experience and divestiture performance at low levels of 
acquisition experience, and negatively moderates the relationship at high levels of acquisition 
experience. Here again, it is useful to return to the equation for the regression model Equation 2 
before testing the hypothesis.  The model is restated here in a simplified format as Equation 6:  
Equation 6: Simplified Format of the Regression Model for Testing Hypothesis 2 
 
 
 
The partial derivative of Equation 6 with respect to Divestiture Experience is:  
                                                     
15 As will be discussed, H1 is still unsupported after controlling for the effects of non-random selection in 
the firm’s disclosure of the gain on sale. 
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Equation 7:  
 
 
The hypothesized moderating role of Acquisition Experience in the relationship between 
Divestiture Experience and divestiture performance Y is easily tested using the partial derivative 
in Equation 7.  Here, β4 represents the slope of the relationship between Acquisition Experience 
and the partial derivative of performance Y with respect to Divestiture Experience (
𝜕𝑌
𝜕(𝐷𝑖𝑣. 𝐸𝑥𝑝.)
), 
while β5 is the rate of change of the slope and is proportional to the curvature.  Both β4 and β5 
may be positive or negative, leading to four types of curvilinear relationships.  These are 
illustrated in Figure 5.  The moderating relationship posited in H2 is represented by the curve 
where β4>0 and β5<0 for Announcement Date CAR, Completion, and Gain-to-Assets.  Again, 
since shorter durations are viewed as better performance, the relationship posited in H2 is 
represented by the curve where β4<0 and β5>0 for Duration.   
--- Insert Figure 5 here --- 
 
It bears highlighting that the curves depicted in Figure 5 have 
𝜕𝑌
𝜕(𝐷𝑖𝑣. 𝐸𝑥𝑝.)
 on the y-axis.  
Another way to visualize the impact of the moderating role that Acquisition Experience may be 
playing is to consider, for different values of Divestiture Experience, the relationship between 
Acquisition Experience and divestiture performance Y – in other words, to graph Equation 6, 
wherein performance Y would be on the y-axis.  Figure 6 presents the simplified case where 
β1=0. Alternatively, β1>0 in Figure 7, and the curves shift vertically accordingly. The moderating 
relationship posited in H2 is again represented by the case where β4>0 and β5<0 for 
Announcement Date CAR, Completion, and Gain-to-Assets.  For Duration, it is represented by the 
case where β4<0 and β5>0.       
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--- Insert Figure 6 and Figure 7 here --- 
 
As for the regression results, Model 7 in Table 8 (Announcement Date CAR), in Table 9 
(Completion), in Table 10 (Duration), and in Table 11 (Gain-to-Assets) are used to test H2.  The 
results in Table 8 for Announcement Date CAR show that the moderating relationship is indeed 
curvilinear, and, as hypothesized, has positive slope (β4>0; p<0.01) and negative curvature (β5<0; 
p<0.05). The significance of the interaction terms in Equation 6 was further evidenced though a 
joint test of the coefficients (p<0.01).  H2 is therefore supported for Announcement Date CAR.  
For Completion, although the slope of the moderating relationship is positive and significant 
(β4=0.0005; p<0.01), there is no evidence of curvilinearity (β5 is insignificant) in Model 7 of 
Table 9. The relationship between Acquisition Experience and  
𝜕𝑌
𝜕(𝐷𝑖𝑣. 𝐸𝑥𝑝.)
  is simply positive and 
linear.  A joint test further confirmed the significance of this linear relationship (p<0.01) in 
Equation 6.  H2 is thus partially supported for Completion.  
Turning to the results for Duration in Model 7 of Table 10, it is seen that the relationship 
between Acquisition Experience and  
𝜕𝑌
𝜕(𝐷𝑖𝑣. 𝐸𝑥𝑝.)
 is curvilinear as hypothesized, but has positive 
slope (β4>0; p<0.01) and negative curvature (β5<0; p<0.01).  A joint test was again used to 
confirm the significance of the interaction terms (p<0.01) in Equation 6.  Keeping in mind that 
longer durations are viewed as performance-impairing, these results suggest that acquisition 
experience negatively moderates the relationship between firm divestiture experience and 
divestiture performance across both low and high levels of acquisition experience.  Thus, H2 is 
partially supported for Duration.   
Lastly, in Model 7 of Table 11 for Gain-to-Assets, the results support the hypothesized 
curvilinear relationship between Acquisition Experience and  
𝜕𝑌
𝜕(𝐷𝑖𝑣. 𝐸𝑥𝑝.)
 , with positive slope 
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(β4=0.0004; p<0.10) and negative curvature (β5<0; p<0.05). These results therefore support H2.  
However, there is the possibility that these results are biased due to non-random selection in the 
firm’s decision to disclose the gain on sale.  This possibility is tested (and confirmed to not be an 
issue, as per Table 12) in the next section.   
          Results for H1 and H2 are summarized in Table 13.  
--- Insert Table 13 here --- 
3.4.6 Robustness Test – Controlling for Non-Random Selection in Gain on Sale Disclosure 
The regression results for Gain-to-Assets in Table 11 may be biased as a result of 
possible non-random selection in the firm’s decision to disclose the gain on sale. A two-stage 
Heckman selection model (Table 12) is used to address this potential bias.  In this model, the first 
stage regression (Model A-1) predicts disclosure of the gain on sale (used in the calculation of 
Gain-to-Assets), and the second stage estimates the OLS regression with Gain-to-Assets as the 
dependent variable (Models 1-7).           
--- Insert Table 12 here ---   
Notably, the two instrumental variables in Model A-1, Segment Count and Restatements 
are both significant (p<0.01 and p<.10, respectively).  Moreover, the coefficient of Segment 
Count is positive (indicating that an increase in Segment Count corresponds to an increase in the 
likelihood of Gain Disclosed), which is as expected. The coefficient of Restatements is negative 
(indicating that firms that are members of high restatement industries are less likely to disclose 
the gain on sale than those firms which are not members of high restatement industries), which is 
also as expected.  Additionally, the combination of these two instruments passes the 
overidentification test (2 = 10.19 with p<0.01), further supporting the validity of the instruments. 
These combined results make a compelling case for the strength and appropriateness of Segment 
Count and Restatements as instrumental variables in this Heckman selection model.   
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Furthermore, a comparison of the second stage coefficient estimates in Models 1-7 of 
Table 12 with those of the original OLS regression models in Table 11 shows excellent 
consistency in the significance of the independent variables and interaction terms across the 
models.  Overall, the magnitude of the second stage Heckman selection model estimates tend to 
be somewhat larger than those in the original OLS regression.  These results suggest that non-
random selection on Gain Disclosed is not biasing the regression results.  Lastly, Lambda (i.e. the 
inverse Mills Ratio) is not significant in any of the second stage models (Models 1-7).  This 
further evidences that selection bias is not an issue for the Gain-to-Assets results. Therefore, 
overall, even after controlling for the effects of non-random selection, the original conclusions 
still stand: H0 is supported, H1 is unsupported, and H3 is supported when divestiture performance 
is measured as Gain-to-Assets. 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
 This paper explores the potential for experience transfer within firms. It focuses on 
“task-to-task,” or “activity-to-activity” transfer, and considers if experience gained in a firm’s 
execution of one activity is transferable to its execution of another.  Specifically, this research 
examines whether and how a firm’s acquisition experience may influence its divestiture 
performance.  Two primary avenues for experience transfer are considered: direct and 
moderating.  In the first, the firm’s acquisition experience is directly applied to its execution of 
divestiture.  Stated differently, this path represents the question of whether a firm’s learning how 
to acquire directly impacts its implementation of divestiture.  In the second, the transfer of the 
firm’s acquisition experience moderates the relationship between the firm’s divestiture experience 
and its divestiture performance.  This path for transfer surfaces the issue of whether a firm’s 
learning how to acquire impacts its learning how to divest. 
The results reveal five key insights:   
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1. Experience transfer from acquisition to divestiture occurs in both a direct and a 
moderating way, although not consistently and not always in the manner 
expected. 
2. These transfer processes are often curvilinear, indicating that acquisition 
experience transfer can be beneficial and detrimental to divestiture.  
3. Viewed together, the results for the four performance variables reveal that 
tradeoffs between them are unavoidable. 
4. At times, acquisition experience was found to have a comparable or even greater 
association with divestiture performance than divestiture experience itself. 
5. Evidenced via statistical significance, the transfer relationships between 
acquisition and divestiture are frequently strong, suggesting the importance of 
their concurrent rather than separate consideration.    
The rationale for each of these insights will be provided in turn in the remainder of this 
section, along with their implications.  Interpretation and discussion will draw upon graphical 
illustration of the regression model results as well as the tables themselves.16 17      
                                                     
16 Consideration of significance of estimated coefficients is an important component of evaluation of 
hypothesis support, although it is not the only one.  As indicated in the tables, this paper uses a minimum 
cutoff of significance at the 10% level, and the figures used in this discussion depict only significant 
coefficients from the models.  Stated differently, these figures assume the coefficients of the insignificant 
terms to be at zero. In actuality, these coefficients may be non-zero.  As such, the figures that include the 
full model, irrespective of the significance of coefficient estimates, are included in the Appendix (Figure 
13, Figure 16, Figure 19, and Figure 20).  
17 Since there was overwhelming evidence that selection bias due to firm disclosure of the gain on sale was 
not biasing the results, the original OLS results for Gain-to-Assets are the primary reference in this 
discussions.  These models are depicted in the graphs.  Graphs using the second stage Heckman Selection 
model results are included in the Appendix (Figure 15, Figure 18, Figure 23, and Figure 24 for models 
which include only significant terms; and Figure 14, Figure 17, Figure 21, and Figure 22 for models 
which include all terms, significant and insignificant). 
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--- Insert Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 11 here ---   
 
1. Experience transfer from acquisition to divestiture occurs in both a direct and a moderating 
way, although not consistently and not always in the manner expected. 
As illustrated in Figure 8, the relationship between Acquisition Experience and 
Completion is a case of direct experience transfer where the effects are as hypothesized, wherein 
acquisition experience impairs divestiture completion performance at low levels of experience 
and improves it at high levels.  Interestingly, while the rate of impairment does indeed start to 
slow with more acquisition experience, the large majority of firms would not experience its 
positive direct transfer benefits, since the transition from negative to positive (at the curve’s 
minimum) occurs well after sixty, which is comfortably beyond typical acquisition experience 
levels.  
Performance measured as deal duration exemplifies a case where direct transfer occurs, 
but does not occur in the manner expected. While an inverted U-relationship was hypothesized, 
Figure 8 shows the reverse, with acquisition experience benefitting divestiture performance at 
lower levels of acquisition experience (until the curve’s minimum, at ~50 acquisitions) and then 
impairing it at the higher levels. For the cases of performance measured as Announcement Date 
CAR and Gain-to-Assets, there is no apparent direct transfer of acquisition experience to 
divestiture performance (or it plays a neutral role). This neutral effect (or non-effect) is 
demonstrated by the horizontal curves depicted in Figure 8, which stand in contrast to the upside-
down U shapes that were hypothesized.  In both cases, the curves shift upwards as divestiture 
experience increases.    
The mixed results are also apparent in the results for the moderating transfer relationship. 
In Figure 10, the partial derivative of divestiture performance with respect to Divestiture 
Experience has the predicted inverted-U shape for both Announcement Date CAR and Gain-to-
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Assets but the shape of the curvilinearity runs counter to predictions for Duration.  Further, the 
relationship for completion is not in the manner hypothesized, as it is strictly positive.  
An important implication of this insight is the importance of considering both the direct 
and moderating paths to transfer.  The direct mechanism in activity-based transfer has been 
considered in only a handful of studies to date (Nadolska and Barkema 2007; Zollo and Reuer, 
2010), where alliance-to-acquisition and joint venture-to-acquisition experience transfers were 
considered.  As such, these studies considered transfer between processes that may be categorized 
along the spectrum of scope expansion activities.  In this research, the consideration of 
acquisition-to-divestiture continues with and contributes to the approach of considering transfer 
between core strategic activities.  However, this research further introduces a new lens on the 
phenomenon, as the activities reflect two distinct, and oppositional, firm requirements – to grow 
and to shrink.  The inconsistencies in the results may reflect the fact that, while the task-based 
similarities between scope expansion and scope contraction is sufficient for transfer for some 
aspects of the activities, they are not for others (suggested by the non- or neutral transfer effects).  
Moreover, the evidence for negative transfer effects suggests that challenges to learning, such as 
inappropriate generalization, are in play. 
The moderating transfer effect, wherein the transfer of acquisition experience serves to 
moderate the relationship between divestiture experience and divestiture performance, has not 
previously been considered in the intra-firm experience transfer literature.  As the results serve to 
validate the efficacy of this learning path, and given the power of their implications – that 
learning in one activity can influence the learning process of another -- clearly merits future 
scholarly consideration.   
2. These transfer processes are often curvilinear, indicating that acquisition experience transfer 
can be beneficial and detrimental to divestiture. 
Both the results for Completion and Duration demonstrate curvilinearity in their direct 
transfer relationships.  The contour plots of Figure 9 show that lower levels of acquisition 
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experience are associated with higher likelihood of completion, with the curvilinear effect 
evidenced by the varying distance between the horizontal contour lines.  For Duration, Figure 9 
shows that high acquisition experience and high divestiture experience is the most desirable 
combination until the curve minimum, after which it will diminish.  For any given level of 
divestiture experience, acquisition experience of approximately fifty gives the shortest duration.   
Curvilinearity is demonstrated in the moderating transfer relationships for divestiture 
performance measured as Announcement Date CAR, Duration (although not in the direction 
hypothesized), and Gain-to-Assets.  The transition points (e.g. from a positive to a negative 
relationship or the reverse) are visible in Figure 10: ~60 for Announcement Date CAR (at which 
point a relatively flat, or neutral period begins), ~50 for Duration, and ~35 for Gain-to-Assets. 
Notably, each of these transition points are on the high end of typical acquisition experience, but 
are still possible nonetheless. Thus, firms may experience a “flip” in the way in which acquisition 
experience is associated with the relationship between divestiture experience and divestiture 
performance.   
The frequent presence of curvilinear transfer relationships in these results brings the 
double-edged sword of experience into sharp relief (Levinthal and March, 1993). While there are 
tangible performance benefits stemming from the transfer of the firm’s acquisition experience (in 
both the direct and moderating paths), the consequences are palpable as well.  Indeed, transfer 
represents the potential for a non-result (i.e. a failure to transfer), the potential for transfer to 
occur in a performance-enhancing way (i.e. transfer occurs and the experience is properly 
applied), and also the potential that the transfer will occur but in a performance-harming way (i.e. 
transfer occurs, but is mis-transferred and inappropriately applied).  The curvilinearity in the 
results illustrate how experience can be both a hero and a villain in organizational learning.  The 
firm’s own experience can both help and hurt its performance. 
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Furthermore, considering and investigating a curvilinear moderating relationship in this 
organization learning context proved to yield valuable insights.  These results suggest that, rather 
than simply assuming a linear relationship, the possibility for the presence of curvilinear 
moderating relationships merits ongoing consideration.      
3. Viewed together, the results for the four performance variables reveal that tradeoffs between 
them are unavoidable. 
Regarding the direct transfer relationship, there is a tradeoff between Completion and 
Duration performance. This is perhaps most easily seen in Figure 8.  For acquisition experience 
of less than about fifty, acquisition experience impairs completion performance but it benefits 
duration acquisition performance.  Over fifty, there is a zone where they are both harmful to 
divestiture performance at the same time.  Both negative relationships persist until extremely high 
levels of acquisition experience, at which the experience-completion performance relationship 
flips to become a positive one.   
The performance tradeoffs present in the moderating transfer relationships are nicely 
illustrated by the contour plots of Figure 11.  Each plot demonstrates a “zone of goodness” – 
depicted by reddish hues (except in the Duration case, in which the blue-hued, shorter duration 
zones are desired) – that reflects the best combination of acquisition and divestiture experience 
for each performance measure.  These zones of goodness are not consistent across the 
performance measures – thus revealing the tradeoffs.  For Announcement Date CAR, the zone of 
goodness is “high-high,” or high divestiture experience and high acquisition experience.  For 
Duration, the zone is “low-high,” or low acquisition experience and high divestiture experience.  
Thus, if short divestiture durations are truly the goal, firms should avoid acquisition experience 
but extensively engage in divestiture.  For Gain-to-Assets, the zone of goodness is at a “high-
high” combination of acquisition and divestiture experience.     
The case of Completion merits some additional examination. The contour plot of Figure 
11 reveals that, within the bands of typical operation, the “low-low” zone is the zone of goodness.  
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Connecting the contour plot to the derivative plot in Figure 10, it is shown that, initially, at low 
levels of acquisition experience, the effect of acquisition experience is insufficient to push the 
relationship between divestiture experience and completion performance out of the negative 
region.  Although acquisition experience is indeed playing a performance-benefitting role at low 
levels of acquisition experience (i.e. it is helping divestiture experience help make divestiture 
performance become positive), it is not able to “help” enough to push Completion performance 
positive.  However, above acquisition experience of ~37, (the zero line on the y-axis in the 
derivative chart, Figure 10), the assistance provided by acquisition experience is enough to make 
divestiture experience help completion performance become positive.  This transition at 
acquisition experience of ~37 is also visible in the contour plot of Figure 11.  At low levels of 
acquisition experience (which is below 37), as divestiture experience increases, Completion 
performance declines.  At high levels of acquisition experience (above 37), acquisition experience 
is able to help the relationship between divestiture experience and completion performance 
enough such that the relationship between Divestiture Experience and Completion is positive.    
The schematic of Figure 12 illustrates this moderating effect.  
--- Insert Figure 12 here ---   
 
The tradeoffs that underpin this insight suggest some critical implications.  For one, 
experience transfer is a nuanced process.  Here, the use of a set of performance measures that 
reflects different aspects of the transfer process greatly facilitated an examination of experience 
transfer that was richer than would have been possible without a holistic consideration of process 
performance.  This suggests that learning transfer must be examined though a variety of lenses in 
order to unpack its mechanisms in a truly comprehensive way.  For another, these tradeoffs reveal 
a complex scenario for managers to navigate.  Although the order of prioritization for achieving 
these performance metrics varies by firm, managers still have to address their competing tensions.  
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Exacerbating the challenge, any compromises that managers may have developed can change 
with changing levels of acquisition and divestiture experience.  A shift to high intensity scope 
change activity will change the nature of the performance tradeoffs that have to be made.  
Interestingly, with the rise of activist investors and the corporate adoption of a private equity 
mindset, some firms may opt emulate the rapid, high frequency acquisition and divestiture levels 
observed in transaction-oriented firms.  It is useful for managers who intend to engage in such 
activity to recognize that such a shift has learning-oriented performance ramifications.         
4. At times, acquisition experience was found to have a comparable or even greater association 
with divestiture performance than divestiture performance itself. 
The potential power of experience transfer is underscored by the fact that transferred 
experience can, at times, play an equivalent or even a larger role than the firm’s own experience 
in the focal activity.  In the case of Duration performance, the results of Model 6 in Table 10 
show that the effects of divestiture experience and acquisition experience are on the same order of 
magnitude.  For Completion performance, the results of Model 6 in Table 9 show that the effects 
appear to supersede those of divestiture experience (i.e., Divestiture Experience is insignificant 
while the acquisition experience terms are not, and, further, has a magnitude that is comparatively 
lower by a factor of three).   This effect is seen visually in the fact that only a single curve is 
represented in Figure 8 -- there is no shift due to any changes divestiture experience.   
However, at other times, of the two types of experience, it is only the firm’s divestiture 
experience that plays a direct role in the firm’s divestiture performance.  The magnitude and 
significance of the coefficient for Divestiture Experience in the Announcement Date CAR model 
is essentially unchanged from the baseline case and slightly diminished in the Gain-to-Assets case 
(Model 1 in Table 8 and Table 11, respectively). 
One implication of this insight is that the fungibility of resources is an essential part of 
firm success, and that the intended application of the resource is not necessarily its best, or its 
only one.  To this end, this insight speaks to the heart of the resource-based view of the firm.  
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There are natural limits to the amount of experience that a firm can obtain and to the managerial 
attention needed to deploy it.  Resource redeployment – with the resource here being experience -
- is a natural outgrowth of these constraints (e.g. Capron et al., 1998; Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; 
Penrose, 1959; Sakhartov and Folta, 2014).  Intriguingly, the result that the transferred acquisition 
experience can play an outsize role – or supplant – that of divestiture experience in achieving 
divestiture performance may suggest that there may be occasions where firms opt to neglect 
learning in one activity and are instead content to let its transferred learning from an alternative 
activity suffice.    
 
5. Evidenced via statistical significance, the transfer relationships between acquisition and 
divestiture are frequently strong, suggesting the importance of their concurrent rather than 
separate consideration.    
 
The transfer relationships, using statistical significance as a guide, are present in both the 
direct and moderating cases.  As can be seen in Model 7 in each of Table 8, Table 9, Table 10, 
and Table 11, this is especially the case for the moderating relationship.  Furthermore, in cases 
where a direct transfer relationship was not detected (Announcement Date CAR, Gain-to-Assets), 
a moderating transfer relationship was identified.  This speaks to the fact that each performance 
variable is revealing a view of transfer, and this consistency further serves to build a very 
compelling case for the presence of experience transfer in firms.       
However, in addition to significance, should consider the magnitude of these transfer 
effects. An examination of the coefficients in Models 6 and 7 in each of Table 8, Table 9, Table 
10, and Table 11  shows that they are small, especially relative to those of the control variables.  
Of course, these are average effects across a large sample, so the strong evidence for the presence 
of these transfer effects alone is powerful in and of itself. 
    Furthermore, it was expected that the control variables would have an impact on 
divestiture performance (which underpinned their inclusion in the models).  For Announcement 
Date CAR, the controls pertaining to firm characteristics (e.g. ln(Total Assets), Negative Net 
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Income, Herfindahl Index) are consistently significant with relatively large effects across the 
models in tables referenced above for each of the performance variables.  That the market is 
likely responding to the financial and structural characteristics of the firm that are easily observed 
is no surprising.   For Completion, it is notable that the transaction-characteristic controls (e.g. 
Geographic Relatedness, Divestiture Program) are significant and large.  Indeed, the fact that 
when both selling parent and divesting unit are located in the same country increases the 
likelihood of deal completion speaks to the role of context-similarity in divestiture and corporate 
development more broadly (e.g. Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999).  For Duration, the high impact 
of Leverage (a highly leveraged firm likely needs the funds from the sale quickly) and Unit-
Parent Size Ratio (more time is requires to separate from relatively larger units) are expected.  
For Gain-to-Assets, the Herfindahl Index control shows that higher gains are sale are associated 
with a Herfindahl Index approaching one (or less diversification), suggesting that a firm with 
more focused operations has a deeper understanding of each of its businesses, and is therefore 
positioned to thus knowledgeably optimize the divestiture sale.  
The dual issues of significance and magnitude surface an important implication.  Again, 
these are average effects.  Using significance as a guide to identifying key processes of interest, 
deliberate mechanisms may be put into place by firms to augment (or avoid augmenting) the 
effects of these transfer processes.  For example, to enhance transfer, managers may opt to codify 
the knowledge gleaned though their experiences through tools like checklists and post-deal 
debrief sessions (Zollo and Singh, 2004; Zollo and Winter, 2002).  To avoid negative transfer, 
firms could, for example, adopt a silo-designed team structure, wherein acquisitions and 
divestitures are handled by separate teams and do not engage in best practice sharing.  Deliberate 
learning can be used as a tool to augment or avoid the transfer relationships that have been 
identified. 
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Furthermore, another major implication of this section’s insight is the important role of 
concurrent learning in firms.  These research results suggest that learning processes in firms – 
here, for divestiture and acquisition – are intertwined.  Learning to acquire can impact not only 
divestiture performance, but the divestiture learning process. Considering these two strategic 
activities concurrently is a more accurate representation of real-world firm operations – indeed, 
these activities do not occur in isolation in practice.  In spite of this, with few exceptions (such as 
Bingham et al., 2015), researchers have not typically considered the commingling of learning 
processes.  These results imply that concurrent learning deserves further, deeper consideration.    
3.5.1 Limitations & Directions for Future Research 
There are several important limitations to this paper.  Notably, only two types of 
corporate development activities – divestiture and acquisition – are considered in this study.  
Alliances and joint ventures, for example, are also commonly used mechanisms by firms to 
expand their boundaries.  These activities are not conducted in isolation in firms; rather, they are 
interwoven components of firms’ corporate strategy agendas. Considering the potential for 
experience transfer across the entire portfolio of firms’ strategic activities, and identifying the 
benefits and drawbacks thereof, could reveal valuable insights around organizational learning 
processes are intertwined and their ramifications for firm performance. 
Additionally, much more remains to be understood about how similarities and differences 
in experiences’ characteristics influence the efficacy of transfer. The transferrable lessons from an 
unrelated acquisition to a closely related divestiture, or even from a vertical acquisition to a 
horizontal divesture, may be different than when each are of the same kind.  With increasing 
globalization and the rise in cross-border transactions, deciphering the degree to which 
experience may be advantageously transferred across strategic activities when it was attained in 
different geographic, cultural, and political contexts would be an especially salient research path 
to pursue.        
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Moreover, this paper focused on divestiture performance, and investigated the potential 
for and implications of experience transfer from that perspective.  Certainly, other outcomes, such 
as acquisition performance, could be examined.  Intriguingly, the transfer of divestiture 
experience and its impact on acquisition performance, be it directly or as a moderator in the 
relationship between acquisition experience and acquisition performance, would not necessarily 
operate under the same mechanisms or demonstrate the same effects as those found in this paper.  
Unpacking the varied natures and complexities of the suite of the different transfer relationships 
in firms could serve to shed new light on how firms may best capitalize on their experiences to 
advance learning and performance. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I investigate the potential for intra-firm experience transfer in the context of 
scope change, specifically by examining whether and how a firm’s acquisition experience may 
influence its divestiture performance.  I demonstrate the presence of two paths for internal 
experience transfer: one in which the firm’s acquisition experience is directly applied to its 
execution of divestiture, and another in which the transfer of the firm’s acquisition experience 
moderates the relationship between the firm’s divestiture experience and its divestiture 
performance. Notably, I find that these learning transfer processes are neither dependably viable 
nor consistently beneficial to divestiture performance, presenting tradeoffs to managers.  
Moreover, I find that the transfer processes are curvilinear, thus fueling these incongruities.   
The results of this research enable me to make several contributions to the organizational 
learning and strategic management literatures.  First, I advance our understanding of activity-to-
activity internal learning transfer.  Most studies have considered context-to-context internal 
transfer, wherein the firm’s experience in performing a certain activity in one context is 
transferred to its performing the same activity in a different context (e.g. a different geography, 
industry, etc.).  In focusing on activity-to-activity internal transfer, I am able to help offer a more 
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complete picture of intra-firm learning processes.  Second, by examining both the direct and 
moderating effects of experience transfer, I am able to demonstrate not only that a firm’s learning 
how to acquire directly impacts its implementation of divestiture, but also that a firm’s learning 
how to acquire impacts its learning how to divest.  This moderating effect has previously only 
been considered qualitatively, and my quantitative approach reinforces the view that a firm’s 
learning processes -- here, for divestiture and acquisition -- are intertwined, and should be studied 
concurrently, rather than in isolation.  Third, I shed light on the complexities of intra-firm 
learning transfer.  In identifying the role that curvilinearity plays in both the direct and 
moderating transfer paths, I reveal that experience transfer can be both an asset and a liability to 
performance.  In treating experience transfer from acquisition to divestiture – two strategic 
activities that are both critical, but that present a tension through their competing objectives of 
scope expansion and scope reduction – I illustrate opportunities and limits inherent to internal 
experience transfer. 
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3.7 TABLES 
 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1 Announcement Date CAR 0.01 0.12 1
2 Completion 0.77 0.42 0.00 1
3 Duration 51.10 113.95 0.03*** . 1
4 Gain-to-Assets 0.03 0.11 -0.01 . 0.01 1
5 Gain Disclosed 0.52 0.50 0.00 . -0.01 . 1
6 Segment Count 2.92 1.97 -0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.12** 0.00 1
7 Restatements 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.03*** -0.05*** 0.02 0.02 0.13*** 1
8 Divestiture Experience 6.14 10.92 -0.03*** -0.02*** 0.01*** -0.06 -0.18*** 0.40*** 0.09*** 1
9 Acquisition Experience 8.46 17.53 -0.03*** 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.17*** 0.40*** 0.10*** 0.67*** 1
10 ln(Total Assets) 7.69 2.72 -0.07*** -0.02*** 0.06*** -0.29*** -0.18*** 0.51*** -0.07*** 0.57*** 0.46*** 1
11 Negative Net Income 0.33 0.47 0.05*** -0.01 -0.03*** 0.16*** 0.04 -0.20*** 0.02*** -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.37*** 1
12 Leverage 0.38 0.27 0.03*** -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.08* -0.06 0.07*** -0.17*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 1
13 Tobin's q 1.45 45.22 -0.03*** -0.01* -0.01** 0.24*** 0.02 -0.01* 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.02*** 1
14 Return on Equity -0.20 36.75 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.36*** 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01* -0.01*** 0.01** 0.00 1
15 Herfindahl Index 0.63 0.33 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01** 0.13** -0.04 -0.75*** -0.16*** -0.24*** -0.17*** -0.39*** 0.16*** -0.01* 0.01* -0.01 1
16 Unit-Parent Size Ratio 0.25 0.43 0.20*** -0.08*** 0.08*** 0.34*** 0.03 -0.20*** -0.02*** -0.19*** -0.16*** -0.38*** 0.29*** 0.32*** -0.05*** 0.01 0.15*** 1
17 Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.81 0.39 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** -0.04 0.13*** -0.13*** -0.06*** -0.19*** -0.16*** -0.23*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.00 0.00 0.10*** 0.13*** 1
18 Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.36 0.48 0.01** -0.04*** 0.04*** 0.12** 0.01 -0.20*** -0.09*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.13*** 0.10*** -0.01*** 0.01 -0.01* 0.17*** 0.09*** 0.02*** 1
19 Divestiture Program 0.53 0.50 -0.03*** 0.10*** 0.02*** -0.10** -0.09** 0.34*** 0.03*** 0.44*** 0.28*** 0.54*** -0.13*** 0.10*** -0.01* 0.01* -0.28*** -0.23*** -0.15*** -0.11*** 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 8: OLS Estimates of Announcement Date CAR Divestiture Performance 
Dependent Variable: Announcement Date CAR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Divestiture Experience 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002 0.0002** 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Acquisition Experience 0.0001** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.0001 -0.0003*
(0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
(Acquisition Experience)^2 0.000 0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Divestiture Experience X Acquisition Experience 0.000 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
Divestiture Experience X (Acquisition Experience)^2 -0.000**
(0.000)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0041*** -0.0042*** -0.0041*** -0.0044*** -0.0044*** -0.0043*** -0.0042***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Negative Net Income 0.0063*** 0.0074*** 0.0074*** 0.0071*** 0.0071*** 0.0071*** 0.0071***
(0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
Return on Equity -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Herfindahl Index -0.0037 -0.0045* -0.0046* -0.0044* -0.0045* -0.0045* -0.0047*
(0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.002 0.0025 0.0025 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.0012 0.0015 0.0015 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0018
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Divestiture Program -0.0013 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.000 0.0005
(0.0018) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0021) (0.002) (0.0022)
Constant 0.017 0.0125 0.0121 0.0137 0.0134 0.0133 0.0133
(0.0215) (0.0236) (0.0235) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0237) (0.0236)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
Number of Observations 27,512 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627 22,627
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 9: Logit Estimates of Completion Divestiture Performance 
 
Dependent Variable: Completion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Divestiture Experience -0.0117*** -0.0048 -0.0151** -0.005 -0.0167**
(0.0043) (0.0055) (0.0068) (0.0061) (0.0085)
Acquisition Experience -0.007*** -0.0169*** -0.0056** -0.015*** -0.0155** -0.0216***
(0.0023) (0.0057) (0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0061) (0.0079)
(Acquisition Experience)^2 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0001)
Divestiture Experience X Acquisition Experience 0.0003*** 0.0005*
(0.0001) (0.0003)
Divestiture Experience X (Acquisition Experience)^2 -0.000
(0.000)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0427** -0.036* -0.0291 -0.0314 -0.0186 -0.0242 -0.0162
(0.0184) (0.0199) (0.0204) (0.0207) (0.0213) (0.0212) (0.0217)
Negative Net Income -0.202*** -0.192*** -0.186** -0.185** -0.165** -0.179** -0.164**
(0.0663) (0.0732) (0.0735) (0.0732) (0.0733) (0.0737) (0.0734)
Leverage 0.322** 0.334** 0.332** 0.329** 0.283* 0.327** 0.275*
(0.131) (0.147) (0.148) (0.146) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149)
Tobin's q -0.0035 -0.0028 -0.0025 -0.0027 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0024
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Return on Equity -0.0012 0.0018 0.0017 0.0018 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Herfindahl Index -0.100 -0.038 -0.0517 -0.0392 -0.0572 -0.0529 -0.0644
(0.105) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio -0.395*** -0.375*** -0.384*** -0.370*** -0.372*** -0.379*** -0.375***
(0.0712) (0.0833) (0.0833) (0.0835) (0.084) (0.0836) (0.0841)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.402*** 0.427*** 0.427*** 0.423*** 0.415*** 0.423*** 0.416***
(0.0758) (0.0823) (0.0824) (0.0824) (0.0827) (0.0825) (0.0828)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness -0.172*** -0.204*** -0.200*** -0.206*** -0.199*** -0.204*** -0.198***
(0.0641) (0.0727) (0.0725) (0.0726) (0.0721) (0.0725) (0.072)
Divestiture Program 0.818*** 0.785*** 0.804*** 0.804*** 0.870*** 0.824*** 0.881***
(0.0734) (0.0793) (0.0799) (0.0811) (0.0847) (0.0824) (0.0867)
Constant 1.047 1.459*** 1.429*** 1.441*** 1.407*** 1.410*** 1.410***
(1.141) (0.356) (0.358) (0.354) (0.354) (0.357) (0.355)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Pseudolikelihood -4948.72 -3960.38 -3958.00 -3959.83 -3954.61 -3957.40 -3954.07
Chi-Square 753.17*** 603.93*** 637.96*** 607.94*** 657.08*** 641.51*** 857.92***
Number of Observations 15,539 12,732 12,732 12,732 12,732 12,732 12,732
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 10: Negative Binomial Estimates of Duration Divestiture Performance 
 
Dependent Variable: Duration (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Divestiture Experience -0.0059*** -0.0076*** -0.0076*** -0.0073*** -0.0098***
(0.002) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0034)
Acquisition Experience -0.0005 -0.0074** 0.0014 0.0015 -0.0053* -0.0152***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.0014) (0.0028) (0.003) (0.004)
(Acquisition Experience)^2 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Divestiture Experience X Acquisition Experience -0.000 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Divestiture Experience X (Acquisition Experience)^2 -0.000***
(0.000)
ln(Total Assets) 0.151*** 0.157*** 0.163*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.171*** 0.173***
(0.013) (0.0125) (0.013) (0.013) (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0137)
Negative Net Income -0.0229 -0.0108 -0.0033 -0.0033 -0.0034 0.0033 0.0024
(0.0442) (0.0425) (0.0427) (0.0423) (0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0424)
Leverage -0.573*** -0.616*** -0.620*** -0.601*** -0.601*** -0.606*** -0.616***
(0.109) (0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.106) (0.107)
Tobin's q 0.0296 0.0273 0.0301 0.030 0.030 0.0326 0.0326
(0.0252) (0.0273) (0.0278) (0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0283) (0.0284)
Return on Equity 0.0017 -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0029 -0.0029
(0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0072)
Herfindahl Index -0.150** -0.165** -0.176*** -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.180*** -0.192***
(0.0609) (0.0658) (0.0656) (0.0653) (0.0663) (0.0656) (0.0659)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio 0.818*** 0.872*** 0.871*** 0.877*** 0.877*** 0.877*** 0.875***
(0.0485) (0.0516) (0.0519) (0.0519) (0.0518) (0.0521) (0.0521)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.171*** 0.210*** 0.214*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.206*** 0.220***
(0.0586) (0.0628) (0.0622) (0.0625) (0.0625) (0.0621) (0.0611)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.0155 0.0558 0.0574 0.0511 0.0511 0.0526 0.0548
(0.0392) (0.0379) (0.0379) (0.0382) (0.0382) (0.0381) (0.038)
Divestiture Program -0.116*** -0.123*** -0.114*** -0.103** -0.103** -0.0949** -0.084*
(0.0403) (0.0424) (0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0429) (0.0428) (0.044)
Constant 3.008*** 3.033*** 2.996*** 2.974*** 2.974*** 2.941*** 2.960***
(0.324) (0.310) (0.315) (0.318) (0.318) (0.322) (0.329)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ln(alpha) 1.489*** 1.493*** 1.492*** 1.492*** 1.492*** 1.491*** 1.490***
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0063 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065 0.0066 0.0067
Number of Observations 13,915 11,515 11,515 11,515 11,515 11,515 11,515
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 11: OLS Estimates of Gain-to-Assets Divestiture Performance 
 
Dependent Variable: Gain-to-Assets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Divestiture Experience 0.0019** 0.0016** 0.0013* 0.0014* 0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Acquisition Experience 0.0011 -0.0012 0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0066**
(0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0032)
(Acquisition Experience)^2 0.000* 0.000 0.0002*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0001)
Divestiture Experience X Acquisition Experience 0.000 0.0004*
(0.000) (0.0002)
Divestiture Experience X (Acquisition Experience)^2 -0.000**
(0.000)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0132* -0.0103 -0.0089 -0.0115 -0.0106 -0.0106 -0.0097
(0.0075) (0.0081) (0.0079) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0083)
Negative Net Income -0.0058 -0.0008 0.0003 -0.0054 -0.004 -0.0041 -0.0037
(0.0179) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.020) (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0205)
Leverage -0.0572 -0.0434 -0.0485 -0.0512 -0.0531 -0.0528 -0.060
(0.0392) (0.041) (0.0416) (0.0411) (0.0415) (0.0415) (0.0431)
Tobin's q 0.0125 0.0113 0.0117 0.0111 0.0113 0.0114 0.0113
(0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0108)
Return on Equity 0.0009*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Herfindahl Index 0.0297* 0.0414** 0.0395** 0.0414** 0.0403** 0.0403** 0.0402**
(0.0166) (0.0203) (0.020) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0199)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio 0.133*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.160***
(0.0391) (0.0453) (0.0451) (0.0453) (0.0452) (0.0452) (0.045)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness -0.0096 -0.0228 -0.0265 -0.0233 -0.0253 -0.0253 -0.0257
(0.0243) (0.0263) (0.0269) (0.0262) (0.0265) (0.0266) (0.0265)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.0377** 0.038** 0.0376** 0.0381** 0.0379** 0.0378** 0.0385**
(0.0147) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0164)
Divestiture Program 0.0108 0.0116 0.0124 0.007 0.0081 0.0082 0.0105
(0.0105) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0118)
Constant 0.081 -0.0014 -0.0006 0.0126 0.0111 0.0109 0.0135
(0.0834) (0.0789) (0.0786) (0.081) (0.0812) (0.0811) (0.0801)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No No
R-Squared 0.374 0.394 0.397 0.400 0.401 0.401 0.408
Number of Observations 345 305 305 305 305 305 305
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 12: Heckman Selection Model for Gain-to-Assets Divestiture Performance  
 
(A-1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable:
Gain 
Disclosed
Gain-to-
Assets
Gain-to-
Assets
Gain-to-
Assets
Gain-to-
Assets
Gain-to-
Assets
Gain-to-
Assets
Gain-to-
Assets
Segment Count 0.142***
(0.051)
Restatements -0.528*
(0.283)
Divestiture Experience -0.0216*** 0.0027** 0.0023** 0.0019* 0.002* 0.0007
(0.0066) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0009)
Acquisition Experience 0.001 -0.0017 0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.007**
(0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0033)
(Acquisition Experience)^2 0.000* 0.000 0.0002*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0001)
Divestiture Experience X Acquisition Experience 0.000 0.0005**
(0.000) (0.0002)
Divestiture Experience X (Acquisition Experience)^2 -0.000**
(0.000)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0957** -0.0069 -0.0048 -0.0019 -0.0037 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0003
(0.0416) (0.0052) (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0066)
Negative Net Income -0.255* -0.0035 -0.0076 -0.0018 -0.004 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0033
(0.155) (0.0247) (0.0286) (0.0295) (0.0287) (0.0295) (0.0294) (0.0298)
Leverage 0.226 -0.0795* -0.068 -0.0756 -0.0825 -0.0865* -0.086 -0.0952*
(0.339) (0.0458) (0.048) (0.0496) (0.0515) (0.0524) (0.0522) (0.0546)
Tobin's q 0.0115 0.0103 0.0088 0.0093 0.0086 0.0089 0.009 0.0089
(0.0832) (0.0121) (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0122)
Return on Equity -0.043 -0.0189 -0.0227 -0.0222 -0.0216 -0.0213 -0.0213 -0.0203
(0.0698) (0.027) (0.0298) (0.0297) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0293) (0.0291)
Herfindahl Index -0.0636 0.0555* 0.0493 0.0534* 0.0666* 0.0673* 0.0673* 0.0707*
(0.227) (0.0298) (0.0304) (0.0315) (0.0359) (0.036) (0.036) (0.0368)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio -0.281 0.157*** 0.184*** 0.187*** 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.194***
(0.207) (0.0464) (0.0529) (0.0534) (0.055) (0.0551) (0.055) (0.055)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.239 -0.0172 -0.0207 -0.0283 -0.0287 -0.0331 -0.033 -0.0357
(0.175) (0.0203) (0.0197) (0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0219)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness -0.128 0.0444** 0.0399** 0.0407** 0.0445** 0.0445** 0.0445** 0.0461**
(0.131) (0.0185) (0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0209)
Divestiture Program -0.155 0.0153 0.0112 0.0148 0.0113 0.0138 0.0138 0.0178
(0.142) (0.0113) (0.0131) (0.0134) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0132)
Lambda -0.0793 -0.0098 -0.035 -0.0738 -0.0837 -0.0834 -0.100
(0.0645) (0.0542) (0.0621) (0.0756) (0.0778) (0.0778) (0.0819)
Constant 0.948 0.0704 -0.022 -0.0232 -0.008 -0.0105 -0.0106 -0.0067
(0.646) (0.0783) (0.0724) (0.0722) (0.0716) (0.072) (0.072) (0.0708)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No
R-Squared 0.310 0.333 0.338 0.342 0.344 0.344 0.353
Number of Observations 593 324 286 286 286 286 286 286
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 13: Summary of Results 
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3.8 FIGURES 
Figure 3: Model Schematic with Hypotheses for Essay 2 
 
 
Figure 4: Illustrative Figures for Hypothesis 1 Evaluation 
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Figure 5: Illustrative Figures for Hypothesis 2 Evaluation – Partial Derivative of Performance 
with Respect to Divestiture Experience 
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Figure 6: Illustrative Figures for Hypothesis 2 Evaluation, without Vertical Curve Shift (β1=0) 
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Figure 7: Illustrative Figures for Hypothesis 2 Evaluation, with Vertical Curve Shift (β1>0) 
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Figure 8: Divestiture Performance vs. Acquisition Experience for Different Levels of Divestiture Experience. Includes only significant terms. 
 
  117 
 
Figure 9: Contour Plot for Hypothesis 1 Discussion. Includes only significant terms. 
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Figure 10: Partial Derivative of Divestiture Performance with Respect to Divestiture Experience for Hypothesis 2 Discussion. Includes only 
significant terms. 
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Figure 11: Contour Plot for Hypothesis 2 Discussion. Includes only significant terms.  
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Figure 12: Illustrative Figure for Evaluating the Moderating Role of Acquisition Experience in the Relationship between Divestiture Experience 
and Completion Performance Y 
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3.9 APPENDIX 
Table 14: Examples of Regression Results Using Full Sample versus CEM Sample 
   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable:
Full Sample CEM Sample Full Sample CEM Sample Full Sample CEM Sample Full Sample CEM Sample
Divestiture Experience 0.0002** 0.0002* -0.0117*** -0.0179*** -0.0059*** -0.006* 0.0019** 0.0015
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0043) (0.0055) (0.002) (0.0031) (0.0008) (0.0014)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0041*** -0.0043*** -0.0427** -0.0505 0.151*** 0.179*** -0.0132* -0.012
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0184) (0.0336) (0.013) (0.0209) (0.0075) (0.0091)
Negative Net Income 0.0063*** 0.0034 -0.202*** -0.267** -0.0229 0.0291 -0.0058 -0.0323
(0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0663) (0.129) (0.0442) (0.0731) (0.0179) (0.0448)
Leverage 0.322** -0.0654 -0.573*** -0.700*** -0.0572 0.052
(0.131) (0.259) (0.109) (0.163) (0.0392) (0.0836)
Tobin's q -0.0035 -0.0277 0.0296 0.0365 0.0125 0.0681**
(0.0035) (0.0178) (0.0252) (0.0315) (0.0109) (0.0266)
Return on Equity -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0009 0.0017 0.0063 0.0009*** -0.0436
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0016) (0.0044) (0.0075) (0.0159) (0.0001) (0.0329)
Herfindahl Index -0.0037 -0.0047 -0.100 -0.184 -0.150** 0.0343 0.0297* 0.0465
(0.0024) (0.0032) (0.105) (0.179) (0.0609) (0.0892) (0.0166) (0.0484)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio -0.395*** -0.227 0.818*** 1.012*** 0.133*** 0.330***
(0.0712) (0.145) (0.0485) (0.0883) (0.0391) (0.124)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.002 0.0019 0.402*** 0.488*** 0.171*** 0.195** -0.0096 -0.0228
(0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0758) (0.137) (0.0586) (0.0898) (0.0243) (0.0272)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.0012 0.0005 -0.172*** -0.229** 0.0155 -0.150*** 0.0377** 0.0406
(0.0016) (0.002) (0.0641) (0.115) (0.0392) (0.0579) (0.0147) (0.0271)
Divestiture Program -0.0013 0.0006 0.818*** 0.813*** -0.116*** -0.106* 0.0108 -0.0146
(0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0734) (0.123) (0.0403) (0.0608) (0.0105) (0.028)
Constant 0.0179 -0.0097 2.209* 2.918*** 2.432*** -18.970 0.081 -0.124
(0.0216) (0.0084) (1.149) (0.644) (0.324) (27.400) (0.0834) (0.102)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Number of Observations 27,512 9,274 15,539 5,044 13,915 4,546 345 133
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
CAR (OLS) Completion (Logit) Duration (Negative Binomial) Gain-to-Assets (OLS)
  122 
 
Figure 13: Divestiture Performance vs. Acquisition Experience for Different Levels of Divestiture Experience. Includes all terms (significant and 
insignificant).  
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Figure 14: Divestiture Performance vs. Acquisition Experience for Different Levels of Divestiture Experience. Includes all terms (significant and 
insignificant). Uses Heckman selection model with Gain-to-Assets. 
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Figure 15: Divestiture Performance vs. Acquisition Experience for Different Levels of Divestiture Experience. Includes only significant terms. 
Uses Heckman selection model with Gain-to-Assets. 
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Figure 16: Contour Plot for Hypothesis 1 Discussion. Includes all terms (significant and insignificant). 
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Figure 17: Contour Plot for Hypothesis 1 Discussion. Includes all terms (significant and insignificant).  Uses Heckman selection model with Gain-
to-Assets. 
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Figure 18: Contour Plot for Hypothesis 1 Discussion. Includes only significant terms. Uses Heckman selection model with Gain-to-Assets. 
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Figure 19: Partial Derivative of Divestiture Performance with Respect to Divestiture Experience for Hypothesis 2 Discussion. Includes all terms 
(significant and insignificant).  
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Figure 20: Contour Plot for Hypothesis 2 Discussion.  Includes all terms (significant and insignificant). 
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Figure 21: Partial Derivative of Divestiture Performance with Respect to Divestiture Experience for Hypothesis 2 Discussion. Includes all terms 
(significant and insignificant). Uses Heckman selection model with Gain-to-Assets. 
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Figure 22: Contour Plot for Hypothesis 2 Discussion. Includes all terms (significant and insignificant). Uses Heckman selection model with Gain-
to-Assets. 
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Figure 23: Partial Derivative of Divestiture Performance with Respect to Divestiture Experience for Hypothesis 2 Discussion. Includes only 
significant terms. Uses Heckman selection model for Gain-to-Assets. 
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Figure 24: Contour Plot for Hypothesis 2 Discussion. Includes only significant terms. Uses Heckman selection model for Gain-to-Assets. 
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4 EXTERNAL EXPERIENCE TRANSFER IN CORPORATE DIVESTITURE  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
For many firms, learning from other organizations presents a valuable, if not essential, 
opportunity.  Although interorganizational learning is subject to challenges of cost, efficiency, 
and effectiveness, its potential benefits – including access to experience different than the firm’s 
own – are substantial (Huber, 1991; Levitt and March, 1988).  The firm’s exchange partners – 
which include customers, suppliers, investors, consultants, and the like – can serve as important 
sources from which firms may obtain external experience (Bruneel et al., 2010).  However, as the 
roles of these exchange partners vary, so too can their motivations.  Such differences may hold 
consequences for the way in which their experience is transferred to the firm, as well as for the 
manner in which this external experience impacts firm performance.   
This paper investigates experience transfer across firm boundaries in the context of 
corporate divestiture.  Specifically, this paper explores whether and how externally-sourced 
divestiture experience may impact firm divestiture performance.  Two archetypical sources of this 
external divestiture experience are examined: advisors, as via the investment bank hired by the 
seller; and competitors, as via the buyer serving as the deal counterparty.   While advisors and 
competitors represent similarly important classes of exchange partners, highly relevant to the firm 
not only in divestiture but throughout its corporate strategic activities, they also reflect 
oppositional motives in engagement.  Whereas an advisor’s intention is ostensibly to benefit a 
firm’s performance, a competitor’s intention is ostensibly to impair it.  This fundamental 
divergence in purpose may translate into fundamental differences in the transfer and impact of 
their experience to the firm. 
To examine the role that the source of the experience may play in external experience 
transfer, two possible paths for external experience transfer are studied.  In the first, the external 
divestiture experience is directly applied to the execution of the firm’s divestiture process.  In the 
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second, the external divestiture experience moderates the relationship between the firm’s own 
divestiture experience and its divestiture performance.  As such, the first alternative considers if 
and how the externally-sourced divestiture experience directly impacts the firm’s divestiture 
performance, and the second considers if and how externally-sourced divestiture experience 
impacts the firm’s learning from its own divestiture experience.  Given the underpinning 
performance-enhancing motivations of bankers and the performance-impairing motivations of 
buyers in divestiture, it is hypothesized that the direct transfer of external experience will help 
and hurt the firm’s divestiture performance, respectively.  In contrast, regarding the moderating 
path for external experience transfer, it is hypothesized that this path will enhance the firm’s 
divestiture performance, irrespective of the motives of the source.  In this case, the firm’s 
interactions with the exchange partner allows for an improvisational learning opportunity that 
circumvents the issue of source motivation and thereby positions the firm to leverage the external 
experience in a performance-enhancing way.        
Notably, the experience transfer process under examination in this paper – wherein the 
external divestiture experience from a banker or a buyer exchange partner is transferred to a firm 
in the context of a divestiture transaction – accurately represents the vast majority of firm 
relationships.  For one, the objective of the exchange relationship is not to learn.  Here, the 
objective is to execute a divestiture, and thus any firm learning is an extra dividend.  For another, 
the relationship is temporary.   In this case, the exchange relationship terminates when the 
divestiture completes.  Moreover, while any of the parties may wish to engage with each other in 
a future transaction, there are no guarantees of repeated exchange going forward.  Lastly, the firm 
closely interacts with the exchange partner.  In divestiture, the selling firm typically has extensive 
and intensive interactions with both its investment bank and the buyer.  As such, there is 
substantial engagement between them.  Hence, given the combination of these characteristics, 
external experience transfer in the context of divestiture – and in the context of firm-advisor and 
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firm-competitor relations – reflects exchanges that are commonplace and central in a firm’s 
activities.  Accordingly, advancing our understanding of whether and how externally-sourced 
experience may impact firm performance in this context has broad implications for advancing our 
understanding of external experience transfer as a whole.   
This research aims to contribute new insights towards answering the question of whether 
and how external experience transfer may impact firm performance, as well as how these 
performance outcomes may change with differences in motives held by the external experience 
sources.  This serves to further our understanding of interorganizational experience transfer, 
which is a topic of keen interest in both the organizational learning and strategic management 
literatures.  Moreover, by setting this study in the context of corporate divestiture, this research 
helps to shed more light on the players and process of divestiture, a comparatively understudied 
but crucial mode of firm scope change.  Further, by considering the potential of investment 
bankers and buyers as sources for firm learning through experience transfer, this research 
contributes to the growing literature on the role and impact of intermediary actors in firm 
corporate development activities.     
4.2 THEORY & HYPOTHESES 
4.2.1 External Experience Transfer 
Although learning through first-hand experience is the primary learning process for firms 
(Dutton and Thomas, 1984; Yelle, 1979), it is by no means the only one.  Experience transfer, 
which may be internal or external, presents another option for firms.  In the case of internal 
experience transfer, the firm transfers its own experience in one area to that in another (Argote 
and Ingram, 2000; Darr et al., 1995; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999).  In the case of external 
experience transfer, experience from other organizations, external to the firm, is transferred 
across the firm’s boundaries and subsequently applied towards its needs (Huber, 1991; Levitt and 
March, 1988).   
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External experience transfer offers a number of advantages to firms.  Critically, the firm 
does not have to earn the experience itself, which may save time and resources.  It is also possible 
that the firm is simply not positioned to obtain the experience in a first-hand way, and so external 
transfer provides the firm with experience to which it would not have otherwise had access. By 
engaging with other organizations, the firm is able to tap into experience that is different than its 
own, which adds novelty and diversity to its experience repertoire.  Firms are not likely to put the 
external experience to waste, as the uniqueness and limited availability of the external experience 
relative to the firm’s own encourages the firm to treat the external experience as being special and 
preferred over its own (Menon and Pfeiffer, 2003).  Furthermore, not only can this external 
experience serve to reduce uncertainty in the firm (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Haunschild, 
1994), but it may also provide the firm with social capital benefits stemming from its association 
with its transfer exchange  partners (Chung, Singh, and Lee, 2000). 
However, there are also drawbacks associated with the transfer and deployment of 
external experience.  Notably, the experience has to be “translated” from the source’s situation 
and adapted to the firm’s situation, as there will invariably be differences between the two.  This 
incurs costs and the potential for mis-learning should key aspects of the transferred experience be 
“lost” in translation.  Tacitness, complexity, and specificity of the experience can all give rise to 
casual ambiguity (Barney, 1991; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990; Simonin, 1999) and thus translation 
losses.  Firms may also develop a false understanding of the experience due to undersampling of 
failure (Denrell, 2003), or through drawing incorrect associations between the experience and its 
outcomes that they believe to be true via a superstitious learning process (Levitt and March, 1988; 
Zollo, 2009).  While the efficacy of transfer can be improved through interorganization 
coordination via formal and relational governance mechanisms, these approaches incur their own 
set of costs to the firm.    
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There are several ways that firms may tap into other organizations’ experiences to 
catalyze external experience transfer.  These options all rest under the umbrella of 
interorganizational learning, although different types with different ramifications exist among 
them.   
One option is “learning by observing” or vicarious learning.  In this case, firms glean the 
second-hand experience by, for instance, keenly watching their competitors’ moves at arm’s 
length (Ingram and Baum, 1997; Garcia‐Pont and Nohria, 2002; Greve, 2000; Haunschild and 
Miner, 1997; Henisz and Delios, 2001; Kim and Miner, 2007).  Firms then attempt to apply this 
external experience to fulfill their own needs, imitating what they believe to have seen.   
Fundamental to this learning process is visibility into the activity of interest.  Some features of the 
activity will be easier to observe than others, and these will facilitate imitation (Greve 1998, 
Haunschild & Miner 1997).   
Alternatively, firms may establish formal arrangements with other organizations for the 
purpose of learning and knowledge exchange.  These collaborations may be instituted through 
such mechanisms as alliances, joint ventures, and partnerships.   While the formality of structure 
and process can help to facilitate experience transfer, the associated costs of coordination and 
management can be significant (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Hamel, 
1991; Khanna, et al. 1998).    As an alternative to accessing the external experience resources 
through contractual or relational means, firms may instead opt for their outright control through 
purchase.  In this case, the firm acquires another organization with the objective of accessing the 
target’s experience and knowledge resources.  Once acquired, the challenge of effectively 
transferring and integrating the purchased experience within the firm still remains.  Across the 
types of these arrangements, scholars have stressed the important role that the firm’s own 
experience plays in ensuring that the identifying, integrating, and applying the external 
knowledge for use within the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998).  
  139 
 
Numerous studies have empirically demonstrated the impact of absorptive capacity on the success 
of external experience transfer in formal transfer arrangements (e.g. Alcacer and Oxley, 2014; 
Penner-Hahn and Shaver, 2005; Sampson, 2005). 
A third option available to firms for accessing external experience is again through 
arrangements or exchanges with other organizations, but in this case, the primary objective of the 
exchange is not learning.  Instead, the firm’s exchange partner serves as an inadvertent source of 
external experience.  There are numerous types of such partners -- from customers and suppliers 
to board members and investors to consultants and distributors – and each has the potential to 
serve as an external experience source for the firm, regardless of the goal of the exchange 
(Bruneel et al., 2010).  For example, Alcacer and Oxley (2014) demonstrated that OEM suppliers 
could learn to move up the value curve through their exchanges with their customers, in spite of 
the fact that the arrangements were established only with a view to serve as a supplier.  Similarly, 
Salomon and Shaver (2005) empirically showed manufacturing firms could advance their 
learning and improve innovation performance outcomes through their exporting relationships.  
Learning through such unplanned external experience transfer has also been demonstrated in 
firm-board member and firm-banker exchanges (Haunschild, 1994; Haunschild and Beckman, 
1998).  While each of these exchanges has a defined objective, there is no intent on behalf of the 
outside partner to share its experience with the firm for the purpose of advancing the firm’s 
learning.   Although this type of “informal” external experience transfer with exchange partners 
may be driven by deliberate appropriation (Dussauge et al., 2000), unintentional access from 
experience spillovers is also a predominant cause.  Indeed, these exchanges often involve high 
levels of intense interaction between the players (Bruneel et al., 2010).  Thus, although these 
exchange relationships are not formal learning arrangements, they still offer the opportunity for 
experience and knowledge transfer.  Moreover, these types of exchanges are ubiquitous in a 
firm’s strategic activities.  They thus reflect a substantive and central opportunity for learning.  
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Accordingly, this third option for external experience access is the setting used in this 
paper to examine the question of whether and how external experience transfer may impact firm 
performance.  Thus, this paper considers the potential for external experience transfer to the firm 
in non-learning focused exchange relationships.  Moreover, two principal types of exchange 
partners, which possess oppositional underpinning motivations with respect to the firm’s 
performance, are considered: advisors and competitors.  
In the firm-advisor and firm-competitor exchanges under study in this research, there is 
the potential for two paths for external experience transfer.   The first is a direct transfer of the 
source’s experience to the activity of interest in the firm.  Hence, the external experience is 
directly applied to the activity.  As such, some scholars may label this transfer process as 
experience “sourcing.”  The motivation of the source can play a crucial role in this transfer 
process.  As the experience is directly applied to the firm’s activity, the source’s underpinning 
motive – be it to enhance or impair the firm’s performance -- will be reflected in the transfer 
process and its effects on performance.     
In the second path, the external experience may play a moderating role between the 
firm’s own experience and its performance.  As such, this case reflects the potential for the 
external experience to impact the firm’s use of its own experience, and thus to learn from its own 
experience.  As the firm interacts with its exchange partner, there is the potential for the firm to 
learn in a real-time, improvisational way as “the composition and execution of [the] action 
converge in time” (Moorman and Miner, 1998).  The firm’s own experience plays a critical role 
in this extemporaneous learning process (Bergh and Lim, 2008; Bingham et al., 2015; Miner et 
al., 2001).  The firm’s own experience serves as a lens through which to evaluate and identify any 
aspects of the source’s experience which may benefit its performance, as via an absorptive 
capacity style mechanism (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998).  As such, the 
firm is positioned to filter the source’s motive from the external experience and thereby ensure its 
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performance-enhancing implementation.  Thus, in the moderating path for external experience 
transfer, the external experience has a positive, beneficial association with the firm’s 
performance, regardless of the source (and motive) of the external experience.   
In other contexts, the type, or characteristics, of experience has been shown to play a 
major role in the firm’s learning process and its performance outcomes.  Numerous defining 
experience characteristics have been examined, including its technological and product market 
orientation (Nerkar and Roberts, 2004), its explorative and exploitative nature (Hoang and 
Rothaermel, 2010), its partner specificity (Gulati et al., 2009), its breadth and depth (Eggers, 
2012), and its corporate development context (Zollo and Reuer, 2010).  With this precedent, there 
is good reason to consider how the source of the experience, and specifically the underpinning 
motivations of the source, may influence external experience transfer.  
Firms have many types of exchange partners, from customers to suppliers to investors 
(Bruneel et al., 2010).   Two archetypical exchange partners are the firm’s advisors and the firm’s 
competitors.  These types are meaningful to study not only due to their prevalence, but also 
because they reflect oppositional motives in engagement.  Whereas an advisor’s intention is 
ostensibly to benefit a firm’s performance, a competitor’s intention is ostensibly to impair it.  
This core disparity in motive between these two types of experience sources may translate into 
fundamental differences in the transfer and impact of their experience to the firm.    
4.2.2 External Experience Transfer in Corporate Divestiture  
This paper’s research setting is corporate divestiture.  Before turning to the issue of 
external experience transfer in corporate divestiture, it is important to first consider the potential 
role that learning-by-doing may play in the context of corporate divestiture.  As discussed in 
Essays 1 and 2, while firm learning through its own direct experience is a fundamental means for 
learning, it is not always viable or sufficient.  Moreover, there are potential risks due to mis-
learning.  The baseline hypothesis pertaining to learning-by-doing in Essay 2 is repurposed here: 
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Baseline Hypothesis (H0): Firm divestiture experience is positively associated with 
firm divestiture performance. 
Studying external experience transfer in the divestiture setting affords the opportunity to 
examine external experience transfer in exchange relationships from two major types of 
experience sources: advisors and competitors.  In divestiture, two of the firm’s most critical 
exchange partners are the investment bank it hires (its advisor) and the buyer involved in the 
transaction (its competitor).  The firm engages in a high level of interaction with both of these 
players throughout the divestiture process, thus setting the stage for possible experience transfer.   
Notably, neither the firm-banker nor the firm-buyer exchanges in divestiture represent 
formal learning arrangements.  However, both bankers and buyers do have the potential to serve 
as sources of substantive divestiture experience for the firm.  Investment bankers, by definition, 
have extensive and diverse experience in corporate development activities, including divestiture.  
Buyers, just like the focal selling firm, also have the opportunity to accumulate divestiture 
experience through engaging in divestiture.  In this paper, those buyers with “high experience,” or 
a level of accumulated divestiture experience higher than the median, are of particular interest. 
Furthermore, it is the nature of divestiture that no two divestitures are exactly alike.  Therefore, 
the buyer’s divestiture experience will reflect differences and variety relative to the firm’s own.  
In sum, although the firm-banker and firm-buyer exchange relationships in divestiture are not 
formal learning arrangements, the divestiture experience of the bankers and buyers do create a 
potential platform for external experience transfer to the firm, wherein the firm may be able to 
learn to divest through interacting and engaging with these players during the divestiture process. 
4.2.2.1 Investment Banks as a Source of Divestiture Experience      
Investment banks are a frequent intermediary in many types of a firm’s strategic 
activities, including scope-changing transactions.  Although their examination in the context of 
divestiture has been sparse (see Brauer et al., 2014 for an exception), scholars have examined the 
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reasons for which they are engaged by firms, their roles, and the advantages and disadvantages of 
their use in other corporate development activities like acquisition (Hayward, 2003; Golubov et 
al., 2012; Porrini, 2006; Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Sleptsov et al., 2013).  In acquisitions, 
investment banks may get involved in such activities as identifying acquisition target, conducting 
due diligence, providing and interpreting information about the market, confirming appropriate 
pricing, and financing the acquisition.  As investment banks are serving the firm in an advisory 
capacity, their recommendations are free from the biases that may plague an insider’s assessment 
and execution of the transaction. 
Yet, evaluations of investment banker participation in corporate transactions have been 
mixed (e.g. Hayward, 2003; Golubov et al., 2012; Sleptsov, 2010).  Given the potential for 
negative performance consequences to the firm in engaging an investment bank, it is not 
surprising that the investment bank’s role in corporate development is often examined through an 
agency lens (Eisenhardt, 1989; Kesner et al., 1994; Sharma, 1997).  In the case of divestiture, the 
expertise for which the banks are hired (attained through their extensive and diverse divestiture 
experiences) also creates information asymmetry issues between the firm and the bank.  
Moreover, should the divestiture fail, the risks and repercussions to the bank, while not 
negligible, are certainly less than those facing the firm.  Hence, there is the potential for banks to 
behave opportunistically when advising firms during divestiture. 
However, there are checks and balances in place to counter this potential opportunism.  
Importantly, banks need to preserve their reputations in order to be hired for future transactions, 
be it by the focal firm or by others (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994).  Should the deal’s 
performance deviate too far from acceptable standards, the bank’s reputation will be tarnished.  
Moreover, even though the banks and the firms may have disparate goals, their impact on 
divestiture performance is the same.  For example, the banks want to collect their fees, and fee 
structures may be contingent upon deal completion.  While firms too are aiming for deal 
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completion, their motivations stem from a cost perspective.  Likewise, both banks and firms 
strive for short-duration deals; although the bank’s preference is driven by their desire to collect 
their fees faster and free their resources earlier, more strategic reasons cause the firm’s preference 
for shorter divestitures.  Thus, despite the potential for agency problems, there are many 
countervailing forcers in place to ensure that the direct external transfer of the bank’s divestiture 
experience will benefit firm divestiture performance. Thus:      
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Investment bank divestiture experience is positively associated 
with firm divestiture performance. 
Likewise, when the bank’s external divestiture experience moderates the relationship 
between the firm’s own divestiture experience and its divestiture performance, it is again 
predicted that it will benefit the firm’s divestiture performance.  Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Investment bank divestiture experience positively moderates the 
relationship between firm divestiture experience and firm divestiture performance. 
4.2.2.2 Buyers as a Source of Divestiture Experience      
In a divestiture transaction, the buyer is the selling firm’s counterparty in the deal.  As 
such, the buyer is the selling firm’s competitor for the duration of the divestiture process.   
Although it has been shown that competitors can work collaboratively in exchange relationships 
like alliances (Dussauge et al., 2000; Gnyawali et al., 2006), the motivating goals of the buyer in 
divestiture are oppositional to those of the selling firm.  Indeed, while the buyer aims to minimize 
the price it pays for the target business unit, the seller aims to maximize it in order to make as 
much money on the deal as possible.  Likewise, a good divestiture performance outcome for the 
buyer could be a deal that does not complete – should the buyer become uncomfortable with how 
the divestiture is progressing, there are far fewer disadvantages – financially, operationally, and 
reputationally – for the buyer to walk away from the deal relative to the seller.  Furthermore, 
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there is far less impetus for the buyer to aim for a “quick close” divestiture than for the seller.  
The buyer, in fact, would prefer a longer duration, in order to extend the time available for due 
diligence and perhaps strengthen its negotiating positon.  Thus, when a buyer is the source of the 
external divestiture experience that is transferred to the firm’s divestiture process, the competitive 
undermining motivations of the buyer will cause its experience to impair the firm’s divestiture 
performance.  Hence: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Buyer divestiture experience is negatively associated with firm 
divestiture performance.  
However, in spite of the competitive motives of the buyer, when its transferred 
divestiture experience serves to moderate the relationship between the firm’s divestiture 
experience and its divestiture performance, the external divestiture experience will benefit the 
firm’s divestiture performance.  In this case, as the firm is learning to divest in a real-time, 
improvisational way as it jockeys with the seller, the firm’s divestiture experience serves to help 
the firm identify those aspects of the seller’s divestiture experience that will be useful in 
improving its performance.  Therefore: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Buyer divestiture experience positively moderates the 
relationship between firm divestiture experience and firm divestiture performance. 
Illustrations of the two models (one focused on bankers and one focused on buyers) 
proposed by the hypotheses are provided in Figure 25 and Figure 26.  It merits highlighting that, 
in order to test the theoretical mechanisms hypothesized in this paper, it is not necessary to 
conduct the analyses using a single “combined” model that incorporates both the banker and the 
buyer relationships simultaneously.  While a combined model would offer the opportunity to 
conduct a comparison between the banker-based and buyer-based effects, assessing their relative 
impact on divestiture performance is not the focus of this paper. Furthermore, the banker and 
  146 
 
buyer data each pose the potential for biasing the results due to distinct non-random selection 
issues (discussed subsequently).  These potential selection issues cannot be addressed 
simultaneously in a combined model.  Thus, it makes solid theoretical and empirical sense to 
work with two separate models, one which is banker-based and one which is buyer-based.18      
4.3 METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1 Data & Sample 
The sample of divestiture transactions and the data sources used are as described in 
Essays 1 and 2.  Additional data for the instrumental variables were obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the World Development Indicators provided by the World Bank. 
4.3.2 Variables 
4.3.2.1 Dependent variables 
Divestiture performance is the outcome of primary interest in this paper, and it is 
measured in three ways: Announcement Date CAR, Completion, and Duration. These variables 
remain as defined in Essays 1 and 2.  Two additional variables, Advisor Flag and Buyer Flag, are 
used in the first stage of the treatment effects model and the Heckman selection model, 
respectively.  These will be fully described in the “Analyses and Results” section. 
4.3.2.2 Independent variables  
The variable Divestiture Experience measures the firm’s cumulative divestiture 
experience.  Just as in Essay 1, this variable is calculated by depreciating the count of the number 
of divestiture transactions undertaken by the parent firm on a linear basis over the twenty-six 
years of the sample. Both complete and incomplete divestitures are included in the count.  
                                                     
18 A combined model was developed and used for brief, high-level assessment in the “Discussion” section.  
Results are in Table 27 (for Announcement Date CAR), Table 28 (for Completion) and Table 29 (for 
Duration) in the Appendix. It must be underscored that potential biases due to non-random selection are 
unaddressed in these results.   
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The variable Bank Divestiture Experience measures the cumulative divestiture experience 
of the investment bank advisor engaged by the firm for a particular transaction.  To calculate the 
divestiture experience level of a particular investment bank, the cumulative number of divestiture 
transactions in which the bank was hired to advise a divesting firm was linearly depreciated over 
the twenty-six years of the sample. Both complete and incomplete divestitures are again included 
in the count. If the firm hired several investment banks for a single transaction, the bank with the 
highest level of cumulative depreciated divestiture experience amongst the banking team 
members was identified, and its experience was used in Bank Divestiture Experience.19  
The divestiture experience of the buyer (i.e. the acquirer) in the divestiture transaction is 
another factor of major interest in this paper.  In this case, the divestiture experience of the buyer 
in the transaction was determined by linearly depreciating the cumulative count of divestiture 
transactions (both complete and incomplete) that were undertaken by the buyer over the twenty-
six years of the sample.  This value was used in Buyer Divestiture Experience.  However, the 
theoretical underpinnings of the experience transfer processes being investigated in this paper are 
premised on the idea that the external experience being transferred offers more or different 
insights than the firm currently possesses.  As such, it was necessary to consider those buyers 
with a meaningful level of divesture experience. Therefore, for each year, the median Buyer 
Divestiture Experience of all buyers was determined. For each buyer, the binary variable High 
Buyer Experience is then set equal to one if Buyer Divestiture Experience is greater than this 
                                                     
19 Numerous alternative operationalizations for Banker Divestiture Experience were examined for the cases 
where the firm hired more than one investment bank. These included using the average of the divestiture 
experience of each of the team members, the median, the sum of their experience levels, and the experience 
of the least experienced bank in the group.  As this variable is meant to capture the level of banker 
divestiture expertise that is available to the firm, using the experience level of the most experienced banker 
in the team was most appropriate.  Using the sum of their experiences would likely overstate the experience 
available, as bankers’ expertise may overlap and the most experienced banker likely serves as the firm’s 
primary interface to the group.    
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median, and is set equal to zero otherwise.20  The variable High Buyer Experience is used in the 
regression models.21   
Federal Funds Rate and U.S. M&A Volume Change are instrument variables used in the 
treatment effects models for the banker-based analyses. Near International Hub and Exchange 
Rate Index are instrument variables that are used in conjunction with the Heckman selection 
models for the buyer-based analyses.  These will be fully described in the “Analyses and Results” 
section.  
4.3.2.3 Control variables 
The control variables remain as defined in Essays 1 and 2.  These variables control for 
parent firm characteristics (ln(Total Assets), Negative Net Income, Leverage, Tobin’s q, Return on 
Equity and Herfindahl Index), characteristics of the parent-unit relationship (Unit-Parent Size 
Ratio, Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness and Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness) and the 
parent firm’s divestiture operations (Divestiture Program).    
4.4 ANALYSES & RESULTS 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables used in the analyses are 
presented in Table 15.  As would be expected, investment banks accumulate a high level of 
divestiture experience.  The mean of Bank Divestiture Experience is 146 divestitures, and its 
maximum is 389 divestitures (both values reflect depreciated divestiture experience counts).  The 
                                                     
20 In addition to using the median as the high-low experience cutpoint, a number of other cutpoint levels 
(e.g. the 25th percentile, the 75th percentile, the 95th percentile) were explored.  The 50th percentile was 
selected for use in the analyses since it reflected the most conservative approach that still allowed for the 
theoretical mechanisms of interested to be evaluated.   
21 As a test of robustness, the buyer-based regressions in this paper were also performed using the 
continuous Buyer Divestiture Experience.  As would be expected, results were weakened.  Results for these 
regressions are included in the Appendix, in Table 24 (with Announcement Date CAR as the dependent 
variable), Table 25 (with Completion as the dependent variable), and Table 26 (with Duration as the 
dependent variable). 
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levels of Firm Divestiture Experience and Buyer Divestiture Experience are on par with each 
other, with means of 7 divestitures and 5 divestitures, respectively, and a maximum of 122 
divestitures (these values also reflect depreciated divestiture experience counts).  This similarity 
helps to confirm the appropriateness of using the binary High Buyer Divestiture Experience 
measure in the analyses.     
Bank Divestiture Experience and High Buyer Divestiture Experience each show 
significant correlations with Duration (p<0.01 and p<0.05, respectively), but only Banker 
Divestiture Experience has a significant correlation with Completion (p<0.01).  Neither have 
significant correlations with Announcement Date CAR.  Notably, the low correlation between 
Firm Divestiture Experience and Banker Divestiture Experience (0.14, p<0.01) and the low 
correlation between Firm Divestiture Experience and High Buyer Divestiture Experience do not 
suggest the presence of any collinearity issues between these variables.  
4.4.2 Model Specification 
There are four regression models of primary focus in this paper.  Two correspond to the 
banker-based analyses and are used to test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.  Two correspond to 
the buyer-based analyses and are used to test Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4.   These models are 
as follows: 
Equation 8: Regression Model for Testing Hypothesis 1 (Direct Effect – Banker Divestiture 
Experience) 
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Equation 9: Regression Model for Testing Hypothesis 2 (Moderating Effect – Banker Divestiture 
Experience) 
 
Equation 10: Regression Model for Testing Hypothesis 3 (Direct Effect – High Buyer Divestiture 
Experience) 
 
Equation 11: Regression Model for Testing Hypothesis 4 (Moderating Effect – High Buyer 
Divestiture Experience) 
 
 
 
 
The divestiture performance variable Y has three alternatives (Announcement Date CAR, 
Completion, Duration), and therefore the performance metric index k has a range of one to three.  
The models for Completion and Duration include all ten control variables described earlier. The 
models for Announcement Date CAR use seven of the control variables. Since CAR is based on 
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market performance, it was necessary to exclude any controls that are also based on market 
performance (Leverage, Tobin’s q, and Unit-Parent Size Ratio) from the models using 
Announcement Date CAR as the dependent variable.   
The presence of the hypothesized direct effects of Banker Divestiture Experience and 
High Buyer Divestiture Experience on divestiture performance are tested using the models 
represented by Equation 8 and Equation 10, respectively. Their hypothesized moderation effects 
on the relationship between Firm Divestiture Experience and divestiture performance are tested 
using the models represented by Equation 9 and Equation 11, respectively.  Note that to properly 
test for the hypothesized direct relationship between Banker Divestiture Experience and 
divestiture performance in Hypothesis 1, it would not be appropriate to conduct the analysis using 
the Banker Divestiture Experience in Equation 9.  Attempting to use Equation 9 would only 
provide the conditional effect of Banker Divestiture Experience on divestiture performance (i.e. 
technically reflecting the case of zero Divestiture Experience) due to the presence of the 
interaction term.  In contrast, the estimation of Equation 8 (which does not have the interaction 
term) provides the main effect of Banker Divestiture Experience on divestiture performance Y.  
The same holds true for the High Buyer Experience models in Equation 10 and Equation 11.     
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to estimate the models for Announcement 
Date CAR, logistic regression is used to estimate the models for Completion, and negative 
binomial regression is used to estimate the models for Duration.  In all regressions, industry fixed 
effects (based on the selling parent firm’s primary 2-digit SIC code) and year fixed effects are 
used.  
4.4.3 The Choice to Divest 
In this paper, there is the potential that non-random selection associated with the firm’s 
decision to divest could be biasing the firm’s divestiture performance results. Coarsened exact 
matching procedures are used to address this possibility, using the same approach as was 
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employed in Essays 1 and 2.  A comparison between the regression results using the full sample 
versus the CEM sample (Table 23 in the Appendix) illustrates the robustness of the results to 
controlling for non-random selection in the firm’s decision to divest a particular business unit. 
4.4.4 The Choice to Hire an Investment Bank - Treatment Effects Model 
In each divestiture transaction, the selling parent firm has the choice of whether or not to 
hire an investment bank.  As a result, there is non-random selection in the observations that are 
treated (the divestitures in which selling firms chose to hire an investment bank) and those which 
are not (the divestitures in which the decision was made to not hire an investment bank).  A 
treatment effects model is used to account for the potential bias in the divestiture performance 
results stemming from the firm’s decision of whether or not to hire an investment bank. 
The first stage of the two-stage treatment effects model predicts the likelihood that the 
selling firm hires an investment bank for its divestiture transaction. The first-stage dependent 
variable, Advisor Flag, is set equal to one if a bank was used, and is zero otherwise.  The second 
stage estimates the regression models for divestiture performance.  Two instrumental variables 
are used in the first stage model: Federal Funds Rate and U.S. M&A Volume Change.  
Federal Funds Rate is the average effective federal funds rate for a given year.  Higher 
federal funds rates mean that is more expensive to borrow money.  In such an environment, 
buyers may be more reticent to part with their money, making it more difficult for selling firms to 
divest business units.  As such, as the federal fund rate increases, selling firms are more likely to 
engage an investment bank to assist with the divestiture.    
U.S. M&A Volume Change is the yearly percent change in the U.S. M&A market, based 
upon deal value. In a deal-rich environment, there are many potential sellers and buyers eager to 
do deals.  Furthermore, since the investment banks are likely busier in a deal-rich environment, 
they may seize the opportunity to raise their fees.  Thus, as M&A volume increases, selling firms 
are less likely to hire an investment bank to assist with the divestiture.   
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4.4.5 Availability of Buyer Divestiture Experience Data - Heckman Selection Model 
In this research, buyer divestiture experience data are only available for buyers that are 
public, U.S.-headquartered companies.  Divestitures transactions for which buyer experience data 
are available are thus not randomly selected, which could in turn bias the regression results.  This 
sample selection problem is addressed through the use of a two-stage Heckman selection model.   
The first stage of the Heckman selection model predicts the likelihood that the buyer in 
the divestiture transaction will be a public, U.S.-headquartered firm (and thus will have 
divestiture experience data available).  The binary outcome variable, Buyer Flag, is set equal to 
one if divestiture experience data is available for the buyer, and is zero otherwise.  The second 
stage estimates the divestiture performance regression models.  Two instrumental variables are 
used in the first stage model: Near International Hub and Exchange Rate Index.   
Near International Hub is a binary variable that captures the selling firm’s physical 
accessibility to potential international buyers.  It is set equal to one if the selling firm is 
headquartered in an area that serves as the primary international gateway to Europe, Asia, or 
South America (i.e. the Northeast tri-state region of New York, Connecticut and New Jersey 
(JFK/EWR); California (SFO/LAX); and Florida (MIA)).  Easier access to potential international 
buyers reduces the likelihood that the buyer will be a U.S. headquartered public company, but 
should have no correlation with divestiture performance. For precedent for the successful use of 
this type of instrument, see Bernstein et al. (2016). 
Exchange Rate Index is the annual average U.S. dollar real effective exchange rate index, 
as recorded by the World Bank in its World Development Indicators database.   As defined by the 
World Bank, this is the nominal effective exchange rate (a measure of the value of the U.S. dollar 
against a weighted average of several foreign currencies) divided by a price deflator.  Essentially, 
it is a measure of the strength of the U.S. dollar.  The U.S. dollar is often viewed as the world’s 
safe haven currency. Likewise, investing in U.S.-based assets is often viewed as a safe haven 
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investment, especially in times of turmoil (as would be reflected in a devaluation of a home 
country currency).   As such, as the U.S. dollar exchange rate index increases, the propensity that 
the buyer of a U.S.-selling firm’s business unit will be a foreign buyer increases.   
4.4.6 Hypothesis Testing 
There are two sets of regression results: one set for the banker-based models, and one set 
for the buyer-based models.  For the banker-based models, the OLS regression results for 
Announcement Date CAR are presented in Table 16, the logit model regression results for 
Completion are provided in Table 17, and the negative binomial regression results for Duration 
are provided in Table 18. In each of these tables, for its respective divestiture performance 
measure, Model 1 is used to test the baseline hypothesis H0, Model 7 is to test H1, and Model 8 is 
used to test H2.  The tables are constructed such that the simplest model (for testing H0) is 
illustrated first.  Key model components are then added in a step-by-step fashion, culminating in 
the models used to test H1 and H2. 
   For the buyer-based models, the OLS regression results for Announcement Date CAR 
are presented in Table 19, the logit model regression results for Completion are provided in Table 
20, and the negative binomial regression results for Duration are provided in Table 21. In each of 
these tables, for its respective divestiture performance measure, Model 1 is used to test the 
baseline hypothesis H0, Model 7 is to test H3, and Model 8 is used to test H4. These tables are 
also constructed using the same step-by-step, or component-by-component, approach as was used 
in the buyer-based tables. 
 
--- Insert Buyer-Based Tables here: Table 16, Table 17, and Table 18 --- 
--- Insert Banker-Based Tables here: Table 19, Table 20, and Table 21 --- 
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In these tables for Announcement Date CAR (which use OLS), the estimated coefficients 
are measured in the units of the outcome variable divided by the units of its predictor variable.  In 
the tables for Completion (which use logistic regression) the estimated coefficients are measured 
in units of log-odds.  In the tables for Duration (which use negative binomial regression), the 
estimated coefficients in Table 10 are interpreted as a difference between the logs of the expected 
counts (i.e. duration days) for a unit change in the associated predictor variable.  
As in Essay 1 and Essay 2, for the Duration performance regressions (Table 10), a 
decrease in the duration of the divestiture process is interpreted as a positive performance result, 
since firms typically want divestiture transactions to close as quickly as possible.  For the other 
three performance variables, positive increases (e.g. a larger Announcement Date CAR) are 
viewed as beneficial improvements in performance. 
The baseline hypothesis H0 predicts that there is a positive relationship between firm 
divestiture experience and divestiture performance.  These results are exactly as described in 
Essay 1, wherein H0 is supported when divestiture performance is measured as Announcement 
Date CAR and Duration, but is unsupported when divestiture performance is measured as 
Completion. 
The hypotheses H1 and H2 concern the role of investment bank divestiture experience on 
divestiture performance.   H1 predicts that investment bank divestiture experience is positively 
associated with firm divestiture performance.  In evaluating H1 it is useful to return to the 
equation for the regression model, Equation 8.  It is restated here in a simplified format as 
Equation 12: 
Equation 12: Simplified Format of the Regression Model for Testing Hypothesis 1 (Banker – 
Direct Effect) 
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Turning to the regression results, Model 7 in Table 16 (Announcement Date CAR), in 
Table 17 (Completion), and in Table 18 (Duration) each correspond to Equation 13 above.  
Starting with Announcement Date CAR, Model 7 in Table 16 shows that the coefficient estimate 
β2 for Banker Divestiture Experience is significant and positive (β2=0.000, p<0.05).  In contrast, 
for Completion (Model 7 of Table 17), the coefficient estimate β2 for Banker Divestiture 
Experience is significant but negative (β2=-0.0013, p<0.10), which is the sign opposite as 
hypothesized.  For Duration, Model 7 of Table 18 shows that the coefficient estimate β2 for 
Banker Divestiture Experience is significant and positive (β2=0.0012, p<0.01), which is the 
opposite sign as hypothesized for Duration.  Taken together, H1 is supported when divestiture 
performance is measured as Announcement Date CAR, unsupported when it is measured as 
Completion, and unsupported when it is measured as Duration.  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that investment bank divestiture experience positively moderates 
the relationship between firm divestiture experience and firm divestiture performance. Here 
again, it is useful to return to the equation for the regression model, Equation 9.  It is restated here 
in a simplified format as Equation 14: 
Equation 14: Simplified Format of the Regression Model for Testing Hypothesis 2 (Banker – 
Moderating Effect) 
 
The partial derivative of Equation 14 with respect to Firm Divestiture Experience is:  
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Equation 15:  
 
 
The hypothesized moderating role of Banker Divestiture Experience in the relationship 
between Firm Divestiture Experience and divestiture performance Y is easily tested using the 
partial derivative in Equation 15.  Here, β3 represents the slope of the relationship between Banker 
Divestiture Experience and the partial derivative of performance Y with respect to Firm 
Divestiture Experience (
𝜕𝑌
𝜕(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑖𝑣. 𝐸𝑥𝑝.)
).   
As for the regression results, Model 8 in Table 16 (Announcement Date CAR), in Table 
17 (Completion), and in Table 18 (Duration) each correspond to Equation 14 above.  The results 
of Model 8 in Table 16 for Announcement Date CAR show that the coefficient of the interaction 
term, β3, is insignificant.  For Completion, the results of Model 8 of Table 17 show that 
coefficient of the interaction term is significant and negative (β3=-0.0002; p<0.01). This is 
opposite the sign hypothesized.  For Duration, the results of Model 8 of Table 18  show that 
coefficient of the interaction term is significant and positive (β3=0.000; p<0.01).  This is also 
opposite the sign hypothesized. In the cases of Completion and Duration, the significance of each 
of the interaction terms in Equation 14 was further evidenced through the significance of joint 
tests of the coefficients.  Taken together, these results can be visually interpreted as per Figure 27. 
Overall, H2 is not supported for Announcement Date CAR, Completion or Duration.   
--- Insert Figure 27 here --- 
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Next, turning to the buyer-based models, H3 predicts that buyer divestiture experience is 
negatively associated with firm divestiture performance.  Again, in evaluating H3 it is useful to 
return to the equation for the regression model, Equation 10.  It is restated here in a simplified 
format as Equation 16: 
Equation 16: Simplified Format of the Regression Model for Testing Hypothesis 3 (High Buyer – 
Direct Effect) 
 
 
Turning to the regression results for H3, Model 7 in Table 19 (Announcement Date CAR), 
in Table 20 (Completion), and in Table 21 (Duration) each correspond to Equation 16 above.  
Starting with Announcement Date CAR, Model 7 in Table 19 shows that the coefficient estimate 
β2 for High Buyer Divestiture Experience is significant and positive (β2=0.0038, p<0.10), which is 
opposite the sign hypothesized.  For Completion (Model 7 of Table 20), the coefficient estimate 
β2 for High Buyer Divestiture Experience is significant and negative as hypothesized (β2=-0.329, 
p<0.01).  For Duration, Model 7 of Table 21 shows that the coefficient estimate β2 for High 
Buyer Divestiture Experience is insignificant.  Taken together, H1 is supported when divestiture 
performance is measured as Completion, but unsupported when it is measured as Announcement 
Date CAR and Duration.  
Lastly, H4 predicts that buyer divestiture experience positively moderates the relationship 
between firm divestiture experience and firm divestiture performance.  For convenience, its 
regression model, Equation 11 is restated here in a simplified format as Equation 17: 
  159 
 
Equation 17: Simplified Format of the Regression Model for Testing Hypothesis 4 (High Buyer – 
Moderating Effect) 
 
The partial derivative of Equation 17 with respect to Firm Divestiture Experience is:  
Equation 18:  
 
 
In Equation 18, β3 represents the slope of the relationship between High Buyer 
Divestiture Experience and the partial derivative of performance Y with respect to Firm 
Divestiture Experience (
𝜕𝑌
𝜕(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑖𝑣. 𝐸𝑥𝑝.)
). 
As for the regression results, Model 8 in Table 19 (Announcement Date CAR), in Table 
20 (Completion), and in Table 21 (Duration) each correspond to Equation 17 above.  The results 
of Model 8 in Table 19 for Announcement Date CAR show that the coefficient of the interaction 
term, β3, is insignificant.  For Completion, the results of Model 8 of Table 20 show that 
coefficient of the interaction term is also insignificant. For Duration, the results of Model 8 of 
Table 21 show that coefficient of the interaction term is significant and positive (β3=0.016; 
p<0.01), which is opposite the sign hypothesized. In the case of Duration, the significance of the 
interaction term in Equation 14 was further evidenced though a joint test of the coefficients.  
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Thus, overall, H3 is not supported when divestiture experience is measured as Announcement 
Date CAR, Completion or Duration.  
To close, it should be noted that the above analyses employed the second-stage of the 
treatment effects models and the Heckman selection models for the banker-based and the buyer-
based models, respectively.  Throughout these second-stage models, Lambda (i.e. the Inverse 
Mills Ratio) is sometimes significant and sometimes not.  The significance of Lambda is usually 
used as an indication that selection bias was an issue in the results.  For consistency, the second-
stage models are used in the hypothesis testing and in the analyses, irrespective of the 
significance of Lambda. Given the likelihood of selection bias in the results, it is most sensible to 
be conservative in approach and use the second-stage results.  Moreover, the instrumental 
variables in each of the first stage models (Model 5 in each of the tables) are each significant with 
sign as expected.  Moreover, each pair of instruments (one pair for the banker-based models and 
one pair for the buyer-based models) passes the overidentification test.  Combined, these results 
help to evidence the efficacy of these instrument variables and validate the use of the second-
stage models. 
Results of the hypothesis tests are summarized in Table 22.  
 
--- Insert Table 22 here --- 
4.5 DISCUSSION 
This paper investigates experience transfer across firm boundaries.  Specifically, it 
explores whether and how externally-sourced divestiture experience may impact firm divestiture 
performance outcomes.  Two mechanisms for external experience transfer are examined.  The 
first is a direct application of the external experience to the firm’s divestiture process.  The 
second is an indirect transfer path, wherein the external experience moderates the relationship 
between the firm’s own divestiture experience and its divestiture performance.  Two types of 
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external divestiture experience sources are considered: the investment bank and the buyer 
involved in the divestiture.   
The results reveal five key insights:   
1. Firm experience typically takes a backseat role to external experience. 
2. When the moderating effect of external experience is present, it always plays a 
performance-impairing role. 
3. In spite of being paid for their advice, banker external experience does not 
always serve a performance-enhancing role.  
4. High-experience buyers are not motivated buyers. 
5. When considering its impact on performance, the source of the external 
experience matters. 
Rationale and implications for each of these insights will be provided in turn in the 
remainder of this section.  Interpretation and discussion will draw upon graphical illustration of 
the regression model results as well as the tables themselves.22     
--- Insert Figure 28, Figure 29, and Figure 30 here ---   
1. Firm experience typically takes a backseat role to external experience. 
A fundamental question that stretches across all four hypotheses is the issue of whether or 
not external experience transfers across firm boundaries.  The results of this paper suggest that, 
                                                     
22 As in Essay 2, it is recognized that consideration of significance of estimated coefficients is an important 
component of evaluation of hypothesis support, although it is not the only one.  As indicated in the tables, 
this paper uses a minimum cutoff of significance at the 10% level, and the figures used in this discussion 
depict only significant coefficients from the models.  Stated differently, these figures assume the 
coefficients of the insignificant terms to be at zero. In actuality, these coefficients may be non-zero.  As 
such, the figures that include the full model, irrespective of the significance of coefficient estimates, are 
included in the Appendix (Figure 31, Figure 32, Figure 33, and Figure 34).  
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not only is external experience transferable, but, relative to the firm’s own experience, it can play 
an outsize role in firm performance.      
The data in this research support this insight regardless of the source of the external 
experience.  Consider the results for the banker-based data, in Model 7 of Table 16, Table 17, and 
Table 18. An examination of the coefficients of Firm Divestiture Experience and Banker 
Divestiture Experience reveals that only the coefficient of Banker Divestiture Experience is 
significant in both the Announcement Date CAR and the Completion cases.  For Duration, both 
coefficients are significant, and both are of the same order of magnitude.   The buyer-based data 
in Model 7 of Table 19, Table 20, and Table 21 tell a similar story. In the case of Announcement 
Date CAR, the coefficient for High Buyer Divestiture Experience is significant, while that of Firm 
Divestiture Experience is not.  For the case of divestiture performance measured as Completion, 
both coefficients are significant, but the magnitude of the coefficient for High Buyer Divestiture 
Experience is larger than the coefficient of Firm Divestiture Experience by an astounding factor 
of ten.  However, neither are significant in the model for Duration.     
That external experience can play such a dominant role relative to internal experience has 
important implications for firms.  These results demonstrate that firms’ advice-seeking from 
intermediaries can serve to replace – in fact, displace – their own experience.  Given that this 
effect is seen not only with experience intentionally sourced from hired bankers, but also when it 
originates from an “unfriendly” counterparty, suggests that it is important for firms to recognize 
that exposing themselves to external experience influences has consequential ramifications for 
their own experience accumulation efforts.  While one pessimistic interpretation is that firms’ 
learning from their own experience is not effective or worthwhile, a more optimistic 
interpretation is that, since external experience can be sourced, firms may not have to learn in that 
particular arena and can devote their resources elsewhere.         
2. When the moderating effect of external experience is present, it always plays a performance-
impairing role. 
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For the banker-based data, the moderating effect was significant in the models for two of 
the three performance measures – Completion and Duration.  As illustrated in Figure 29 and 
Figure 30, the charts for Completion show that as firm experience increases, externally-sourced 
banker experience becomes increasingly detrimental to firm performance.  In fact, this external 
experience is so harmful that, as one can see in the blue-hued “high-high” experience zone in 
Figure 30, the likelihood of deal completion actually goes negative (the white line is the zero 
boundary).  The same is true for the case of Duration – as firm experience increases and as 
banker experience increases, deal duration increases at an increasing rate. Thus, the moderating 
effect is performance-impairing in both cases.  Stated differently, this ironically means that the 
“low-low” experience zones for Completion and Duration in Figure 30 offer optimal performance 
conditions.  
For the buyer-based data, the moderating effect was significant only in the case of 
divestiture performance measured as Duration. The interaction plot of Figure 32 shows that the 
effects of high buyer experience and low buyer experience diverge with increasing firm 
performance, wherein the effects associated with high buyer experience lengthen, and thus 
impair, duration divestiture performance.   
In theorizing about the moderating effect of inter-firm experience transfer, this paper 
offered a hopeful view – that, regardless of the source of experience, and whatever motivations 
with which it is laden, beneficial learning would prevail.  Unfortunately, the reality suggests 
otherwise, on two fronts: viability and impact.  The lack of a significant moderating effect in both 
the banker-based data (one case) and the buyer-based data (two cases) suggest that learning 
transfer through this indirect path presents challenges, irrespective of the source of the external 
experience.  It does not appear to be a viable mechanism that firms should depend upon as part of 
its learning process arsenal. As for impact, the results paint an even darker picture.  When the 
moderating mechanism is successfully activated, the external experience impairs firm 
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performance, across all measures for both sources.  This has deleterious implications for the 
firm’s capability development processes.  In shaping the relationship between the firm’s own 
experience and performance, external experience is shaping a primary, direct avenue for firm 
learning.  Thus, as demonstrated in these results, external experience harms the firm’s own 
learning efforts.       
3. In spite of being paid for their advice, banker external experience does not always serve a 
performance-enhancing role.  
 As shown in the banker-based data in Model 7 of Table 17 (for Completion) and Table 
18 (for Duration), the coefficient of Banker Divestiture Experience indicates that increasing 
banker experience reduces the likelihood of deal completion and lengthens deal duration – each 
of which are viewed as poor divestiture performance outcomes. The results for Completion are 
especially surprising, given that investment bank compensation schemes are often tied to deal 
completion.  Likewise, Model 8 in these tables show that the moderating effect of Banker 
Divestiture Experience also has these negative consequences for divestiture performance.  The 
only ostensibly positive outcome associated with external experience sourced from bankers is in 
case of Announcement Date CAR, wherein Banker Divestiture Experience has a positive 
relationship with performance.   
These results are counterintuitive – they suggest that, when a firm engages an investment 
bank, it is often not getting what it pays for. However, an alternative interpretation is that the 
results suggest that, when it comes to divestiture performance measurement, what firms think 
they want may not be what is best.  On the surface, divestiture performance expectations seem 
clear-cut – get the deal done, making as much money as possible, as quickly as possible.  Yet, it 
could well be that, with the benefit of their extensive divestiture experience, that short duration 
deals are not necessarily better.  More time allows for an opportunity to identify shared sources of 
value between the selling parent and the acquirer, and thus successfully position and unwind the 
unit from the parent accordingly.  Furthermore, bankers may have learned through their 
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divestiture experience that completing a bad deal is worse than terminating one. This sheds 
important light onto the role of deal intermediaries – when duration and completion performance 
is viewed in this way, external experience sourced from investment banks may be far more 
valuable than it at first appears.     
4. High-experience buyers are not motivated buyers. 
When divestiture performance is measured as Completion, the results of Model 7 in Table 
20 show that the absolute magnitude of the coefficient of High Buyer Experience (β2=-0.329, 
p<0.01) is an order of magnitude larger than that of the coefficient for Firm Divestiture 
Experience (β1=-0.0209, p<0.01).  Thus, transferred external divestiture experience originating 
from the buyer serves to severely reduce the likelihood of the divestiture deal’s completion.  In 
essence, buyers, at least high-experience buyers, do not appear to be especially motivated to 
complete the deal. 
This result has several implications.  For one, it surfaces an important difference between 
divestiture and acquisition: the cost of deal failure is much higher in divestiture than in 
acquisition.   The risks of gaining the “damaged goods” reputations that befall unsuccessfully 
divested units are not present for acquirers.  Further, while the divestiture is just a financial 
transaction to the buyer (until the heavy lifting of post-deal integration begins), the selling firm 
has to bear the costs of dis-integration before the deal completes. Incomplete divestiture deals are 
not as detrimental to buyers as are they are to selling firms.  This, in turn, gives rise to another 
implication: caveat venditor, or “seller beware.”  Selling firms should recognize that working 
with a deal counterparty which has a high level of divestiture experience hurts the likelihood that 
the deal will complete. As such, when considering potential buyers, selling firms should 
incorporate this factor into their assessments.  This also hold true for investors.  Knowing that 
high-experience buyers reduce the likelihood of divestiture completion could change the way in 
which they wish to place their stock market bets. 
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5. When considering its impact on performance, the source of the external experience 
matters…but surprisingly less than one might expect. 
The results demonstrate that different types of externally-sourced divestiture experience 
can influence the firm’s divestiture performance differently, but that there are notable 
consistencies in their impact as well.  For example, the direct effect of external divestiture 
experience raises the cumulative abnormal returns associated with the divestiture announcement 
when the experience is sourced from a banker, as well as when the experience comes from a high-
experience buyer.  Likewise, the direct effect of external divestiture experience sourced from a 
banker or from a high-experience buyer reduces the likelihood that the divestiture transaction will 
complete.  However, while the direct effect of divestiture experience sourced from a banker 
lengthens the duration of the divestiture transaction, buyer-based divestiture experience has no 
significant direct effect. The moderating effect reveals two more points of commonality between 
the two source types: insignificance for Announcement Date CAR and a performance-impairing 
role for Duration.  However, differences surface again with Completion, wherein banker-based 
external experience has a significant negative moderating effect, but buyer-based external 
divestiture experience has no significant effect. 
It is natural for firms to tap into the external experience sources to which it has access, 
deliberately or not.  However, the results underscore that, in doing so, firms should not expect 
similar outcomes from different experience sources.  The firm-bank relationship investigated in 
this paper is a client-advisor relationship, while the firm-buyer relationship is a supplier-buyer 
one.  Certainly, many other types of external experience sources are available, from board 
members to investors.  Firms need to recognize that not all experience is cut from the same cloth, 
and that this has ramifications for inter-firm experience transfer. 
This implication raises another question: given that the source of the experience matters, 
which experience source matters most to divestiture performance?   Analyzing a combined 
regression model that incorporates both sources is one way to address this question.  As was 
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described previously, the banker-based data and the buyer-based data are each subject to distinct 
sample selection problems.  While these issues were successfully addressed separately in this 
paper, they cannot be addressed simultaneously in this research.  This renders any regression 
results from a combined model to be suspect.  However, in the spirit of exploration, a combined 
model was created.  Results are presented in Table 27 (for Announcement Date CAR), Table 28 
(for Completion) and Table 29 (for Duration) in the Appendix.  Due to convergence issues, OLS 
is used to estimate the model for Completion, rather than logistic regression.  Furthermore, the 
continuous Buyer Divestiture Experience variable is used in these regression models. Looking at 
Model 10 for each of the three tables and comparing the main effects of Firm Divestiture 
Experience, Banker Divestiture Experience, and Buyer Divestiture Experience, the results show 
that Banker Divestiture Experience is the only main effect that is significant for Announcement 
Date CAR and Duration.  Firm Divestiture Experience is the only main effect that is significant 
for Completion.  Taking these results at face value, they are intriguing.  They suggest that Banker 
Divestiture Experience can matter more than the firm’s own divestiture experience, and that the 
main effect of Buyer Divestiture Experience plays no role in the firm’s divestiture performance 
outcomes. It is a similar theme for the moderating effect.  Looking at Model 14 in each of the 
tables, significant interaction effects are found only in Completion and Duration, and in both of 
these cases it is the interaction between Firm Divestiture Experience and Banker Divestiture 
Experience that is significant.  Thus, these results from the combined model (which again must be 
interpreted skeptically) reinforce the finding that the source of the external experience matters, 
and suggests that Banker Divestiture Experience matters more than Buyer Divestiture Experience 
(and, at times, more than Firm Divestiture Experience).            
4.5.1 Limitations & Directions for Future Research 
One limitation of this paper is that only two types of external experience sources are 
considered.  The results of this paper suggest that inter-firm experience transfer is an important, 
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albeit complex, process, and evaluating additional types of external experience sources could 
offer additional insights into its mechanisms and impact on firm performance.  Furthermore, the 
contextual characteristics (e.g. industry, geography, deal size) of the external experience offered 
by the investment banks and the buyers were not considered in this paper.  The degree of 
similarity between the external experience and the contextual characteristics of the focal 
transaction may play a role in the effectiveness and the fidelity of the experience transfer process.  
Studying the impact of such similarities and differences offers an interesting opportunity for 
future study.    
Another limitation is that any repeated transactions between a particular seller-banker 
pair or between a particular seller-buyer pair are not specifically tracked.  Unpacking how the 
influence of external experience may be augmented or attenuated as the two parties engage in 
multiple interactions could advance our understanding of the conditions under which external 
experience offers the greatest performance benefits to firms.     
While this paper offered insights regarding the role of external divestiture experience 
sourced from investment banks on firm divestiture performance, these learnings were conditioned 
upon the firm’s hiring of an investment bank for the divestiture transaction.  Another line of 
inquiry could explore the benefits and consequences to divestiture performance associated with 
the firm’s decision of whether or not to hire an investment banker for its divestiture transactions.  
The advantages (and disadvantages) associated with the hire-versus-no hire decision around 
investment bankers for firms have been investigated in other types of transactions, including 
acquisitions and initial public offerings.  Insights regarding the merits of hiring an investment 
banker in divestiture transactions versus not hiring one are sure to be of interest to scholars and 
managers alike.       
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4.6 CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates experience transfer across firm boundaries.  Two key questions 
are addressed: first, whether and how external experience influences firm performance outcomes; 
and second, how the type of the sourced experience may play a role in these outcomes.  To do so, 
this research focuses on corporate divestiture, and considers the influence of divestiture 
experience sourced from investment bankers and buyers on firm divestiture performance.  Two 
possible avenues for experience transfer are examined: direct and moderating.  In the first, the 
external divestiture experience is directly applied to the firm’s divestiture process.  In the second, 
the external divestiture experience moderates the relationship between the firm’s own divestiture 
experience and its divestiture performance.  
I find that the direct and the moderating paths for external learning transfer are both 
viable, but not consistently and not always beneficially for performance.  Indeed, when present, 
the moderating effect of external experience always plays a performance-impairing role.  
Moreover, I determine that, relative to the firm’s own divestiture experience, transferred external 
divestiture experience has an outsize influence on divestiture performance.  Intriguingly, I find 
that the source type impacts only the activation of particular transfer paths.  When a certain 
transfer path is present for the investment banks and the buyers, the nature of the effect of that 
external transfer on divestiture performance (i.e. performance-enhancing or performance-
impairing) is the same, regardless of the source.  Given that the underpinning motivations of 
bankers and buyers involved in divestiture transactions differ, this consistency in outcome is 
notable.  As such, I find that the performance impact of external experience transfer often runs 
counter to theoretical predictions and managerial expectations.        
Taken together, these findings contribute new insights towards answering the questions 
of whether and how external experience influences firm outcomes, as well as how these outcomes 
change with differences in the external experience source.  In addition to advancing 
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understanding of interfirm experience transfer, a topic of pointed interest in both the 
organizational learning and strategic management literatures, this research contributes to the 
burgeoning literature on the role and impact of intermediary actors in firm corporate development 
activities.                                
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4.7 TABLES 
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
1 Announcement Date CAR 0.01 0.12 1
2 Completion 0.77 0.42 0.00 1
3 Duration 51.10 113.95 0.03*** . 1
4 Advisor Flag 0.25 0.43 0.02*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 1
5 Buyer Flag 0.28 0.45 0.00 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 1
6 Federal Funds Rate 4.86 2.32 0.00 -0.10*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.02*** 1
7 U.S. M&A Volume Change 0.59 2.48 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 -0.02*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 1
8 Near International Hub 0.38 0.48 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01*** -0.02*** 0.02*** -0.02*** 1
9 Exchange Rate Index 110.93 10.68 0.00 0.01** -0.02*** 0.08*** -0.05*** 0.23*** -0.23*** 0.00 1
10 Firm Divestiture Experience 7.03 12.87 -0.03*** -0.01* 0.01** 0.04*** 0.01 -0.15*** -0.02*** 0.15*** -0.05*** 1
11 Banker Divestiture Experience 146.21 105.70 0.00 -0.03*** 0.15*** 0.02* 0.09*** -0.02** 0.00 0.00 -0.13*** 0.14*** 1
12 High Buyer Divestiture Experience 0.65 0.48 -0.01 -0.02** 0.00 0.07*** . -0.14*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.09*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 1
13 Buyer Divestiture Experience 4.75 10.70 -0.01 -0.02*** 0.01 0.07*** . -0.09*** -0.01 0.03*** -0.02** 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.32*** 1
14 ln(Total Assets) 7.69 2.72 -0.07*** -0.02*** 0.06*** 0.14*** 0.07*** -0.14*** -0.04*** 0.07*** 0.02*** 0.58*** 0.28*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 1
15 Negative Net Income 0.33 0.47 0.05*** -0.01 -0.03*** -0.01** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.02*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.14*** -0.07*** -0.02* -0.05*** -0.37*** 1
16 Leverage 0.38 0.27 0.03*** -0.04*** 0.04*** 0.06*** -0.01 0.03*** -0.06*** -0.02*** 0.04*** 0.11*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 1
17 Tobin's q 1.45 45.22 -0.03*** -0.01* -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03*** 0.01 -0.02*** 1
18 Return on Equity -0.19 36.75 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01* -0.01*** 0.01** 0.00 1
19 Herfindahl Index 0.63 0.33 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01** -0.09*** 0.01*** 0.07*** 0.06*** -0.03*** -0.13*** -0.24*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.39*** 0.16*** -0.01* 0.01* -0.01 1
20 Unit-Parent Size Ratio 0.25 0.43 0.20*** -0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.00 0.09*** -0.01* 0.01 0.05*** -0.19*** -0.08*** 0.03** 0.01 -0.38*** 0.29*** 0.32*** -0.05*** 0.01 0.15*** 1
21 Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.81 0.39 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.02*** -0.05*** 0.02*** -0.20*** 0.03*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.23*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.00 0.00 0.10*** 0.13*** 1
22 Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.36 0.48 0.01** -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.04*** 0.01 -0.07*** -0.01 -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.14*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.13*** 0.10*** -0.01*** 0.01 -0.01* 0.17*** 0.09*** 0.02*** 1
23 Divestiture Program 0.53 0.50 -0.03*** 0.10*** 0.02*** 0.14*** 0.04*** -0.05*** -0.02*** 0.03*** 0.00 0.43*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.54*** -0.13*** 0.10*** -0.01* 0.01* -0.28*** -0.23*** -0.15*** -0.11*** 1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 16: Heckman Model – OLS Regression Results for Announcement Date CAR, Banker Models 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Heckman 1st Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable: CAR CAR CAR CAR Advisor Flag CAR CAR CAR
Federal Funds Rate 0.0739***
(0.0158)
U.S. M&A Volume Change -0.260***
(0.0738)
Firm Divestiture Experience 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0093*** -0.0015 -0.0014
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Bank Divestiture Experience 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm X Bank Divestiture Experience -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0041*** -0.0047*** -0.0051*** -0.0051*** 0.114*** -0.0036*** 0.0141 0.0143
(0.0006) (0.001) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0082) (0.0013) (0.0151) (0.0151)
Negative Net Income 0.0059*** 0.0086*** 0.0085*** 0.0085*** 0.153*** 0.0109** 0.0342 0.0345*
(0.0018) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0234) (0.0042) (0.0209) (0.0208)
Return on Equity -0.000 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0006 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Herfindahl Index -0.0036 -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.0283 -0.0103** -0.0148** -0.0149**
(0.0023) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0396) (0.0045) (0.0059) (0.0059)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.0022 0.0047 0.0048 0.0049 0.285*** 0.0086* 0.0519 0.0528
(0.0014) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0244) (0.0047) (0.0373) (0.0372)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.001 -0.0263 -0.0011 -0.0052 -0.0052
(0.0015) (0.0029) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0215) (0.003) (0.0044) (0.0044)
Divestiture Program -0.0007 -0.0041 -0.0043 -0.0044 0.159*** -0.0026 0.022 0.0223
(0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0238) (0.0036) (0.0211) (0.0211)
Lambda 0.0182 0.224 0.228
(0.0182) (0.179) (0.178)
Constant 0.0134 0.0242 0.0266 0.0261 -1.540*** 0.005 -0.331 -0.337
(0.0214) (0.023) (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.356) (0.0349) (0.292) (0.291)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.018 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.036
Number of Observations 29,230 7,762 7,762 7,762 33,605 7,433 7,433 7,433
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 17: Heckman Model – Logit Regression Results for Completion, Banker Models 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Heckman 1st Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable: Completion Completion Completion Completion Advisor Flag Completion Completion Completion
Federal Funds Rate 0.0432**
(0.0205)
U.S. M&A Volume Change -0.290***
(0.0955)
Firm Divestiture Experience -0.011*** -0.0148*** 0.0268* -0.0155*** -0.0099 0.031
(0.004) (0.0055) (0.0154) (0.0018) (0.015) (0.0208)
Bank Divestiture Experience -0.0012* -0.0013* -0.0002 -0.0013* -0.0013* -0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Firm X Bank Divestiture Experience -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0381** -0.123*** -0.0782 -0.0963* 0.249*** -0.299*** -0.157 -0.140
(0.0184) (0.0451) (0.0492) (0.0497) (0.0111) (0.0743) (0.223) (0.223)
Negative Net Income -0.188*** 0.0034 0.0276 0.0231 0.119*** -0.0945 -0.0271 -0.0143
(0.0643) (0.151) (0.152) (0.151) (0.0309) (0.156) (0.180) (0.179)
Leverage 0.305** 0.599* 0.586* 0.567 -0.531*** 0.966** 0.697 0.604
(0.127) (0.353) (0.349) (0.348) (0.0801) (0.389) (0.532) (0.530)
Tobin's q -0.0034 0.131 0.129 0.128 0.0042 0.141 0.144 0.145
(0.0035) (0.104) (0.102) (0.103) (0.0026) (0.106) (0.107) (0.109)
Return on Equity 0.0003 -0.0013 -0.001 -0.0013 0.0001 -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0014
(0.0013) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0012) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0055)
Herfindahl Index -0.0943 -0.303 -0.305 -0.316 -0.0193 -0.254 -0.267 -0.282
(0.103) (0.206) (0.209) (0.210) (0.0473) (0.210) (0.211) (0.212)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio -0.404*** -0.873*** -0.856*** -0.846*** 0.868*** -1.565*** -1.113 -0.982
(0.0691) (0.149) (0.150) (0.150) (0.0378) (0.297) (0.725) (0.726)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.369*** -0.196 -0.214 -0.184 0.250*** -0.402** -0.269 -0.200
(0.0749) (0.194) (0.192) (0.192) (0.0371) (0.204) (0.302) (0.302)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness -0.193*** -0.251* -0.268* -0.262* -0.0741** -0.209 -0.252 -0.256
(0.0624) (0.151) (0.152) (0.152) (0.0294) (0.152) (0.161) (0.161)
Divestiture Program 0.791*** 0.511*** 0.569*** 0.536*** 0.129*** 0.501*** 0.574*** 0.559***
(0.0709) (0.144) (0.147) (0.148) (0.0315) (0.152) (0.192) (0.194)
Lambda -1.376*** -0.523 -0.294
(0.508) (1.390) (1.388)
Constant 1.366 4.394*** 4.094*** 4.126*** -2.299*** 7.742*** 5.943** 5.423*
(1.145) (0.898) (0.907) (0.921) (0.294) (1.213) (2.983) (2.974)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 16,260 5,526 5,526 5,526 15,958 5,379 5,379 5,379
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 18: Heckman Model – Negative Binomial Regression Results for Duration, Banker Models 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Heckman 1st Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable: Duration Duration Duration Duration Advisor Flag Duration Duration Duration
Federal Funds Rate 0.0432**
(0.0205)
U.S. M&A Volume Change -0.290***
(0.0955)
Firm Divestiture Experience -0.004*** 0.0004 -0.007** -0.0155*** 0.015*** 0.0079
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0051) (0.0056)
Bank Divestiture Experience 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0009*** 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.0009***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Firm X Bank Divestiture Experience 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
ln(Total Assets) 0.149*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.249*** 0.0999*** -0.120 -0.126*
(0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0139) (0.014) (0.0111) (0.0197) (0.0772) (0.0767)
Negative Net Income -0.0313 -0.0267 -0.0269 -0.026 0.119*** -0.0385 -0.141*** -0.145***
(0.0424) (0.0395) (0.0395) (0.0395) (0.0309) (0.0409) (0.0545) (0.0543)
Leverage -0.574*** -0.533*** -0.534*** -0.527*** -0.531*** -0.504*** -0.0689 -0.0438
(0.106) (0.101) (0.101) (0.103) (0.0801) (0.115) (0.189) (0.189)
Tobin's q 0.0292 0.0203 0.0201 0.0216 0.0042 0.0201 0.0164 0.0178
(0.0251) (0.0208) (0.0205) (0.0228) (0.0026) (0.021) (0.0209) (0.0232)
Return on Equity -0.0034 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0001 0.002 0.0017 0.0017
(0.0066) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0012) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076)
Herfindahl Index -0.138** -0.120** -0.120** -0.123** -0.0193 -0.128** -0.105* -0.108*
(0.0598) (0.0579) (0.0579) (0.058) (0.0473) (0.0588) (0.0592) (0.0593)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio 0.817*** 0.599*** 0.598*** 0.597*** 0.868*** 0.547*** -0.171 -0.202
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.0378) (0.0831) (0.253) (0.251)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.188*** 0.371*** 0.372*** 0.362*** 0.250*** 0.346*** 0.133 0.114
(0.0572) (0.0507) (0.0507) (0.051) (0.0371) (0.0559) (0.0945) (0.0931)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.0192 0.0988*** 0.0993*** 0.0986*** -0.0741** 0.106*** 0.168*** 0.170***
(0.0379) (0.0363) (0.0364) (0.0365) (0.0294) (0.0366) (0.0414) (0.0414)
Divestiture Program -0.111*** -0.0903** -0.0912** -0.088** 0.129*** -0.0933** -0.210*** -0.211***
(0.039) (0.0412) (0.0415) (0.0413) (0.0315) (0.0428) (0.0592) (0.0589)
Lambda -0.0923 -1.403*** -1.456***
(0.134) (0.479) (0.476)
Constant 2.685*** 2.839*** 2.848*** 2.864*** -2.299*** 3.122*** 5.999*** 6.147***
(0.320) (0.372) (0.373) (0.361) (0.294) (0.442) (1.077) (1.062)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 14,519 5,566 5,566 5,566 15,958 5,419 5,419 5,419
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 19: Heckman Model – OLS Regression Results for Announcement Date CAR, Buyer Models 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Heckman 1st Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable: CAR CAR CAR CAR Buyer Flag CAR CAR CAR
Near International Hub -0.041**
(0.0193)
Exchange Rate Index 0.007***
(0.0016)
Firm Divestiture Experience 0.0002** 0.0002* 0.0004** -0.0021** -0.000 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0002)
High Buyer Divestiture Experience 0.0037* 0.0037* 0.005* 0.0038* 0.0038* 0.0051*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0026)
Firm X High Buyer Divestiture Experience -0.0002* -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0041*** -0.0039*** -0.0045*** -0.0046*** 0.0662*** 0.0018 0.0023 0.0022
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0055) (0.0019) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Negative Net Income 0.0059*** 0.010*** 0.0096*** 0.0096*** -0.0707*** 0.0027 0.0023 0.0023
(0.0018) (0.003) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0192) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Return on Equity -0.000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0021*** 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Herfindahl Index -0.0036 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.000 0.0436 0.0043 0.0046 0.0046
(0.0023) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0305) (0.0041) (0.0045) (0.0045)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.0022 0.0071*** 0.0071*** 0.0071*** 0.583*** 0.0646*** 0.0689** 0.0683**
(0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.026) (0.0221) (0.032) (0.0319)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.0012 -0.001 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0701*** 0.0059 0.0064 0.0063
(0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0188) (0.004) (0.0047) (0.0046)
Divestiture Program -0.0007 -0.0027 -0.0033 -0.0035 -0.0202 -0.0053** -0.0054* -0.0055**
(0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0203) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0028)
Lambda 0.132*** 0.142* 0.140*
(0.0506) (0.074) (0.0738)
Constant 0.0134 0.0433* 0.0487** 0.0482** -2.845*** -0.232** -0.254 -0.251
(0.0214) (0.0227) (0.0224) (0.0223) (0.303) (0.107) (0.158) (0.157)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.018 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.036
Number of Observations 29,230 8,655 8,655 8,655 34,633 8,655 8,655 8,655
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 20: Heckman Model – Logit Regression Results for Completion, Buyer Models 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Heckman 1st Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable: Completion Completion Completion Completion Buyer Flag Completion Completion Completion
Near International Hub -0.0661**
(0.0257)
Exchange Rate Index 0.0064***
(0.0023)
Firm Divestiture Experience -0.011*** -0.019*** -0.0216** -0.003*** -0.0229*** -0.0258**
(0.004) (0.0059) (0.0098) (0.001) (0.0076) (0.011)
High Buyer Divestiture Experience -0.326*** -0.330*** -0.346*** -0.328*** -0.329*** -0.347***
(0.103) (0.103) (0.106) (0.103) (0.103) (0.106)
Firm X High Buyer Divestiture Experience 0.0032 0.0035
(0.0073) (0.0073)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0381** -0.0326 0.0136 0.0141 0.109*** -0.183* 0.141 0.143
(0.0184) (0.0311) (0.034) (0.034) (0.0082) (0.0979) (0.141) (0.141)
Negative Net Income -0.188*** -0.113 -0.0882 -0.0876 -0.0188 -0.0735 -0.114 -0.113
(0.0643) (0.108) (0.109) (0.110) (0.0279) (0.111) (0.113) (0.113)
Leverage 0.305** -0.080 -0.136 -0.138 -0.470*** 0.579 -0.670 -0.680
(0.127) (0.246) (0.234) (0.234) (0.0585) (0.510) (0.626) (0.627)
Tobin's q -0.0034 0.0096 0.0122 0.0121 0.0059** 0.0028 0.018 0.018
(0.0035) (0.0213) (0.0242) (0.024) (0.0028) (0.0221) (0.0255) (0.0253)
Return on Equity 0.0003 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 0.0026** -0.0018 0.0039 0.004
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.003) (0.003)
Herfindahl Index -0.0943 -0.399** -0.408** -0.410** 0.0371 -0.460** -0.363* -0.364*
(0.103) (0.177) (0.181) (0.182) (0.0417) (0.184) (0.191) (0.191)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio -0.404*** -0.0612 -0.011 -0.010 0.255*** -0.414 0.277 0.282
(0.0691) (0.127) (0.129) (0.129) (0.0321) (0.263) (0.342) (0.342)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.369*** 0.471*** 0.473*** 0.475*** 0.737*** -0.666 1.369 1.383
(0.0749) (0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.0418) (0.749) (1.000) (1.001)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness -0.193*** -0.264** -0.281** -0.281** 0.0709*** -0.377*** -0.196 -0.194
(0.0624) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.0261) (0.128) (0.142) (0.143)
Divestiture Program 0.791*** 0.676*** 0.769*** 0.772*** -0.036 0.756*** 0.725*** 0.727***
(0.0709) (0.114) (0.119) (0.119) (0.0286) (0.121) (0.127) (0.127)
Lambda -2.105 1.662 1.686
(1.334) (1.789) (1.790)
Constant 1.366 -0.399 -0.854 -0.847 -2.993*** 4.313 -4.657 -4.704
(1.145) (1.218) (1.206) (1.205) (0.510) (3.207) (4.312) (4.312)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 16,260 5,556 5,556 5,556 16,305 5,556 5,556 5,556
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 21: Heckman Model – Negative Binomial Regression Results for Duration, Buyer Models 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Heckman 1st Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable: Duration Duration Duration Duration Buyer Flag Duration Duration Duration
Near International Hub -0.0661**
(0.0257)
Exchange Rate Index 0.0064***
(0.0023)
Firm Divestiture Experience -0.004*** -0.0022 -0.0153*** -0.003*** 0.0005 -0.0127***
(0.0015) (0.0021) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.0038)
High Buyer Divestiture Experience 0.0495 0.0493 -0.0389 0.0468 0.0467 -0.0404
(0.0455) (0.0455) (0.0514) (0.0453) (0.0453) (0.0512)
Firm X High Buyer Divestiture Experience 0.0162*** 0.016***
(0.0034) (0.0034)
ln(Total Assets) 0.149*** 0.112*** 0.118*** 0.121*** 0.109*** 0.0396 0.0326 0.043
(0.0126) (0.0155) (0.0175) (0.0172) (0.0082) (0.0441) (0.0689) (0.068)
Negative Net Income -0.0313 -0.113** -0.112** -0.112** -0.0188 -0.0976* -0.0966* -0.0976*
(0.0424) (0.0525) (0.0526) (0.0521) (0.0279) (0.054) (0.0544) (0.0539)
Leverage -0.574*** -0.372*** -0.367*** -0.383*** -0.470*** -0.0333 -0.0076 -0.054
(0.106) (0.124) (0.129) (0.123) (0.0585) (0.254) (0.312) (0.309)
Tobin's q 0.0292 -0.0016 -0.0001 -0.0019 0.0059** -0.0048 -0.0053 -0.0064
(0.0251) (0.0332) (0.0392) (0.0308) (0.0028) (0.0346) (0.0342) (0.0265)
Return on Equity -0.0034 -0.0079*** -0.0079*** -0.0078*** 0.0026** -0.0094*** -0.0095*** -0.0092***
(0.0066) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0011) (0.0029) (0.003) (0.0029)
Herfindahl Index -0.138** 0.0643 0.0654 0.0618 0.0371 0.0392 0.037 0.0358
(0.0598) (0.071) (0.0709) (0.0706) (0.0417) (0.072) (0.0747) (0.074)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio 0.817*** 0.764*** 0.769*** 0.779*** 0.255*** 0.589*** 0.574*** 0.601***
(0.047) (0.0616) (0.0622) (0.0619) (0.0321) (0.122) (0.166) (0.163)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.188*** 0.0049 0.0047 0.0144 0.737*** -0.553 -0.597 -0.535
(0.0572) (0.122) (0.124) (0.123) (0.0418) (0.345) (0.485) (0.481)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.0192 0.0372 0.0347 0.0314 0.0709*** -0.0176 -0.0213 -0.0199
(0.0379) (0.047) (0.0479) (0.0473) (0.0261) (0.0623) (0.0678) (0.0676)
Divestiture Program -0.111*** 0.0171 0.024 0.0389 -0.036 0.0508 0.052 0.0642
(0.039) (0.0533) (0.0531) (0.0529) (0.0286) (0.056) (0.0574) (0.0572)
Lambda -1.039* -1.121 -1.025
(0.630) (0.885) (0.876)
Constant 2.685*** 3.240*** 3.177*** 3.181*** -2.993*** 5.492*** 5.684*** 5.472***
(0.320) (0.253) (0.282) (0.270) (0.510) (1.333) (1.979) (1.952)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 14,519 5,035 5,035 5,035 16,305 5,035 5,035 5,035
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 22: Summary of Results 
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4.8 FIGURES  
Figure 25: Model Schematic of Banker-Based Hypotheses 
  
 
Figure 26: Model Schematic of Buyer-Based Hypotheses 
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Figure 27: Partial Derivative of Divestiture Performance with Respect to Firm Divestiture Experience vs. Bank Divestiture Experience. Includes 
only significant terms. 
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Figure 28: Divestiture Performance vs. Firm Divestiture Experience for Different Levels of Banker Divestiture Experience. Includes only 
significant terms. 
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Figure 29: Contour Plot for Hypothesis 2 Discussion (Banker Models). Includes only significant terms. 
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Figure 30: Divestiture Performance vs. Firm Divestiture Experience for High/Low Buyer Divestiture Experience. Includes only significant terms.  
 
  184 
 
4.9 APPENDIX 
Table 23: Examples of Regression Results Using Full Sample versus CEM Sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable:
Full Sample CEM Sample Full Sample CEM Sample Full Sample CEM Sample
Firm Divestiture Experience 0.0002** 0.0001 -0.011*** -0.0154*** -0.004*** -0.0045*
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.004) (0.0042) (0.0015) (0.0025)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0041*** -0.0044*** -0.0381** -0.0594* 0.149*** 0.179***
(0.0006) (0.001) (0.0184) (0.0333) (0.0126) (0.0208)
Negative Net Income 0.0059*** 0.0052 -0.188*** -0.244* -0.0313 0.023
(0.0018) (0.0043) (0.0643) (0.125) (0.0424) (0.0716)
Leverage 0.305** -0.0159 -0.574*** -0.715***
(0.127) (0.253) (0.106) (0.159)
Tobin's q -0.0034 -0.028 0.0292 0.036
(0.0035) (0.0178) (0.0251) (0.0313)
Return on Equity -0.000 0.000 0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0034 0.006
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0044) (0.0066) (0.0158)
Herfindahl Index -0.0036 -0.0083** -0.0943 -0.202 -0.138** 0.0487
(0.0023) (0.0041) (0.103) (0.173) (0.0598) (0.0872)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio -0.404*** -0.331** 0.817*** 1.043***
(0.0691) (0.137) (0.047) (0.0851)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.0022 0.0002 0.369*** 0.424*** 0.188*** 0.210**
(0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0749) (0.135) (0.0572) (0.0883)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.0012 0.0013 -0.193*** -0.227** 0.0192 -0.143**
(0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0624) (0.110) (0.0379) (0.0567)
Divestiture Program -0.0007 0.0005 0.791*** 0.826*** -0.111*** -0.101*
(0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0709) (0.120) (0.039) (0.0594)
Constant 0.0176 -0.0035 2.224* 3.025*** 2.438*** -19.230
(0.0215) (0.0109) (1.146) (0.643) (0.321) (78.310)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 29,230 5,561 16,260 5,250 14,519 4,715
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
CAR (OLS) Completion (Logit) Duration (Negative Binomial)
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Table 24: Heckman Model - OLS Regression Results for Announcement Date CAR, Continuous Variable Version of Buyer Models 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Heckman 1st Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable: CAR CAR CAR CAR Buyer Flag CAR CAR CAR
Near International Hub -0.041**
(0.0193)
Exchange Rate Index 0.007***
(0.0016)
Firm Divestiture Experience 0.0002** 0.0002 0.0002* -0.0021** -0.000 -0.000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Buyer Divestiture Experience 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Firm X Buyer Divestiture Experience -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0041*** -0.004*** -0.0045*** -0.0046*** 0.0662*** 0.0016 0.0023 0.0022
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0055) (0.0019) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Negative Net Income 0.0059*** 0.0099*** 0.0096*** 0.0096*** -0.0707*** 0.0029 0.0023 0.0023
(0.0018) (0.003) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0192) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Return on Equity -0.000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0021*** 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0003**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Herfindahl Index -0.0036 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0436 0.004 0.0044 0.0045
(0.0023) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0305) (0.004) (0.0045) (0.0045)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.0022 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.0069*** 0.583*** 0.0632*** 0.0684** 0.0684**
(0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.026) (0.0222) (0.0319) (0.0319)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.0012 -0.001 -0.0007 -0.0008 0.0701*** 0.0058 0.0064 0.0064
(0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0188) (0.004) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Divestiture Program -0.0007 -0.0025 -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0202 -0.0051* -0.0052* -0.0053*
(0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0203) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Lambda 0.129** 0.141* 0.141*
(0.051) (0.0738) (0.0738)
Constant 0.0134 0.046** 0.0511** 0.0515** -2.845*** -0.223** -0.249 -0.249
(0.0214) (0.0226) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.303) (0.107) (0.157) (0.157)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.018 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.036
Number of Observations 29,230 8,655 8,655 8,655 34,633 8,655 8,655 8,655
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 25: Heckman Model - Logit Regression Results for Completion, Continuous Variable Version of Buyer Models 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Heckman 1st Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable: Completion Completion Completion Completion Buyer Flag Completion Completion Completion
Near International Hub -0.0661**
(0.0257)
Exchange Rate Index 0.0064***
(0.0023)
Firm Divestiture Experience -0.011*** -0.0187*** -0.0132* -0.003*** -0.0227*** -0.0169**
(0.004) (0.0058) (0.0068) (0.001) (0.0074) (0.0083)
Buyer Divestiture Experience -0.0075 -0.0072 0.0005 -0.0074 -0.0072 0.0005
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0052)
Firm X Buyer Divestiture Experience -0.0007*** -0.0007***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0381** -0.0337 0.0118 0.0097 0.109*** -0.179* 0.141 0.126
(0.0184) (0.0307) (0.0337) (0.0336) (0.0082) (0.0979) (0.141) (0.140)
Negative Net Income -0.188*** -0.120 -0.0962 -0.101 -0.0188 -0.0823 -0.122 -0.125
(0.0643) (0.108) (0.109) (0.110) (0.0279) (0.111) (0.113) (0.113)
Leverage 0.305** -0.0888 -0.144 -0.135 -0.470*** 0.551 -0.685 -0.624
(0.127) (0.247) (0.235) (0.237) (0.0585) (0.514) (0.626) (0.625)
Tobin's q -0.0034 0.0123 0.0153 0.0162 0.0059** 0.0058 0.0212 0.0215
(0.0035) (0.028) (0.0286) (0.029) (0.0028) (0.0282) (0.0297) (0.0301)
Return on Equity 0.0003 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013 0.0026** -0.0019 0.0038 0.0036
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.003) (0.0029)
Herfindahl Index -0.0943 -0.386** -0.396** -0.393** 0.0371 -0.445** -0.351* -0.352*
(0.103) (0.177) (0.182) (0.182) (0.0417) (0.185) (0.191) (0.191)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio -0.404*** -0.0808 -0.0327 -0.0388 0.255*** -0.424 0.260 0.225
(0.0691) (0.127) (0.129) (0.129) (0.0321) (0.262) (0.343) (0.341)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.369*** 0.488*** 0.490*** 0.469*** 0.737*** -0.616 1.397 1.288
(0.0749) (0.170) (0.170) (0.171) (0.0418) (0.755) (0.998) (0.990)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness -0.193*** -0.262** -0.280** -0.284** 0.0709*** -0.372*** -0.193 -0.206
(0.0624) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.0261) (0.128) (0.142) (0.142)
Divestiture Program 0.791*** 0.659*** 0.749*** 0.732*** -0.036 0.736*** 0.705*** 0.692***
(0.0709) (0.114) (0.119) (0.120) (0.0286) (0.121) (0.126) (0.127)
Lambda -2.045 1.685 1.520
(1.340) (1.787) (1.774)
Constant 1.366 -0.613 -1.062 -1.019 -2.993*** 3.963 -4.915 -4.496
(1.145) (1.222) (1.211) (1.213) (0.510) (3.221) (4.306) (4.273)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 16,260 5,556 5,556 5,556 16,305 5,556 5,556 5,556
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
  187 
 
Table 26: Heckman Model – Negative Binomial Regression Results for Duration, Continuous Variable Version of Buyer Models 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Pre-Heckman Heckman 1st Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage Heckman 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable: Duration Duration Duration Duration Buyer Flag Duration Duration Duration
Near International Hub -0.0661**
(0.0257)
Exchange Rate Index 0.0064***
(0.0023)
Firm Divestiture Experience -0.004*** -0.0023 -0.0038 -0.003*** 0.0003 -0.0012
(0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.001) (0.0029) (0.0033)
Buyer Divestiture Experience 0.004* 0.0041* 0.0016 0.004* 0.004* 0.0014
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.003) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.003)
Firm X Buyer Divestiture Experience 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003)
ln(Total Assets) 0.149*** 0.112*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.109*** 0.0383 0.0342 0.0361
(0.0126) (0.0156) (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0082) (0.044) (0.0683) (0.068)
Negative Net Income -0.0313 -0.111** -0.110** -0.110** -0.0188 -0.0952* -0.0946* -0.0951*
(0.0424) (0.0524) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0279) (0.054) (0.0544) (0.0543)
Leverage -0.574*** -0.375*** -0.370*** -0.376*** -0.470*** -0.0339 -0.0189 -0.0285
(0.106) (0.120) (0.124) (0.120) (0.0585) (0.251) (0.311) (0.310)
Tobin's q 0.0292 -0.0033 -0.002 -0.0036 0.0059** -0.0065 -0.0068 -0.008
(0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0308) (0.0233) (0.0028) (0.0266) (0.0264) (0.0204)
Return on Equity -0.0034 -0.0079*** -0.0079*** -0.0078*** 0.0026** -0.0094*** -0.0094*** -0.0094***
(0.0066) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0011) (0.0029) (0.003) (0.003)
Herfindahl Index -0.138** 0.064 0.0652 0.0672 0.0371 0.0386 0.0373 0.0395
(0.0598) (0.0711) (0.071) (0.0708) (0.0417) (0.072) (0.0746) (0.0743)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio 0.817*** 0.764*** 0.770*** 0.772*** 0.255*** 0.588*** 0.579*** 0.585***
(0.047) (0.062) (0.0626) (0.0622) (0.0321) (0.121) (0.164) (0.163)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.188*** 0.0084 0.0082 0.0153 0.737*** -0.553 -0.579 -0.564
(0.0572) (0.122) (0.123) (0.121) (0.0418) (0.347) (0.483) (0.480)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.0192 0.0361 0.0334 0.0329 0.0709*** -0.0191 -0.0213 -0.0211
(0.0379) (0.0468) (0.0475) (0.0472) (0.0261) (0.0622) (0.068) (0.068)
Divestiture Program -0.111*** 0.0173 0.0245 0.0275 -0.036 0.0511 0.0518 0.0543
(0.039) (0.053) (0.0529) (0.053) (0.0286) (0.0558) (0.0572) (0.0573)
Lambda -1.047* -1.095 -1.080
(0.631) (0.881) (0.878)
Constant 2.685*** 3.273*** 3.207*** 3.190*** -2.993*** 5.541*** 5.652*** 5.602***
(0.320) (0.247) (0.272) (0.264) (0.510) (1.337) (1.963) (1.952)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 14,519 5,035 5,035 5,035 16,305 5,035 5,035 5,035
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 27: OLS Regression Results for Announcement Date CAR, Combined Banker and Buyer Model 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Dependent Variable: CAR
Firm Divestiture Experience 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002* -0.000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.000 0.0001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Banker Divestiture Experience 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.0001** 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.0001** 0.000 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Buyer Divestiture Experience 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.001* 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004* 0.001* 0.0004 0.001* 0.0011* 0.0011*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Firm X Banker Divestiture Experience -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm X Buyer Divestiture Experience -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Banker X Buyer Divestiture Experience -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0041*** -0.0047*** -0.004*** -0.0051*** -0.0051*** -0.0045*** -0.0046*** -0.004*** -0.0041*** -0.0039** -0.0039** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004**
(0.0006) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Negative Net Income 0.0059*** 0.0086*** 0.0099*** 0.0085*** 0.0085*** 0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0116** 0.0117** 0.0117** 0.0117** 0.0116** 0.0118** 0.0116** 0.0118** 0.0117** 0.0117**
(0.0018) (0.0033) (0.003) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052)
Return on Equity -0.000 0.0004*** 0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Herfindahl Index -0.0036 -0.010** -0.0002 -0.010** -0.010** -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0091 -0.0091 -0.0092 -0.0091 -0.0089 -0.0091 -0.0089 -0.0091 -0.009 -0.009
(0.0023) (0.0044) (0.0036) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.0022 0.0047 0.007*** 0.0048 0.0049 0.007*** 0.0069*** 0.0081* 0.0082* 0.0081* 0.0081* 0.0077 0.0083* 0.0077 0.0082* 0.0079* 0.0079*
(0.0014) (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.0012 -0.0012 -0.001 -0.0011 -0.001 -0.0007 -0.0008 0.0043 0.0042 0.0043 0.0043 0.0042 0.0042 0.0042 0.0042 0.0042 0.0042
(0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058)
Divestiture Program -0.0007 -0.0041 -0.0025 -0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0062 -0.0064 -0.0061 -0.0062 -0.0064 -0.0063 -0.0065 -0.0064 -0.0066 -0.0066
(0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0052)
Constant 0.0134 0.0242 0.046** 0.0266 0.0261 0.0511** 0.0515** 0.0522*** 0.0494*** 0.0509*** 0.0508*** 0.053*** 0.0485*** 0.053*** 0.0484*** 0.0503*** 0.0503***
(0.0214) (0.023) (0.0226) (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.016) (0.0163) (0.016) (0.0161) (0.0161)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.018 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.069 0.070 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.069 0.070 0.071 0.071
Number of Observations 29,230 7,762 8,655 7,762 7,762 8,655 8,655 2,588 2,588 2,588 2,588 2,588 2,588 2,588 2,588 2,588 2,588
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 28: OLS Regression Results for Completion, Combined Banker and Buyer Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Dependent Variable:  Completion (OLS)
Firm Divestiture Experience -0.001** -0.0008** 0.0005 -0.0016** -0.0012* -0.0013** 0.0005 -0.0013** -0.0013** 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0013** 0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0009)
Banker Divestiture Experience -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.0001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Buyer Divestiture Experience -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.000 -0.0006 -0.002 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.002 -0.0007 -0.0021 -0.002 -0.0021
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Firm X Banker Divestiture Experience -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm X Buyer Divestiture Experience -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Banker X Buyer Divestiture Experience 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0037** -0.007*** -0.0035 -0.0044* -0.005* 0.0007 0.0004 -0.0075** -0.0074** -0.0033 -0.0042 -0.0033 -0.0032 -0.0042 -0.0041 -0.0032 -0.0041
(0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Negative Net Income -0.0185*** -0.0032 -0.0112 -0.0024 -0.0021 -0.0091 -0.009 0.006 0.0058 0.0079 0.0081 0.0079 0.0077 0.0081 0.0079 0.0077 0.0079
(0.0061) (0.0077) (0.0101) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.012) (0.0121)
Leverage 0.0322** 0.0356* -0.0126 0.0374* 0.0366* -0.0138 -0.0126 0.0298 0.0286 0.0301 0.0283 0.0299 0.029 0.0279 0.027 0.0289 0.0267
(0.0126) (0.0202) (0.0232) (0.0203) (0.0201) (0.023) (0.023) (0.0342) (0.0341) (0.0333) (0.0332) (0.0334) (0.0332) (0.0333) (0.0331) (0.0332) (0.0332)
Tobin's q -0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0071* 0.0072** 0.0077** 0.0072** 0.0077** 0.0078** 0.0072* 0.0073** 0.0078** 0.0073**
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0036)
Return on Equity 0.000 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Herfindahl Index -0.0094 -0.0148* -0.0336** -0.0149* -0.0153* -0.0336** -0.0334** -0.0167 -0.0165 -0.0175 -0.0178 -0.0175 -0.0172 -0.0178 -0.0175 -0.0172 -0.0175
(0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0154) (0.009) (0.009) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0135)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio -0.0465*** -0.0568*** -0.0072 -0.0554*** -0.0556*** -0.0037 -0.0047 -0.0388** -0.0394** -0.0358** -0.0356** -0.0357** -0.0364** -0.0353** -0.0362** -0.0363** -0.036**
(0.0084) (0.0114) (0.0136) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0166) (0.0166)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.0348*** -0.0066 0.0457** -0.0076 -0.006 0.0459** 0.0453** -0.0103 -0.0105 -0.0094 -0.0091 -0.0094 -0.0096 -0.0091 -0.0093 -0.0096 -0.0093
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0186) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0164)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness -0.0197*** -0.0124* -0.0243** -0.0137* -0.0133* -0.0262** -0.0262** -0.0319** -0.0316** -0.0331*** -0.0333*** -0.0331*** -0.0327*** -0.0333*** -0.0329*** -0.0327*** -0.0329***
(0.0061) (0.0076) (0.0104) (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124)
Divestiture Program 0.071*** 0.0234*** 0.0627*** 0.0253*** 0.0251*** 0.068*** 0.0669*** 0.018 0.0182 0.0215* 0.020* 0.0216* 0.0217* 0.0202* 0.0203* 0.0218* 0.0204*
(0.0063) (0.0074) (0.0108) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121)
Constant 0.812*** 1.058*** 0.446 1.038*** 1.036*** 0.407 0.409 1.093*** 1.098*** 1.051*** 1.050*** 1.050*** 1.055*** 1.049*** 1.055*** 1.055*** 1.055***
(0.103) (0.0333) (0.330) (0.0352) (0.0342) (0.327) (0.328) (0.050) (0.0504) (0.053) (0.053) (0.0531) (0.0532) (0.053) (0.0532) (0.0533) (0.0533)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.054 0.055 0.069 0.056 0.058 0.071 0.072 0.086 0.087 0.088 0.090 0.088 0.089 0.090 0.091 0.089 0.091
Number of Observations 16,316 5,874 5,656 5,874 5,874 5,656 5,656 2,238 2,238 2,238 2,238 2,238 2,238 2,238 2,238 2,238 2,238
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 29: Negative Binomial Regression Results for Duration, Combined Banker and Buyer Model 
  
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
Dependent Variable: Duration
Firm Divestiture Experience -0.004*** 0.0004 -0.007** -0.0023 -0.0038 0.0016 -0.0065* 0.0019 0.0016 -0.0064* -0.0065* 0.0019 -0.0064*
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0033)
Banker Divestiture Experience 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0009*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0009*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0012*** 0.0009***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Buyer Divestiture Experience 0.004* 0.0041* 0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.001 -0.0017 -0.001 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0011
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.003) (0.0018) (0.0053) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0053) (0.0023) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053)
Firm X Banker Divestiture Experience 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm X Buyer Divestiture Experience 0.0002 -0.000 -0.0001 -0.000 -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Banker X Buyer Divestiture Experience 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Total Assets) 0.149*** 0.115*** 0.112*** 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.113*** 0.118*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.113*** 0.117***
(0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0156) (0.0139) (0.014) (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0192) (0.0193) (0.0192) (0.0193) (0.0193)
Negative Net Income -0.0313 -0.0267 -0.111** -0.0269 -0.026 -0.110** -0.110** -0.125** -0.125** -0.126** -0.127** -0.126** -0.126** -0.127** -0.127** -0.126** -0.127**
(0.0424) (0.0395) (0.0524) (0.0395) (0.0395) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0539) (0.054) (0.0539) (0.054) (0.0539) (0.054) (0.054) (0.0541) (0.054) (0.0541)
Leverage -0.574*** -0.533*** -0.375*** -0.534*** -0.527*** -0.370*** -0.376*** -0.548*** -0.548*** -0.553*** -0.540*** -0.551*** -0.553*** -0.537*** -0.540*** -0.551*** -0.537***
(0.106) (0.101) (0.120) (0.101) (0.103) (0.124) (0.120) (0.131) (0.131) (0.132) (0.133) (0.132) (0.132) (0.133) (0.133) (0.132) (0.133)
Tobin's q 0.0292 0.0203 -0.0033 0.0201 0.0216 -0.002 -0.0036 0.0832*** 0.0833*** 0.0816*** 0.0846*** 0.082*** 0.0816*** 0.0853*** 0.0846*** 0.0821*** 0.0853***
(0.0251) (0.0208) (0.0252) (0.0205) (0.0228) (0.0308) (0.0233) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0224) (0.0227) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0228) (0.0227) (0.0224) (0.0228)
Return on Equity -0.0034 0.0021 -0.0079*** 0.0021 0.0021 -0.0079*** -0.0078*** -0.0115 -0.0115 -0.0116 -0.0115 -0.0116 -0.0116 -0.0115 -0.0115 -0.0116 -0.0115
(0.0066) (0.0076) (0.0027) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0095)
Herfindahl Index -0.138** -0.120** 0.064 -0.120** -0.123** 0.0652 0.0672 -0.026 -0.0261 -0.0265 -0.0297 -0.0262 -0.0265 -0.0295 -0.0296 -0.0264 -0.0295
(0.0598) (0.0579) (0.0711) (0.0579) (0.058) (0.071) (0.0708) (0.0766) (0.0766) (0.0767) (0.0765) (0.0767) (0.0766) (0.0765) (0.0764) (0.0766) (0.0764)
Unit-Parent Size Ratio 0.817*** 0.599*** 0.764*** 0.598*** 0.597*** 0.770*** 0.772*** 0.736*** 0.736*** 0.731*** 0.730*** 0.730*** 0.731*** 0.729*** 0.730*** 0.730*** 0.729***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.062) (0.048) (0.048) (0.0626) (0.0622) (0.0643) (0.0644) (0.0644) (0.0647) (0.0646) (0.0645) (0.0649) (0.0648) (0.0647) (0.065)
Unit-Parent Geographic Relatedness 0.188*** 0.371*** 0.0084 0.372*** 0.362*** 0.0082 0.0153 0.0432 0.0431 0.0408 0.0397 0.0403 0.0408 0.0389 0.0397 0.0402 0.0388
(0.0572) (0.0507) (0.122) (0.0507) (0.051) (0.123) (0.121) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114)
Unit-Parent Industrial Relatedness 0.0192 0.0988*** 0.0361 0.0993*** 0.0986*** 0.0334 0.0329 0.0184 0.0185 0.0205 0.0221 0.0205 0.0206 0.0222 0.0221 0.0207 0.0223
(0.0379) (0.0363) (0.0468) (0.0364) (0.0365) (0.0475) (0.0472) (0.0506) (0.0506) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Divestiture Program -0.111*** -0.0903** 0.0173 -0.0912** -0.088** 0.0245 0.0275 -0.0337 -0.0337 -0.0374 -0.0302 -0.0385 -0.0373 -0.0315 -0.0302 -0.0385 -0.0315
(0.039) (0.0412) (0.053) (0.0415) (0.0413) (0.0529) (0.053) (0.0551) (0.0551) (0.0553) (0.0551) (0.0553) (0.0553) (0.0551) (0.0551) (0.0553) (0.0551)
Constant 2.685*** 2.839*** 3.273*** 2.848*** 2.864*** 3.207*** 3.190*** 3.044*** 3.044*** 3.102*** 3.092*** 3.105*** 3.103*** 3.095*** 3.091*** 3.106*** 3.096***
(0.320) (0.372) (0.247) (0.373) (0.361) (0.272) (0.264) (0.231) (0.233) (0.260) (0.260) (0.260) (0.262) (0.260) (0.262) (0.262) (0.262)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 14,519 5,566 5,035 5,566 5,566 5,035 5,035 2,121 2,121 2,121 2,121 2,121 2,121 2,121 2,121 2,121 2,121
Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Figure 31: Partial Derivative of Divestiture Performance with Respect to Firm Divestiture Experience vs. Banker Divestiture Experience. Includes 
all terms (significant and insignificant).    
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Figure 32: Divestiture Performance vs. Firm Divestiture Experience for Different Levels of Banker Divestiture Experience Includes all terms 
(significant and insignificant). 
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Figure 33: Contour Plot for Hypothesis 2 Discussion (Banker Models). Includes all terms (significant and insignificant). 
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Figure 34: Divestiture Performance vs. Firm Divestiture Experience for High/Low Buyer Divestiture Experience. Includes all terms (significant 
and insignificant). 
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5 CONCLUSION 
The objective of this dissertation was to examine whether and, if so, how firms learn to 
achieve superior divestiture performance.  The viability and efficacy of three major learning 
processes – first-hand experience accumulation, internal experience transfer, and external 
experience transfer – were investigated in the context of divestiture.  From this platform, this 
dissertation yields new insights into the potential (and limitations) of firm learning as a source of 
competitive advantage and, at the same time, advances our understanding of corporate divestiture.  
Importantly, in making progress on these fronts, this research further speaks to several vibrant 
conversations in strategic management: firm scope, the market for corporate control, and firm 
capability development.  In this concluding section, the specific contributions and broad 
implications of this dissertation are discussed, followed by recommendations for future research. 
5.1 Contributions 
This dissertation began with an examination of whether and how the firm’s own first-
hand divestiture experience may impact its divestiture performance.  In contrast to prior research 
dedicated to unpacking the experience-performance link in the context of scope expansion, 
consideration of the potential value of direct experience accumulation in the context of scope 
reduction has been comparatively underexplored.  The inconsistent empirical results of these 
earlier studies do, however, serve to starkly illustrate the reality that “experience is often a poor 
teacher” (Levinthal & March 1993, pg. 98), and, consequently, that the issue of whether and how 
firms learn is not clear-cut.  As a result, an underpinning premise of this research was the 
recognition that consideration of the “whether” is just as interesting – and just as crucial – as the 
“how” when examining divestiture experience as a possible source of firm performance 
heterogeneity.  In an effort to make headway on this stubborn, two-pronged question of firm 
learning, a process-oriented approach was taken in this dissertation. A collection of six divestiture 
process performance measures was developed and used accordingly. Considering the potential 
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relationship between experience and performance at the process level, and doing so quantitatively 
in a large sample, is a fresh approach that proved to be valuable in deciphering this relationship’s 
complexities.  Notably, while divestiture experience was found to benefit performance for most 
of the process performance measures identified, it was also found to impair the likelihood of 
divestiture deal completion.  One interpretation of this finding is that the presence of this negative 
relationship between divestiture experience and completion evidences mis-learning on behalf of 
the firm, and thus poses a tradeoff for firms aiming to gain from the positive benefits of learning 
demonstrated in other aspects of process performance.  Another interpretation suggests that deal 
completion is measuring something different than what was originally believed.  Indeed, this 
result may be surfacing the market savviness of experienced firms – sellers who are able to 
engage in a unbiased appraisal of the value of their business units will know when walking away 
from a deal is the best choice.            
Building upon this foundation, the potential for firm learning through internal experience 
transfer was next investigated, focusing specifically on whether and how a firm’s acquisition 
experience may impact its divestiture performance.  Thus, this dissertation considered the 
important case of activity-to-activity internal experience transfer, wherein the firm’s experience 
in one activity is applied to its execution of another.  Considering such activity-to-activity internal 
experience transfer complements and extends the more typically considered case of context-to-
context internal experience transfer, wherein the firm applies its experience in a particular activity 
in one context to another, different, context (e.g. the firm transfers its acquisition experience in 
one industry to another, or in one country to another).  Furthermore, in addressing such activity-
to-activity, or acquisition-to-divestiture, internal experience transfer, this research offers a more 
realistic representation of the firm’s learning environment.  A firm’s activities do not occur in 
isolation -- they are comingled, and thus the firm’s learning processes may be comingled as well.  
In an aim to comprehensively represent and analyze the full potential of acquisition experience 
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transfer on divestiture performance, two avenues for experience transfer were considered: direct 
and moderating.   In the first, the firm’s acquisition experience is directly applied to its execution 
of divestiture.  This path represents the question of whether a firm’s learning how to acquire 
directly impacts its execution of divestiture.  Prior studies of internal experience transfer in 
corporate development mainly focus on this direct path alone.  This dissertation widens the 
examination to consider a second, moderating, avenue for transfer, in which the transfer of the 
firm’s acquisition experience moderates the relationship between the firm’s divestiture experience 
and its divestiture performance.  This path for transfer surfaces the issue of whether a firm’s 
learning how to acquire influences its ability to learn how to divest from its own divestiture 
experience.  The results of this dissertation demonstrate, for the first time, the viability of both 
paths of internal experience transfer.  Furthermore, the possibility for curvilinear relationships in 
both the direct and moderating paths to transfer was explored and confirmed, thereby offering a 
novel view of the double-edged nature of experience and its efficacy in internal experience 
transfer.     
Lastly, the lens of analysis was turned from inside the firm to outside its boundaries, and 
the potential for an external experience transfer process in divestiture was explored.  In this case, 
the firm sources divestiture experience from outside of the firm.  This dissertation investigated 
whether and how such externally-sourced divestiture experience impacts firm divestiture 
performance.  Two major categories of exchange partners were considered: advisors (represented 
by investment banks) and competitors (represented by the acquiring buyers). Exchange partners 
can serve as important sources from which firms may obtain external experience.  But, as the 
roles of these exchange partners vary, so too can their motivations as they engage with the firm.  
A premise of this dissertation was that such differences may hold consequences for the way in 
which their experience is transferred to the firm, as well as for the manner in which this external 
experience impacts firm performance.  This dissertation’s  divestiture setting allowed for not only 
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the study of these two important classes of exchange partners, but it allowed for their 
consideration in the context of one of the most common types of relationships that firms have 
with outside parties – relationships that are non-learning focused (here, the focus is to execute a 
divestiture), are temporary (terminating at the divestiture’s completion, with no guarantees of 
repeated exchange going forward), and are characterized by substantial engagement between the 
exchange partners (in divestiture, the selling firm typically has extensive and intensive 
interactions with both its investment bank and its competitor).  Thus, in considering these types of 
exchange partners, and this type of exchange relationship, this dissertation assesses the potential 
for external experience transfer in a context that represents the vast majority of firm relationships 
– these are commonplace relationships, but ones that are central to the firm’s activities – and 
probes the divestiture learning ramifications due to differences in the divestiture experience 
source.  Notably, the results of this dissertation demonstrated that, when external experience 
transfer does occur, it is remarkably effective – it has an outsize effect on firm divestiture 
performance, oftentimes superseding the impact of the firm’s own divestiture experience, 
irrespective of which of the two types of sources was considered.  While the results showed that 
the activation of learning transfer varies with the source of the experience, the results also 
demonstrated that when a certain transfer path is present for both types of sources (the investment 
banks and the buyers), the performance-enhancing (or performance-impairing) effect of that 
external transfer on divestiture performance is the same, regardless of the source.  Given that the 
underpinning motivations of bankers and buyers involved in divestiture transactions differ, this 
consistency in outcome is notable.  As such, I find that the performance impact of external 
experience transfer often runs counter to theoretical predictions and managerial expectations. 
Taken together, the insights gleaned from examining the triad of first-hand experience 
accumulation, internal experience transfer, and external experience transfer make great headway 
in unraveling the issue at the heart of this dissertation: whether and how firms learn to achieve 
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superior divestiture performance.  Stated succinctly, this dissertation demonstrates that firms can 
learn to divest through their own divestiture experience, but experience transfer can have greater 
impact.  However, this dissertation also shows that experience can hurt, as well as help, the firm’s 
divestiture performance.  
Embedded within this overall takeaway are three key insights.  First, these learning 
processes are complex.  Using a variety of performance variables that tracked to the divestiture 
process itself, and which reflected how divestiture is evaluated by managers in practice, was a 
key catalyst for revealing this complexity.  Without this nuanced -- but realistic -- view, we would 
be in peril of having an incomplete and inaccurate view of learning in divestiture.  Second, 
managerial tradeoffs are pervasive throughout these learning processes.  The double-edged nature 
of experience was evidenced throughout -- in the set of different types of performance measures, 
within the firm’s accumulation of experience, and across the different types and sources of 
experience.  Third, the learning paths available to the firm vary dramatically in their viability and 
efficacy, and often in opposition to expectations.  In providing a more comprehensive and clearer 
view of firm learning than previously available, this dissertation can serve as valuable tool for 
firms aiming to develop a divestiture learning strategy, as its insights can help firms to identify 
and capitalize upon their own best opportunities for leveraging learning in achieving superior 
divestiture performance. 
5.2 Implications 
In addition to the specific contributions described above, this dissertation offers important 
implications for three areas of keen interest in strategic management:  firm scope, the market for 
corporate control, and firm capability development. 
5.2.1 Firm Scope 
Firm scope has long been an important focus in strategic management research, starting 
with the earliest work on diversification and performance.  Considering scope-changing 
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transactions provides a complementary view, offering additional research questions and 
identifying new opportunities for relating value creation to firm scope.  When examining the 
firm’s boundary-changing moves, prior research has typically emphasized transactions that 
enable scope expansion, such as acquisitions and alliances.  Such an emphasis is fully in keeping 
with the resource-based view, which has been the primary lens informing the relationship of 
scope with performance, and its premise that diversification is driven by a firm’s need to expand 
into adjacent areas to appropriate more value from its indivisible, and thus underutilized, 
resources.   
Through its focused and comprehensive examination of divestiture, along with its 
consideration of the interrelationship between acquisition and divestiture, this dissertation helps 
to elucidate the inveterate role of divestiture in scope change and its crucial role in value creation 
from firm diversification.  Indeed, firm scope is necessarily dynamic; it must not only expand, but 
also contract to meet the evolving strategic demands of the firm.  This dissertation illuminates the 
point that conversations around firm scope change must not be dominated solely by growth.  
Divestiture is a valuable and necessary partner with acquisition for creating value from the firm’s 
scope-changing moves. 
5.2.2 The Market for Corporate Control 
This dissertation also holds implications for the market for corporate control.  In the 
market for corporate control, would-be acquirers aggressively search for targets vulnerable to 
takeover, using the poor performance of business units or their parent firms as a guide.  In this 
regard, the market for corporate control may serve as an external driver of the corporate 
divestitures that were of focus in this dissertation. 
For one, this dissertation sheds light on the properties of the market for corporate control.  
One view of the market for corporate control is that it is driven by the likes of activist investors, 
who use ownership of a small percentage of the firm as a toehold from which to instigate 
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corporate restructuring, and by private equity firms, who are motivated by their promised 
intentions to spend their investment funds on targets that will quickly benefit from restructuring 
within a five- to eight-year timeframe.  The findings of this dissertation encourage the expansion 
this perspective of the market for corporate control to include the “strategic corporates” – 
conventional firms of the type that were examined in this dissertation – as being active and 
willing participants in this market, rather than just as reluctant sellers whose hands were forced to 
redeploy their assets.   Indeed, this dissertation shows that these firms contribute to the market’s 
vibrancy as both buyers and sellers of assets.  This dissertation serves to evidence the fact that 
there are, indisputably, two sides to this market. Further, this dissertation underscores that process 
intermediaries like investment banks are a key feature of the market for corporate control, 
wherein they may serve to identify and match these buyers and sellers. 
For another, this dissertation sheds light on the functioning of the market for corporate 
control.  Notably, it illuminates the seemingly critical role that divestiture experience plays in 
ensuring smooth operations of this market.  The fact that participation of highly experienced 
divesting firms -- and the even more experienced investment banks -- corresponds with a 
reduction in the likelihood of deal completion suggests that assets are not being placed into this 
market recklessly – that “smart” firms and intermediaries are willing to pull back from a 
divestiture if they determine they cannot derive the necessary value expected from the 
transaction.   
This dissertation surfaces other aspects of the operations of the market for corporate 
control as well.  Some scholars have used an agency perspective through which to interpret this 
market.  Viewed through this lens, the market plays a disciplining role (such as via activist 
investors) to correct agency problems and ensure that firms are maximizing the value of their 
assets.  Other scholars use a perspective that sees the market as a clearinghouse that ensures 
optimal asset ownership.  Potential acquirers will bid only for those assets from which they feel 
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they can capture value. Through the bidding process, the market ensures that assets are placed 
with their “best” or most effective owner, as the highest bid that matches the buyer to the asset 
reflects the highest amount of acquirer confidence in realizing the value of the asset. This 
dissertation lends credence to both interpretations.  Firms divest at a loss and a gain relative fair 
value of the assets, which resonates with the agency view in the case of the former and 
clearinghouse view in the latter.     
5.2.3 Firm Capability Development 
This dissertation has important implications for our understanding of capability 
development in firms on several fronts.   On one front, this research establishes the potential for 
firm capability-building in an understudied aspect of scope change.  While prior studies have 
taught us much about capability development in the context of scope expansion, especially 
around acquisition capabilities and alliance capabilities, our understanding of capability 
development in the context of scope reduction has heretofore remained strikingly limited.  
Through its focused and comprehensive consideration of the divestiture process, this research 
soundly demonstrates the potential for firm divestiture capability development and illuminates the 
relationship between firm divestiture capability and performance. 
On a second front, this dissertation surfaces the role of concurrent learning and its 
implications for capability development in firms.  To date, with only a handful of exceptions, 
previous research has not addressed the possibility and ramifications of comingling between the 
firm’s learning processes.  This is in spite of the fact that many of the firm’s strategic activities, 
such as those pertaining to scope change, seldom occur in isolation in practice.  This dissertation 
explores concurrent learning in the context of acquisition and divestiture, and finds compelling 
evidence that suggests that these capability-building processes in firms are intertwined.  
Specifically, it is found that learning to acquire can impact not only divestiture performance, but, 
intriguingly, the divestiture learning process itself.  As such, this dissertation not only offers new 
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insights into concurrent learning, but serves as an important platform for further investigation of 
the comingling of capability development processes in firms.    
On a third front, this research advances our understanding of capability sourcing by 
firms.  Colloquially stated, firms are not superheroes.  While there are numerous domains in 
which firms may build capabilities and benefit from their deployment, firm’s bandwidth capacity 
to hone and master all such capabilities is constrained.  Indeed, an attempt to master all 
capabilities is likely an attempt to master none of them.  As such, the extent to which firms can 
outsource their capability development – to turn to external sources to borrow or buy capabilities 
– is an appealing, and likely necessary, option.  This dissertation demonstrates that capability 
outsourcing can be a powerful alternative in the divestiture context.  The results indicate that 
firms can not only outsource capabilities in a direct fashion (wherein the externally transferred 
capability is directly applied to the divestiture activity at hand), but that firms may also inject 
sourced capabilities into their own capability-building processes.  Thus, outsourced capabilities 
may serve as both replacement and supplement for a firm’s own capability development. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of transfer and outsized impact that external divestiture capability 
was shown to have on divestiture performance in this dissertation implies that outsourcing 
capabilities can be a powerful option for firms.  This in turn suggests that firms’ deliberate design 
of their capability portfolios, as to which capabilities to build and which to source, could be an 
important component of firm performance success.         
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
The contributions and implications of this dissertation suggest numerous intriguing 
avenues for future research.  For example, consideration of private equity firms could serve as a 
valuable setting from with to study firm learning in the context of corporate divestiture.  Private 
equity firms and strategic corporate firms are often found bidding against each other in the market 
for corporate control.  From a perspective of firm scope change, private equity firms “buy to sell” 
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assets, as opposed to the “buy to hold” approach of strategic corporates.  This, in turn, encourages 
private equity firms to treat acquisition and divestiture as a single, unified transaction, since 
private equity firms predicate their acquisitions with a clear view towards divestiture (or “exit”).  
Such a holistic approach to scope expansion and scope reduction could consequently hold 
meaningful insights around capability development in firms.     
As another example, widening the consideration of internal experience transfer to include 
more of the firm’s strategic activities, beyond just those of divestiture and acquisition, could 
prove very valuable in further deciphering the capability building process in firms.  Treating the 
full portfolio of the firm’s scope-expansion and scope-reduction activities could shed more light 
on how their associated learning and capability development processes may be intertwined.  
Pursuing this avenue of investigation may also allow for a greater understanding of which, and 
when, firm capability building in scope-changing activities may be successfully supplemented or 
replaced by externally-sourced capabilities.   
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